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An unusual document caughtJudge Allen Minker's eye as he sifted
through the mail on a chilly afternoon in late January 1986. The
document was an order from the Arizona Supreme Court. Minker, the
sole superior court judge in Arizona's small-sized Greenlee County
(population 11,400), rarely got orders from the Arizona Supreme
Court-especially ones directed specifically to him. Upon closer reading, Minker learned the supreme court had just appointed him as presiding judge of the Little Colorado River adjudication.
Minker, who had been on the bench for only a few years following
a predominately criminal law practice in the Tucson area, had not a
clue what the Little Colorado River adjudication was-much less why
the supreme court had appointed him as the presiding judge. The
case, docketed in another county, would require him to travel 350
miles roundtrip to hold hearings. Was he being rewarded or punished
by those justices down in Phoenix?
Over the next twelve years, Minker often pondered the same question as he attempted to steer a case that seemed always to have a life
and pace of its own. The supreme court assigned Minker to a general
stream adjudication, already underway for eight years, involving 3,000
parties who filed 11,000 claims to the scarce waters of a pitifully small
river system. So small indeed that the Little Colorado River itself could
be hurdled in many of its upper reaches and was often dry in many of
its lower stretches. However, the river basin itself is enormous, encom-
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passing most of northeastern Arizona and including the Navajo Indian
Reservation (largest in the United States), the Hopi Reservation (oldest continuously inhabited community in the United States), and several important national monuments (Painted Desert, Petrified Forest).
The parties themselves ranged from a "who's who" listing of Arizona
movers and shakers-Salt River Project, Arizona Public Service Co.,
Southern California Edison, Peabody Coal Co., Santa Fe Railroad,
Phelps Dodge Corporation, Stone Container Corporation, Aztec Land
& Cattle Company-to individual farmers, ranchers, and homeowners.
Throughout the years, as he learned water law, Indian law, hydrology, western history, techniques for managing complex cases, and settlement strategies, Minker also mulled another question often shared
by judges assigned to comparable stream adjudications in other parts
of the West: what is the reason for these cases?

A majority of the western states participate in general stream adjudications. Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and Washington are undertaking comprehensive, basin wide adjudications of water rights.
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah are
presently determining water rights on a more piecemeal basis, either
because they previously adjudicated most of their streams, or because
they deemed more expansive general adjudications unnecessary.
North Dakota has not attempted adjudication, and South Dakota and
Alaska have abandoned their efforts. Only Texas has completed statewide general stream adjudication; its success is due in large part to the
absence of federal and tribal lands in that state, which eliminates the
need to adjudicate the water rights associated with such holdings.
However, Texas grapples even more desperately with groundwater issues.
Modem general stream adjudications, most of which have been
filed since the 1970s, are characterized by their enormity and longevity.
These complex lawsuits are among the largest civil proceedings ever
litigated in state or federal courts. For instance, 28,500 persons have
filed more than 100,000 claims to water rights in the Arizona general
1. SeeALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.060, .065, .165- .169 (Michie 2004); ARIz. REv. STAT.
§§ 45-251 to -264 (West 2003); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-2900 (West 1971 &
Supp. 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1401 to 1428 (Michie 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-201 to -243(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
46-226 to -231 (2002); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.090-.320, 534.100 (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-13 to -19 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1997); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-15 to -20 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.6- .8 (West
1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 539.010-.350, 541.310-.320 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
46-10-1 to -13 (Michie 2004); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 111.301-.341 (Vernon 2000);

ANN.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
90.03.110-.245 (West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-301 to -331 (Michie 2003).
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stream adjudications.! Parties have filed over 150,000 claims for water
Also, in Montana, aprights in Idaho's Snake River adjudication.'
proximately 80,000 persons have filed 218,000 water rights claims in
the statewide adjudication.4
These proceedings are tied closely to state government, since the
state attorney general, state engineer, or water resources department
frequently files them under a specialized statute. These state agencies
remain active participants in the litigation: they propose decrees, generate technical reports, and supply other information to the court.
The participation of the federal government and Indian tribes, however, is the unique feature of modern general stream adjudications and
sets them apart from earlier water rights litigation. Federal agencies
and tribes prefer not to engage in these massive proceedings, so their
presence is most often involuntary.' The 1952 McCarran Amendment,'
known as "the Magna Carta of state water rights adjudication, " ' mandated their participation. With the McCarran Amendment, Congress
waived federal sovereign immunity whenever comprehensive stream
adjudications arise in state or federal court.'
Due to the McCarran Amendment, the federal government and
the Indian tribes became the most significant parties in most stream
adjudications. With federal land ownership exceeding 50 percent of
the landmass in seven western states alone, and tribal lands comprising
nearly 52 million acres, the water rights claims of these parties are
2. Arizona Supreme Court, Arizona's General Stream Adjudications: Overview of
at
Questions,
Asked
Frequently
Adjudications,
http://supreme.state.az.us/wm/bulletin/Overview.htm (last modified May 4, 2004).
3. Snake River Basin Adjudication, Informational Brochure, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.srba.state.id.us/DOC/BROCHI.HTM (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
4. WATER RIGHTS BUREAU, STATE OF MONTANA - DEP'T OF NATURAL RES. &
2004),
(Apr.
9-10
MONTANA
IN
RIGHTS
WATER
CONSERVATION,
http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/WaterRights/WaterRightsWeb. htm.
5. Both before and after the McCarran Amendment, the federal government
selectively brought water rights adjudications in troublesome western watersheds. In
the 1970s, however, as several western states moved toward beginning comprehensive
proceedings in state courts, the United States, both in its proprietary and trust capacities, filed federal court adjudications in an effort to secure what the federal government perceived to be a favorable judicial forum.
6. Act ofJuly 10, 1952, ch. 651, § 208, 66 Stat. 549, 560 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 666 (2000)).
7. A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finality in General Water Rights Adjudications, 25
IDAHO L. REV. 271,272 (1988-9).
8. The McCarran Amendment waived only the sovereign immunity of the United
States in comprehensive stream adjudications. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). While this waiver
put both the water rights of federal agencies and the water rights of tribes (held in
trust capacity by the United States) before the courts, tribal governments themselves
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In recent years, tribal governments
have frequently intervened in general stream adjudications in order to protect more
directly tribal water rights and, in the process, they have placed themselves under the
jurisdiction of the court.
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enormous. ' Consequently, in many stream adjudications, federal and
tribal parties are pitted against all other water claimants.
General stream adjudications have become a principal forum for
the clash of legal rights and values concerning water. Much is at stake;
general stream adjudications reflect the importance of water to the
residents of the western states. Since rainfall is unpredictable in many
parts of the West, water users rely on rivers and streams, as well as the
commonly interconnected groundwater with those rivers and streams.
These sources of water are critical to the fanning, ranching, and mining economies of the western states. Urban expansion and recreation
also depend on those sources. For many Indian tribes, water has provided spiritual sustenance along with promise of future economic development. Environmental advocates likewise seek to protect the riparian ecology of western watersheds. Since many western rivers are overappropriated, the battle intensifies.
I. THE WEST BEFORE GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS
More than one hundred years separate the first mining uses of water by the Forty-niners of the California mountains from the passage of
the federal McCarran Amendment in 1952, which made modern general stream adjudications possible. During this period, the West
changed fundamentally. The nature and extent of these changes are
evident from a study of western lands policy, demographics, Indian
policy, and the development of regional water law and institutions.
Many able historians have passed this way before us and we urge
the reader to refer to these scholars for a more comprehensive render0
We seek only to relate the context in which the
ing of western history."
9. The Public Land Law Review Commission described the impact of federal
landholdings upon western water in 1970, as follows:
Federal lands are the source of most of the water in the 11 coterminous westem states, providing approximately 61 percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region. Most of this runoff comes from land withdrawn or reserved for specific purposes. Forest Service and National Park Service reservations contribute about 88 and 8 percent, respectively, of the runoff from public lands and more than 59 percent of the total yield from all lands of those
states. Other public lands, such as the vast acreages administered by the Bureau of Land Management, do not contribute much to the overall yield of
western streams, but are so situated that they influence water quality.
U.S. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 141

(1970).
10.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS
(1983);PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF

THE AMERICAN WEST (1987); DONALD J. PISANI, To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER,
LAW, AND PUBLIC POICY, 1848-1902 (1992) [hereinafter 1 PISANI ]; DONAIDJ. PISANI,
WATER, LAND AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMrrs OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-1920 (1996)
[hereinafter 2 PISANI].
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adjudications of western rivers and streams began. Hence, we present
a profile of the West as it was when the first water rights adjudications
emerged in the hope of revealing some of the important reasons why
these cases arose.
A. ACQUIRING THE AMERICAN WEST
The acquisition of most of what we now know as the American West
came from the major European powers, who won these lands by conquest from the indigenous people. Mexico and Russia ceded the remainder of the western territory.
The first major western acquisition occurred when the United
States purchased the Louisiana Territory from France at the urging of
Thomas Jefferson in 1803. Napoleon offered the territory for sale to
fund France's military initiatives in Europe. The Louisiana Purchase
included over 523 million acres of land in what are now fourteen
states, including eight of the western states studied here (Montana,
Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado,
and Oklahoma)."
Texas, which gained its independence from Mexico in 1836,joined
the Union in 1845. In an effort to pay its own revolutionary war debt,
Texas sold 79 million acres of its territory to the federal government in
1850. " These lands later became parts of New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming.
The Oregon Compromise of 1846 averted a war with Great Britain,
and settled the northern American boundary. The Compromise also
brought another 181 million acres of Pacific Northwest Territory (now
part of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana) under the United
States' dominion. 3
The United States used less noble means to acquire territory from
its southern neighbor. In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
ended the Mexican-American War. Mexico agreed to recognize the
Rio Grande as the boundary between Texas and Mexico and consented
to sell almost 335 million acres to the United States.'4 These lands later
formed all or significant parts of California, Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.
With the 1853 Gadsden Purchase, the United States acquired an
additional 19 million acres from Mexico.'" This purchase added to the
New Mexico territory. As a result of the purchase of Alaska from Rus-

11.

PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAw REVIEW COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW

DEVELOPMENT 76, 86 (1968).
12. Id. at81-82.
13. Id. at 76, 86.
14. Id. at 83.
15. Id. at 86.
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sia in 1867, the United States annexed over 365 million more acres."
Alaska was also the last land acquisition to bring public land into the
United States. This purchase essentially completed the western land
base studied here.
All told, the Untied States fueled its drive westward by acquiring 1.7
billion acres of land west of the Mississippi River." Of course, the federal government would not keep all of this land for long.
B. GIVING THE LAND AWAY: THE HOMESTEAD MOVEMENT

Even as the United States was busy acquiring the western lands,
Congress enacted a series of measures to "privatize" or otherwise dispose of much of the public domain east of the Mississippi River. These
privatization measures included military land bounties for soldiers and
sailors who had served during the Revolutionary War, cash and credit
sales of land, special laws legalizing the practice of squatting to acquire
public lands, and a "preemption" program that allowed settlers to purchase up to 160 acres of land after living upon and improving it for
one year."
Congress disposed of other lands for public purposes. Most notable of these efforts was the Land Ordinance of 1785, which, in addition
to establishing the rectangular survey system that exists today, reserved
section 16 in every township "for the maintenance of public schools,
within said township."'" The Land Ordinance of 1785 became the
Morrill Act, which granted public lands to states so they could establish
colleges of agriculture and mechanical arts (this program was the land
grant college system). 0 Other land grants provided st-cs with a
source of funds for other permanent improvements, and divested the
federal government of some swamplands.
Although the California gold rush greatly heightened Americans'
interest in the West, the Civil War delayed public land disposal in the
region. Once the hostilities ended, settlement of the western public
domain began in earnest under the older statutes, as well as under new
legislation specifically fashioned by Congress to expedite western development.
Although federal assistance to railroads in the East existed as early
as 1835, development accelerated with major grants made in 1862 to
support transcontinental railroad constructionY. On each side of the
16.
17.

Id.
Id. See also SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K FAIRFAx, FOREST AND RANGE POLCY:
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DANA & FAMIFAx].
18. SeeGATES, supra note 11, at 121-284.
19. 28JouRNALs OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 378 (1785).
20. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
301-08 (1994)).
21.
GATES, supra note 11, at 357, 364.
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proposed track, the United States gave alternate sections of land to the
Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads, the companies that completed the transcontinental route in 1869. Eventually, the United
States granted more than 131 million acres from the public domain to
support railroad construction.' The United States conveyed almost 94
million acres directly to the railroad companies while the United States
conveyed the remaining 37 million acres to the states for the benefit of
the railroads."
Also in 1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act.2 ' The Act allowed any person older than twenty-one years of age to settle and cultivate up to 160 acres.' The statute contained numerous weaknesses,
however. For instance, its acreage allowances were too small to foster
productive farming in the arid West. For this and other reasons, lawmakers revised the homesteading program over the years. Eventually,
the United States patented 285 million acres under these laws. 6 Similar laws followed.
Among such legislation was the Timber Culture Act," which Congress passed in 1873. Before its repeal in 1891 (because its growth quotas were unrealistic in light of the West's arid climate), this law granted
160 acres of public land to any person who planted trees on forty acres
and kept them growing for ten years. " Other land grant legislation
included the 1877 Desert Land Sales Act.' The Act granted 640 acres
of land to anyone who agreed to irrigate otherwise unproductive land
within three years.' In addition, the Mining Act of 1866,1 Placer Act of
1870," and General Mining Act of 1872" created a system for locating
minerals on both public lands and the lands patented to prospectors.
Under these various auspices, the federal government gave away
over one billion acres, which constituted over 70 percent of the original public domain. Public lands scholar Sally K. Fairfax reports that of
this total, some 69 percent went to individuals and institutions, 22 percent to the states, and 9 percent to railroads. '
The divestiture of the public domain continued into the twentieth
century. Congress passed several acts that liberalized homestead poli22. Id. at 379.
23. Id. at 385, 805.
24. Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
25. Id.
26. DANA & FAiRFAX, supra note 17, at 24.
27. Timber Culture Act, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873).
28. Id.
29. Desert Land Sales Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 32123 (2000)).
30. Id.
31. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
32. Placer Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217.
33. General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91.
34. DANA & FAIRFAx, supra note 17, at 29.
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cies.5 Indeed, homestead entries during the movement's first two decades proceeded at a higher rate, and involved more acreage, than in
any time before. 6
C. THE GIVEAWAY

ENDS

The late 1800s and the first decades of the twentieth century
brought a turnabout as the first efforts to retain the remaining federal
public lands began. John Wesley Powell, whose travels made him extremely knowledgeable about the West, urged the government to take
a more scientific approach to land disposition. As director of the
United States Geological Survey (USGS), Powell argued that watersheds, not 640-acre rectangular sections, should be the basic planning
unit in the West. 7 He also believed that these lands should be surveyed, classified, and disposed of based on their best potential use, and
that the western lands should be withdrawn from entry until they could
be surveyed and classified. Although Congress authorized the land
withdrawal and surveys in 1888, pressure from western boosters and
potential settlers led Congress to reopen the public domain in 1890,
long before Powell and his agency finished their work."
1. Federal Withdrawals and Management
The use of federal domain for parks began in 1864 when Congress
transferred Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree Grove to California
for its use as a public park." Likewise, Congress reserved 2 million
acres in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho in 1872 to create the first national park, Yellowstone.'
After a time, California clearly could not
administer the Yosemite grant properly, so the federal government
reclaimed the land in 1906 and formed its own park. That same year,
Congress passed the Antiquities Act, allowing the President of the
United States to withdraw lands to protect areas with historic, prehistoric, or scientific values." Under this law, Congress reserved twenty-

35. See, e.g., Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (repealed by 43
U.S.C. § 218 (2000) (increasing homestead size to 320 acres); Three-Year Homestead
Act of 1912, ch. 153, 37 Stat. 123 (repealed by 43 U.S.C. § 218 (2000) (reducing the requisite residency period on the land from five to three years); Stockraising Homestead
Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (repealed by 43 U.S.C. § 291-298 (2000) (providing 640acre homesteads on nonirrigable land).
36. GATES, supra note 11, at app. A at 799-800.
37. WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL
AND THE SECOND OPFNING OF THE WEST 322 (1954).
38. See id. at 316-24.
39. GATES, supra note 11, at 566.
40. Id.
41. Antiquities Act, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 431-433 (2000)).
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three national monuments in eleven states and Alaska by 1910.2 Congress subsequently expanded several national monuments to form national parks." Today, over 564 million acres of land reside in federal
ownership."
Growing public concern over the rapid and frequently wasteful depletion of the nation's natural resources prompted decisive action in
the field of forestry in the 1890s: the Forest Reserve Act."5 Although
Congress already created a Division of Forestry within the Department
of Interior in 1876, that agency's only function was research. The Forest Reserve Act served as an early indication that the federal government would not shy away from holding on to significant amounts of
land to accomplish its goals. ' This legislation authorized the President
to withdraw timbered public lands from homestead and other types of
entry and set those lands aside as forest reservations. Presidents Grover
Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt vigorously wielded the Act's authority to create a system of forest reserves. 7 In time, the government
created 155 national forests, with 101 located in the West. 8 These reservations totaled approximately 156,274,000 acres. 9
With the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act" in 1934, the federal
government committed itself to actively managing much of the remaining public domain. The Act empowered the Secretary of the Interior
to establish grazing districts. The grazing districts currently encompass
141 million acres of public land for grazing and forage crops."
The Department of the Interior created an elaborate leasing system
for these lands, since the Act barred homestead entry upon them, except in Alaska. In many respects, the Taylor Grazing Act marked the
closing of the public domain." The Taylor Grazing Act demonstrated
42. DANA & FAiRJAx, supra note 17, at 78.
43. Id.
44. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
2003 5, 7 tbl.1-1, 1-2 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS].
45. Forest Reserve, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891), repealed by 16 U.S.C. § 471 (2000).
See also DANA & FAIRrAX, supra note 17, at 55.
46. DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 55.
47. "On February 22, 1897, [Cleveland] issued proclamations creating thirteen new
reserves with a gross area of 21.3 million acres, which more than doubled the existing
area of reserves. His action came without warning .... and without consultation with a
single governor or elected representative from the affected areas." Id. at 60.
FORESTRY SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST
48.
AS
OF
SEPTEMBER
30,
2004
tbl.1,
SYSTEM:
LAND
AREAS
REPORT

http://www.fs.fed.us/land/staff/lar/LAR04/table 1.htm.
Id.
49.
50. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §

315 (2000)).
51.

PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 13-15 tbl.1-4.

52.
See generally E. LOUIsE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMIN: DISPOSAL
AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-50 (Stuart Bruchey & Eleanor Bruchey eds., Arno Press

1972) (1951).
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that the federal government was much more inclined to keep its land
than give it away. This policy culminated in the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976." Under FLPMA, the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), a division of the Department of the Interior, managed approximately 262 million acres of western public domain. 4 The BLM leased much of the land to ranchers and farmers for
livestock grazing.
To facilitate its western expansion, the United States eventually acquired approximately 1.7 billion acres of land in the area west of the
Mississippi River, including Alaska, but not including Hawaii." The
federal government's disposition policies resulted in the permanent
transfer of nearly 1.2 billion acres of this land to states, corporations,
and private persons. At present, 564.5 million acres of land remain in
federal ownership as national parks and monuments, forests, wildlife
preserves, BLM public lands, and military installations. 6
Congress acted frequently to assist agricultural settlement in the
West. In addition to the Homestead Act and Desert Land Sales Act of
1877, the Carey Act of 1894 7 provided incentive to western states (up
to one million acres of federal land) to reclaim the land through irrigation. 8 While agriculture was wildly successful in lush pockets of the
West, farming was usually a hard and unpredictable enterprise for most
western agrarians. Locally sponsored irrigation projects simply proved
economically impractical. In addition, widespread drought during the
1890s convinced many westerners they could not do it alone. The federal government needed to help.
With water came thousands of settlers who poured into the searing
desert where only three inches of rain fell each year on average, and
summer temperatures frequently climbed to 120 degrees. 9 The population of the West grew from just over 4 million in 1900 to more than 9
million in 1920." In California's Imperial Valley alone, the population
reached 15,000 in 1909 with 160,000 acres irrigated." At the same
time, the urban areas of Los Angeles and southern California burgeoned. In fact, growth pressures in California helped push the fed53. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)).
54. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICs, supra note 44, at 13-14 tbl-4.
55. GATES, supra note 11, at 86; DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 11.
56. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 5-7 tbl.1-1, 1-2.
57. Carey Act, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372 (1894) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 641

(2000)).
58. Id. at 422.
59. PHILIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST 186
(1981).
60.
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UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 22 (1975)
STATISTICS].
61. FRADKIN, supra note 59, at 186.

[hereinafter HISTORICAL

Issue 2

D1VIDING WESTERN WA TERS

eral Reclamation Service (renamed the Bureau of Reclamation in
1923) to plan the Hoover Dam and develop the Colorado River for
western growth. 2
2. The Lure of the Mines
The glitter of gold, not the agrarian dream, was responsible for the
bulk of the dramatic population increases in the western region. Fortyniners left the eastern states in droves for California after the discovery
of gold. The City of Denver sprang up practically overnight when miners found gold traces in the mountains of Colorado in the late 1850s.
Discovery of silver in Colorado and Arizona also brought settlers to the
mountain West.
Not surprisingly, Americans and immigrants flowing west to seek
their fortunes in gold and silver mines provided a powerful catalyst for
growth in the western states. The mines of the West provided a large
increase in the gold and silver output of the United States, which
stimulated the economy of the northern states during the Civil War. 3
The mining rushes also helped divide the West into political territories.
The demand for increased food markets resulted from the proliferation of mining camps." The wealth generated by the mining fields
contributed to the completion of railroads as the demand for passage
to the mountains and the coast increased.
As the population surged westward, this influx increased the pressure on the sovereignty and territories of Native Americans. These
pressures prodded the federal government to move the Indian tribes
and the original inhabitants out of the way for non-Indian fortune
seekers.65
The potential to make it big in the West had a snowball effect. The
population of the region grew at a greater rate than the rest of the nation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. During this
time, the United States' population growth exceeded that of all other
industrialized nations.' Furthermore, the large influx of foreign-born
inhabitants who came to work on the railroads and in the mines added
to the already unique western culture.

62.

Id. at 187.

FREDERICK MERK, HISTORYOF THE WESTWARD MOVFMFNT 418 (1978).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Keith L. Bryant, Jr., Entering the Global Economy, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 195, 232 (Clyde A. Milner I et al., eds. 1994) [hereinafter OXFORD
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3. "Show me a rich country and I'll soon give you a large town" 7
As Americans moved west in the 1800s, following gold, timber, and
the plough, the virgin character of the region began to change. Fueled by the gold rushes of the 1840s and 1850s, city populations sprung
up and flooded the frontier with would-be millionaires. City centers
replete with trade, government, culture, and countless promoters generated a constant demand for metals, wood, and food. Even from the
earliest settlement days, the West was surprisingly urban.
At the turn of the twentieth century, western population figures revealed fairly dramatic changes beginning in the 1850s. To illustrate, in
1850, the regional population of the West amounted to 0.6 percent of
the total population in the United States.' "By 1890, the proportion of
residents of the western states who lived in towns of ten thousand or
more was larger than that of any other U.S. region except the Northeast."" By 1900, the western population comprised almost 6 percent of
the total population in the United States."0 Nearly 40 percent of all
westerners lived in urban areas.'
Growth of the frontier regional
economy occurred in tandem with large mineral discoveries, because
the need to supply goods and equipment to the mining economy hurried increases in urban growth.
In 1860, San Francisco stood alone as the only true urban center in
the West. By 1900, however, "Houston, Dallas, Denver, Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, and other urban areas boasted large populations
and complex economies. "7
What drove this period of increasing
growth in western urban centers? In part, the arid geography of the
region encouraged urban growth because the dry, harsh climate made
living in many rural parts of the West virtually intolerable.' The oasis
of the city helped soften the dry reality. Much of the West was too arid
to support successful farms.
Western migration also coincided with the industrial revolution,
another factor that encouraged urban grown in the West. As the profitability of growing food for subsistence abated, the market for exchange goods and services developed. Still, this market depended
upon access to a concentrated population. '
One precious commodity helped fuel the growth of the West: water. Cities, mines, and farms alike relied on it. Yet, as John Wesley
67. Carol A. O'Connor, A Region of Cities, in OxFoRD HisTORY, supra note 66, at 535
(citing a Western pioneer proverb).
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Powell argued in 1879, strong federal intervention would be required if
communities were to continue growing.75 The federal government
faced the challenge of harnessing this vital resource.
4. Boom and Bust Cycles
Abundant natural resources in the largely undeveloped West
spawned extractive industries including mining, timber, and ranching.
The ability to harness western watercourses facilitated growth in many
sectors of the western economy. The West's dual dependence on its
natural resources and eastern capital made the region particularly vulnerable to boom and bust cycles.
For instance, Edmund Morris described the devastating winter of
1886-87 that almost annihilated ranching in the Northern Great Plains
and ended Theodore Roosevelt's years as a cattleman in the Bad Lands
6
Ranchers lost 75 to
near Medora, Dakota Territory in financial ruin."
herds.
As
Morris
recounted,
"When
the last drifts
85 percent of their
of snow melted away, and the flood abated, cowboys went out onto the
range to look for survivors [among the cattle]. Bill Merrifield was
among them. 'The first day I rode out,' he reported, 'I never saw a live
animal.""
The Depression of 1893 was another harsh blow to western fortunes. The economic downturn was more severe than any since the
Revolutionary War, with unemployment higher than 10 percent for
half of the decade.' Uncertainties about the gold standard and monetary policy, poor agricultural prices, and reduced railroad investment
unduly burdened the West.'
Despite the swings in economic fortunes, the population in the
western region persisted in growing during the first few decades of the
twentieth century. From 1917 to 1919, the West shared in the postWorld War I boom. However, the drought years escalated the Great
Depression of the 1930s in all western states (except perhaps California, where the climate remained more sound). "[L]ow prices, and
drought were driving people from their land and into other parts of
America."' Historian Robert Athearn reported that during this period,
the Southwest lost between 5 and 10 percent of its population." The
75.

JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED

STATES: WITH A MORE DETAILED AccouNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH 3-5,

Stegner ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press) (1879).
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77. Id. at 366.
78. See NEIL IRVIN PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON: THE UNITED
1919, at 116, 295 (1987).
79. See generally id. at 110-140 (describing the depression of the 1890s).
80.

STATES

1877-

ROBERT G. ATHEARN, THE MYTHIC WEST IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 88

(1986).
81.

7-9 (Wallace

Id.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 8

tier of states from the Dakotas to Oklahoma suffered from similar
losses in population.'
As the depression deepened, the western population became less
rural." In 1900, over 50 percent of western citizens lived in a rural
area."4 Yet, by 1940, nearly 60 percent of residences lived in an urban
setting.8 This change occurred despite the federal government's continuing provision of ample opportunities to acquire homestead property. Indeed, homestead land was available until 1934.' Athearn hypothesized that farmers just could not make a go of it in rural areas,
gave up, and moved on to neighboring towns and cities."
In 1933 the New Deal programs, spearheaded by President Franklin Roosevelt and driven by large public water works projects such as
Boulder Canyon Dam on the Colorado River and Fort Peck Dam on
the Missouri River, began to turn the western economy around. Thus,
as America entered World War II, prosperity was gradually returning to
the country and to the West.
D.

INDIAN POLICYAND THE END OF TRIBALISM

Manifest destiny, or the opening of the western frontier to settlement, depended on a particular federal policy. One major challenge
was termed the "Indian problem." Commentators frequently criticize
American Indian policy for its ambiguous and unstable history. In its
service of manifest destiny, however, American Indian policy consistently produced one result important to Anglo-Americans moving west
during the 1800s: making more land available for settlement. The
United States accomplished this by removing Native Americans from
their ancestral homelands. Even when the United States did not physically remove entire tribes, the government significantly reduced or
parceled tribal lands. One side effect was clear: the reduction of the
Indians' land base diminished their military and political power.
The framers of the United States Constitution placed Indian policy
in the hands of Congress. The Constitution mandated that Congress
should regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, while it empowered
the President to make treaties, necessarily including Indian treaties,
given the consent of the Senate.'
The United States generally treated Indian tribes as foreign sovereign nations and often considered them enemies. The federal gov82,
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ernment initially orchestrated the commerce between tribes and the
growing territories. Before 1815, most "Indians negotiated treaties
from a position of some power, for the tribes had the option of allying
with either the United States or the British." 9
Despite the tribes' powers, by the 1820s, non-Indian settlers continued west for new land. They demanded stronger policies to facilitate favoring Anglo expansion. The federal government heeded their
call. Thus, the United States implemented a removal policy.
1. Removal Policy (1830-1871)
Though it had its genesis much earlier, Presidents Monroe, Adams,
and Jackson most ardently championed the executive policy of removal.' Jackson was especially supportive of removal, because he
fought in many Indian wars. In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act,' which expressed the goal of removing the Indian population from the eastern United States and gave the President power to
accomplish the removal. 2
The Act's intent was to force tribes from their eastern homelands
to areas west of the Mississippi. The United States had a number of
methods to accomplish the removal of Indian tribes from tribal lands.
The United States used one option, war, liberally. Whether or not preceded by bloodshed, the government's relations with the tribes typically culminated in a treaty. Inevitably, treaties required tribal governments to forfeit some portion of their land. The United States held
the remainder in reserve.
The United States often forced treaty negotiations upon tribes who
did not understand English. Further, some tribal spokespeople did
not really represent the tribes they purported to represent." Often,
the United States imposed treaties upon tribes, even without their consent."9
After 1871, the United States renounced treaty-making, and bilateral agreements arose as the negotiation method of choice. 5 Like treaties, these agreements reserved and ceded portions of land to tribes.
89.
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Both houses of Congress ratified these agreements. Other methods
accomplished the same goals: unilateral congressional statutes, Interior
department actions, and executive orders. All continued to draw
boundary lines around the many varied tribes of the West. Treaties
and treaty substitutes"' worked to form today's Indian reservations.
These documents recognized tribes under the emerging United States
government and eventually established a reservation system.
The removal policy, which was essentially "the purchase of Indian
lands and the transposition of their former owners to new territories to
the [W]est," resulted in many treaties. 7 Through this policy, the
United States created reservations for many eastern Indian tribes on
lands west of the Mississippi. The non-Indian Anglo world intended to
impose its culture upon the new Indian reservations, changing Indian
warriors and hunters in the abundant new world into benign American
farmers. Yet, these ideals could not quite succeed. The United States
initiated numerous attempts at creating boundaries, but those attempts
then failed. As western expansion continued and whites increasingly
crossed the boundaries set by treaties, the government broke the treaties, and reservations diminished."
The United States gave tribes a choice of sorts: keep the homeland
and be overrun by white settlement, or move west. President Jackson
remained committed to removal of all Indians. He did not hesitate to
use force if needed, but the United States Supreme Court sometimes
refused to uphold such strong-arm tactics. Though the Court could
only deal with particularized situations, the judiciary in the early days,
led by Chief Justice John Marshall, rendered legal decisions that ran
against the currents of removal.'

96.
97.

A term coined by Professor Wilkinson. Id. at 8.
BENJAMIN CAPPS, THE INDIANS 157 (Time-Life Books ed. 1973).
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Id. at 157-69.
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First, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), a case about the

validity of a tribe's land grant to non-Indian individuals, the Court ruled such a conveyance was invalid. Id. at 543, 604-05. The doctrine of occupancy (sometimes called
Indian title, aboriginal title, and original title) was created for tribes in their aboriginal
lands after European discovery. "The result of this decision was to recognize a legal
right of Indians in their lands, good against all third parties but existing at the mere
sufferance of the federal government." CANBY, supra note 90, at 15.
In the early 1830s, Justice John Marshall penned two more cases involving the
Cherokee nation. The young state of Georgia gave up western land claims in return
for a federal promise to extinguish Indian title in Georgia. Georgia did not wait for
the federal government to make good on its promise. Instead, it passed legislation that
divided Cherokee land between Georgian counties and invalidated Cherokee law. The

Cherokee sued in the Supreme Court, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831), where Justice Marshall determined the Cherokee tribe demonstrated some
level of sovereignty, though not as formidable as that of a foreign state. Id. at 17. Instead, Marshall created the concept of the "domestic dependent nation" and determined the United States was to Indian tribes like "a ward to his guardian." Id.
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More telling than the treaties that began to form the Indian reservation system was the impact of broad policies Congress adopted that
left implementation to later legislative or administrative action. The
policy of allotment, discussed in the next section, played as large a role
as removal policy in determining the character of today's Indian reservations.
2. Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928)
Eventually, Indian wars enforcing removal policy became far less
popular, less successful than planned, and enormously expensive."
The United States needed more effective tactics to terminate Indian
tribal societies and open lands inhabited by the tribes for settlement.
Toward that end, the effort to "assimilate" Indian people into the
American culture developed. The first major indication that the federal government was serious about assimilation occurred when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) moved from the War Department to the
Department of the Interior."'
The favored assimilation tool was the allotment program. Congress
passed the General Allotment Act (also called the Dawes Act) in
1887."' The government's new mandatory initiative resembled the
homestead program in that it allotted parcels of reservation land to
individual tribal members. These individuals became yeoman farmers-full participants in American capitalism. Once the government
allotted tribal land, it opened surplus reservation land to Anglo settlement. Perhaps for this reason, some advocates of assimilation argued
allotment promoted the best interest of the whites as well as those of
Indians.'3° Others regarded allotment as a destructive force, because it
The next term, Marshall opined Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832),
where Georgia authorities arrested non-Indian missionaries living in Cherokee country
and accused them of violating state law requiring a state license or sworn allegiance to
Georgia. Id Marshall upheld the sovereignty of the tribe and ruled that jurisdiction
over the Cherokees "belonged exclusively to the federal government, and that Georgia
had no power to pass laws affecting the tribe." ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., 500 NATIONS: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 328 (1994). The Court stated "[t] he
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force....
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
Despite the Court's language, the sovereignty of Indian tribes was difficult to
protect without the support of Congress and the executive. Indian tribes were armed
only with the words of the Supreme Court and had no political power. After the
Worcester opinion, Jackson is thought to have remarked "John Marshall has rendered
his decision, now let him enforce it." JOsEPHY, supra, at 328.
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imposed individual property ownership on members of a culture that
believed in communal ownership."n
Under allotment, heads of families initially received 160 acres,
while other family members received 80 acres."'° If the land was suitable merely for grazing, these acreages doubled.'" Title to the allotted
land remained with the United States in "trust" for twenty-five years
(longer, if the President extended the time). Once twenty-five years
passed, the land became unencumbered and freely sold."7
After the federal government finished meting out reservation land
to tribal members, it opened the remainder, or "surplus," to others.
Thus, allotment policy put more land into Anglo hands. The policy
also reduced total Indian landholdings by 35 percent, from
138,000,000 acres in 1887 before the Dawes Act to 48,000,000 acres in
1934.10 The gross statistics underestimate the losses of tribal landholdings due to the allotment policy. Tribes were left with lands of lesser
quality, where almost half of the land was either desert or semidesert." All told, tribes lost over 80 percent of the value of their lands
due to the allotments.""
Ensuing events were equally harsh. Allottees frequently lost their
land due to state tax foreclosures."' "Grafters" made things worse.
They specialized as dealers of Indian lands, monopolizing the best
tracts and leasing them out to tenant farmers."' They also appropriated the land of recalcitrant Indians who refused to accept allotments
in their surplus holdings. In addition, grafters plundered the assets of
Indian children by seeking appointment as guardians of young allottees and using the allotment for the grafters' benefit."' Those benefits
were potentially huge: in the Five Tribes area of Oklahoma alone,
there were 60,000 Indian minor children."4 The agricultural value of
their allotted estates equaled approximately $130,000,000 and that
value was growing due to increasing oil prices."' Unscrupulous dealers
would even have adult Indians declared incompetent to gain guardianship and, thus, control the land owned by their "charges." Grafters
collected lease money and royalties, but rarely distributed it to the
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landowning Indians, or heirs."6 Grafters even employed murder to
channel allotments into conspirators' hands; tribes reported twentyfour unsolved cases, some involving shooting, poisoning, and arson.""
More passive forces, like those of agricultural economics, gave allotment policy another unfortunate dimension. As allottees died, their
estates were broken into small portions and distributed among heirs.
Beneficiaries frequently leased out the land, but increasing parcel
fragmentation generated proportionately smaller income. '
If the goal was to assimilate Indians into mainstream society, allotment failed. By eroding tribal lands and aboriginal governments, and
splitting tribal members up, allotment policy corroded the political
power of tribes. The Indian Task Force of the Hoover Commission
summed up:
The practice of allotting land and issuing fee patents obviously did
not make the Indians competent. It proved to be chiefly a way of getting Indian land into non-Indian ownership ....
The rationalization
behind this policy is so obviously false that it could not have prevailed
for so long a time if not supported by the avid demands of others for
Indian lands. This was a way of getting them, usually at bargain
prices." 9

3. Winters v. United States
A United States Supreme Court opinion issued during the allotment period ran contrary to the general destruction of tribal property
that characterized that era. In Winters v. United States,"0 Indians on the
Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana asserted they were entitled to
"reserve" water in the Milk River for future purposes, even though they
had no need for the water at the time of the case. The Court agreed
and held the tribe was entitled to enough water to enable it to accomplish the reservation's original purpose. The Court reasoned the
United States surely would not give the Indians a reservation for farming purposes, but no water for farming. "It was the policy of the Government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those [uncivil]
habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people."'2' The holding

116. Id.
117. Id. at 333.
118. Cohen predicted "the allotment system, working down through the partitionment or sale of the land of deceased allottees, mathematically insures and practically
requires that the remaining Indian allotted lands shall pass to whites. The allotment
act contemplates total landlessness for the Indians of the third generation of each
allotted tribe." COHEN, supra note 103, at 216.
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of Winters gave the federal government the power to "reserve" water
when it entered into treaties with Indian tribes exempt from state law.
For more than fifty years there was little government reaction to
the Winters holding and the reserved rights doctrine lay dormant.'"
Perhaps this was because the government policy of western expansion
persisted in largely disregarding Indian rights. For instance, the
United States engineered huge water projects into western riverbeds,
2
The tribes themselves
often in complete derogation of Indian rights."
had little ability to stop this. Allotment so isolated and impoverished
tribes that they lacked the political power and resources to pursue the
water rights recognized by Winters.
4. Reform Period (1928-1945)
The end of the allotment period coincided with the final closing of
the American frontier. Allotment ended with the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),' passed after the election of President Franklin Roosevelt. The IRA prohibited further allotments and froze previously allotted land still in trust status. The IRA allowed some surplus lands, not
'
Congress also
yet claimed by third parties, to be returned to tribes.
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire new lands and water
rights for tribes."6
Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, pursued new educational, economic, and administrative reform and encouraged Indian tribes to form self-governing tribal societies under the
IRA.' Tribes had the option to reorganize their governments under
IRA provisions, though a vote by the tribe in favor was required. 8 As a
result, ninety-five tribes adopted constitutions, and seventy-four formed
corporations for conducting their business. Some relatively undisturbed tribes declined such changes. They continued to manage their
affairs in ways dictated by their own custom. 29'
Critics of the IRA believed it merely imposed Anglo institutions on
Indian people.'" They noted that many tribes adopted constitutions
modeled on Anglo-American institutions. 131 While critics debate the
legacy of the IRA, John Echohawk, executive director of the Native
122.
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American Rights Fund, reached an interim assessment shared by many:
"The Indian New Deal wasn't perfect...but its results were fundamentally beneficial for Indian people. The Indian Reorganization Act reversed the direction of American Indian policy. The pattern of history
changed from the erosion of Indian sovereignty to its restoration and
revival." 32
Although reform came, the extent of the damage allotment caused
was painfully evident by the 1920s. In 1928, the federal government
published the Meriam Report. The report clearly documented the
failure of the allotment policy and described extreme poverty and despair on divided reservations. ' This report, written under contract by
Interior Secretary Hubert Work, compiled the results from an in-depth
social and economic survey of American tribes and found "deplorable
conditions of poverty, disease, lack of social and economic adjustment,
suffering, and discontent," on reservations, citing the allotment policy
as its main cause."' The report also suggested various solutions to the
devastating consequences of allotment.
Some reformers wanted to divest tribes of all their remaining land
by liquidating the reservations. The Harding administration proposed
paying the Indians the cash value for their remaining assets.' One bill
unified the Pueblo people by recognizing the rights of squatters who
invaded Pueblo property in New Mexico. Pueblo people united statewide for the first time in 242 years. Seventeen Pueblo representatives
traveled to Washington D.C. to protest the bill, declaring, "[t]he time
has come when we must live or die.""'
Another sign of the renewal of tribalism came during the 1930s
and 1940s. Legal scholarship focused on Indian sovereignty, thereby
lending it some support.13 7 For instance, Indian scholar Felix Cohen
wrote his Handbook of FederalIndian Law and used the doctrine of tribal
sovereigntyJohn Marshall originally postulated as his thesis.' Cohen's
scholarship became the leading authority courts used to address Indian
issues, thereby encouraging more judges to issue decisions respecting
Indian sovereignty.
By the end of World War II, however, the spirit of reform lost
ground. New political forces ruled the day, and tribal interests were
not among them. In the end, the power the tribes regained proved
limited and was not enough to make reform a permanent feature on
the federal agenda or the political horizon.
132. LIMERICK, supra note 10, at 209.
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E. TERMINATION ERA

The IRA and Collier's policies produced a resurgence of social,
spiritual, and political power for Native Americans, but the advent of
the Termination Era in the 1950s halted such gains. Just eleven years
after Congress passed the IRA, Collier's reforms began fading into the
past. In 1949 the Hoover Commission issued its Report on Indian Affairs
suggesting a return to assimilation policy: "[C] omplete integration of
Indians should be the goal so that Indians would move into the mass of
the population as full, taxpaying citizens." ' 9 Social forces of the times,
coupled with the desire to abate federal funding to tribes, brought
termination policy to the forefront of Indian policy debates. ,
F. SUMMARY
As previously discussed, a series of land settlement initiatives, principally the Homestead Act of 1862 and the Desert Land Sales Act of
1877, parceled out the public domain for the benefit of individual family farmers. Federal land tenure in the West was important to water
adjudications because it determined the type and magnitude of water
rights claimed for these lands. Often, the same individual or family
leased these lands for decades. They constructed stockponds, ditches,
wells, and other water improvements. As for lands that remained in
federal control, the government intensified its interest in these holdings, because the land could support recreation, environmental protection, and other governmental initiatives. Tribal lands present a
more challenging prospect after the advent of Winters rights and the
associated questions surrounding the quantification of tribal water
rights. General stream adjudications currently face the daunting task
of defining water rights for this patchwork of western lands, and the
lands and water are enmeshed in an intense value struggle over the
future of the West.
H. THE SEARCH FOR WATER LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
SUITABLE FOR THE WEST
By the 1860s, Manifest Destiny accomplished its principal tenet: to
secure under the American flag all of the territory between the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans. After the Civil War, the nation's attention turned
toward settling this vast terrain for the dual purposes of developing
western lands and protecting them from foreign threats. At the beginning of this settlement era, western rivers and streams sufficiently accommodated the water needs of new settlers. After the first wave of
settlers acquired prime riparian lands and diversion points, it became
139.
140.

GETCHES, supra note 89, at 229 (internal quotations omitted).
DEBO, supra note 112, at 349-53.
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apparent that new water laws and institutions would be necessary if
remaining arid lands were to support a growing population and economy in the ensuing years.
The first wave of settlers adopted a legal regime for the future and
called it "prior appropriation." To administer the doctrine, they created local institutions to develop and allocate water resources. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the federal government assumed
an active role in western water issues with federal reclamation legislation and funding. The combination of water law and local involvement, coupled with federal support, facilitated the development of the
American West. Ultimately, this combination placed a premium on
ascertaining existing water rights, providing the impetus for the general stream adjudications.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE

The eastern riparian water rights doctrine, which limits water use
to those persons with lands bordering a river or lake, eventually proved
ill-suited for the arid West. Beginning in the late 1840s, custom and
tradition determined water allocation policies in many parts of the
West. The prior appropriation doctrine, which embodied the principle "first in time, first in right," arose in response to western needs to
suit the aridity and geography of the region.'' The doctrine treated
each of the following as property: priority, place of diversion, quantity,
transfer rights, and the owner's status in the hierarchy of users.' Early
miners first applied prior appropriation principles to the use of surface
water, and eventually western territories and states adopted the doctrine in their statutes as well.' 2
At first, the federal government responded in a deferential manner
by recognizing past and even future appropriations of water on public
lands, which were based on local customs and traditions. The government's deference was particularly evident in the Mining Act of 1866
and the Desert Land Sales Act of 1877.
Even the federal judiciary deferred to state law in the appropriation and use of water in a series of court cases, which bestowed each
state with broad regulatory authority over water rights on public lands
141.
See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) ("Imperative
necessity, unknown to the countries which gave [the riparian doctrine] birth, compels
recognition of [the prior appropriation doctrine] in conflict therewith.").
Mark W. Tader, Reallocating Western Water: Beneficial Use, Property, and Politics,
142.
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 277, 284.
143. John D. McGowen, The Development of PoliticalInstitutions on the PublicDomain, 11
Wyo. L.J. 1-14 (1956). Later, western state legislatures required that the state itself
concur with the appropriation. This policy required appropriators to apply for permits
before constructing the works or using the water. A state agency then decided whether
unappropriated water was available for the use, and whether that use was beneficial.
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and gave each the exclusive right to choose its own system of water
law.'" During this period, territorial and state governments' were the
primary drivers of water rights and water use control. Congress remained content to defer to state or territorial law on such matters.'46
B. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

The need for water also presented organizational challenges as
communities realized they needed some sort of structure to oversee
the movement of water. As a solution, Mormons in the Salt Lake Valley pioneered the first communal irrigation organizations.' This cooperative movement also took hold in irrigation-based colonies, which
some touted as experimental utopian communities. These included
Anaheim, California, where in 1857; individuals formed the Los Angeles Vineyard Society for the purpose of cultivating grapes and producing wine.' 8 Settlers established one of the most famous initiatives, the
Union Colony, in 1870 near the confluence of the Cache la Poudre
and Platte rivers in Colorado. "9 They named the community "Greeley,"
after Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune, who sponsored the
community in its early days. The Chicago-Colorado Colony established
a similar settlement near Longmont, Colorado."
More formal, corporate organizations evolved as citizens realized
that mere cooperative efforts would be insufficient to settle the entire
West. Private canal companies organized in many states, including the
Highland Ditch Company of Colorado in 1871."' The Boise City Land
& Irrigation Company in Idaho followed, as did the Pecos Irrigation &
Investment Company of New Mexico.'
The financial returns from
144. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 152,
154-56 (1935) (holding Congress had recognized the validity of local customs related
to the appropriation of water); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907) ("It may
determine for itself whether the common law rule in respect to riparian rights or that
doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of water for
the purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress shall not enforce either rule upon
any state."); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704
(1899).
145. State powers to legislate in the field of water rights arose from the general sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The power to create property rights and the police power to regulate those rights
stems from this reserved sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment provides, "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
146. Ernest A. Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAW &
CONTMP. PROBS. 325, 329 (1957).
147. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 18.
148. Id. at 20-21.
149. Id. at 22.
150. Id. at 23.
151.
Id.
152. Id. at 24, 26.
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these companies, however, could not sustain the day-to-day cost of operating the irrigation projects. As one historian concluded: "In general, the canal corporation as an institution could construct irrigation
projects, but could not successfully operate them."'
Progress continued nonetheless. Mutual ditch or irrigation companies formed in many states, with the assistance of state or territorial
legislatures."' The companies required farmers to pool their resources
in exchange for stock, and assigned them a proportionate share of irrigation water. One such mutual irrigation company was the Hardy Irrigation Canal Company, which six Arizona pioneers organized in 1870
along Arizona's Salt River near Tempe.' In 1900 farmers organized a
similar mutual ditch company, the Big Ditch Company, in the Yellowstone Valley near Billings, Montana. '
Another corporate form, the development corporation, which was
a hybrid between the private corporation and the mutual irrigation
company, allowed developers to create a mutual corporation, build
irrigation facilities, and divide and sell the land and stock to individual
farmers. These corporations became a predominant settlement pattern in southern California in cities such as Pomona, Pasadena, and
Redlands.'"
In 1887 California's Wright Act,' further enhanced the financial
capacity of local irrigation efforts. The Act enabled a county board of
supervisors to create irrigation districts that could assess agricultural
land, issue bonds, and construct irrigation projects. Eventually, sixteen
other western states adopted variants of the Wright Act.'" New Mexico
further refined the irrigation district concept by authorizing water conservancy districts that allowed communities to assess both urban and
agricultural lands to support multi-purpose projects.'"
C.LIMITS OF LOCAL EFFORTS

By the late 1800s, however, many westerners realized that the region's rives needed large storage facilities if the reclamation and settlement of the West were to proceed. The private canal companies and
153. Id. at 27.
154. Among the forms of legislative support irrigation districts enjoyed were exemption from state and territorial taxation, exclusivity rights (with which some companies
held exclusive rights to particular service areas), and the power of eminent domain to
acquire rights of way and purchase land through condemnation. IPIsANI, supra note
10, at 98-99.
155. DUNBAR, supranote 10, at 29.
156. Id. at 30.
157. Id. at 32.
158. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 20500-29975 (West 1984) (officially named the Irrigation
District Law, but commonly known as the Wright Act).
159. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 33.
160. Id. at 34-35.
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irrigation districts had already overextended themselves"' and lacked
the financial capacity and engineering expertise to construct large
storage projects. Gradually, eyes turned toward Washington to provide
assistance.
Congress responded in 1888 by mandating a survey of possible
storage sites on western rivers. 6 The United States Geological Survey
(USGS), which John Wesley Powell headed at the time, conducted the
survey with Arthur D. Foote and Edwin S. Nettleton as supervising field
engineers." Powell recommended, and Congress agreed, the government should close the public domain to settlement until the USGS
completed the survey and Congress had the opportunity to act. The
closing led to such an outcry from the western states and territories
that Congress reversed itself in 1890.1' By that time, however, "Powell,
with his topographical mapping, stream gauging, and reservation of
reservoir sites, had laid the foundation for national reclamation.'6 5
D.NATIONAL RECLAMATION

In 1894, Congress enacted the Carey Act.'66 Considered to mark a
crossroads in the history of western reclamation, this Act authorized
the transfer "of one million acres within each state's public lands for
irrigation, reclamation, settlement, and cultivation []",
The Act responded to the expectation that states would contract with private development corporations to undertake the reclamation work. Only
Montana, Washington, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming, and Idaho capitalized on the Carey Act."n William "Buffalo Bill" Cody led Carey Act reclamation efforts in several states; his grand visions for developing irrigated commonwealth communities stood in stark contrast to the "Wild
West" he so fervently peddled years before.' 9 The Carey Act was ultimately deemed ineffective because of a lack of private financing.'7" One
commentator observed, "[t]he Carey Act development corporations
161. Many irrigation corporations ignored the reality that they could only meet
interest and maintenance costs of building their canals if their service areas settled
rapidly and densely. When droves of settlers failed to materialize, these costs crushed
some companies. In Arizona's Salt River Valley, companies built eight canals at a cost
of nearly one million dollars, but only approximately twenty percent of the lands that
the canals were capable of serving actually became cultivated. 1 PISANI, supra note 10,
at 106.
162. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 47.
163. Id. at 47-48.
164. Id. at 48.
165. Id.
166. 43 U.S.C. § 641 (2000).
167. KAREN L. SMiTH, THE MAGNIFICENT EXPERIMENT: BUILDING THE SALT RIVER
RECLA.MATION PROJECT 1890-1917, at 8 (1986).
168.
1 PISANI, supra note 10, at 261.
169. Id. at 254-55.
170. SMITH, supra note 167, at 8.
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faced the same problems as the earlier corporations-miscalculation of
costs, overestimation of the water supply, and a dearth of settlers to
purchase water rights.""' In the end, the Carey Act did little to cultivate or reclaim the public domain. '
During the 1890s, support increased for a strong federal role in
western reclamation. Captain Hiram M. Chittenden of the Army Corps
of Engineers, who surveyed and located five possible reservoir sites in
Colorado and Wyoming, recommended Congress fund the construction of these projects.' However, he proposed states build the water
distribution facilities themselves.'
In addition, in 1899, California attorney George Maxwell organized the National Irrigation Association,
an organization devoted to national reclamation. 7 ' By 1902, the national reclamation movement crested with the support of President
Theodore Roosevelt. With Roosevelt's assistance, Senator Francis
Newlands of Nevada succeeded in urging Congress to pass his reclamation act.'
The Reclamation Act of 1902' was a strategic federal instrument to
further settlement and economic development of the West. The Act
authorized federal funds for the construction of reservoirs and water
distribution facilities in sixteen western states and territories.' Farmers
would construct projects with federal loans, which the farmers would
repay within ten years." The federal government entrusted responsibility for the program to the Reclamation Service, housed within the
Department of the Interior's United States Geological Survey. This
configuration of authority circumvented regional policies and traditions, and created a more closed system of decision-making." With this
171. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 40.
172. SMITH, supra note 167, at 8.
173. 1 PIsANi, supra note 10, at 276-77. With the states responsible for the distribution system, Chittenden estimated the federal government could provide enough water
storage to reclaim the entire and West for $5.37 per acre, or approximately $1,430,031
each year for a century. Id. at 278.
174. Id. at 278.
175. Id. at 287.
176. Id. at 317-18.
177. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 372 (2000)).
178. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 51. These states are Washington, Oregon, California,
Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch.
1093, 32 Stat. 388. Congress added Texas in 1905 as the seventeenth reclamation state.
DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 51.
179. DuNBAR, supra note 10, at51.
180. SMITH. supra note 167, at 21. Note that section 8 of the Act declared, "nothing
in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere
with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation...." Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32
Stat. at 390. According to historian Donald J. Pisani, the Reclamation Act "pandered
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enactment, Congress gave private rights prevalence, and directed the
Secretary of the Interior to proceed in conformity with state laws.''
The federal government deemed all water rights delivered by federal
irrigation projects "attached" to the land watered. This precluded any
entity from selling, purchasing, or monopolizing water rights as a
from the land, a factor that restricted state admincommodity separate
82
istrative control.
On March 14, 1903 Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock
authorized reclamation projects on five rivers: the Salt River in Arizona, Truckee-Carson River in Nevada, Uncompahgre River in Colorado, North Platte River in Wyoming and Nebraska, and Milk River in
Montana." By 1907, twenty-four such reclamation projects were underway in fifteen states.'84 By 1929, more than one hundred federal
projects were complete, bringing irrigation to about 1,500,000 acres."'
The proponents of these projects hoped they would finance themselves over time, but the federal projects did not live up to that expectation. Congress responded by passing multiple relief measures, which
extended repayment dates or reduced the amounts due. ' The Secretary of the Interior's Committee of Special Advisers on Reclamation in
1924 concluded it was a fundamental error to believe the construction
of irrigation projects alone would foster vigorous agriculture. "7 Part of
the problem was the inordinate amount of energy the government devoted to engineering without regard to the dynamics of human interaction. The federal water subsidy contributed to the western migration
of many would-be farmers, but not all had the capital or experience
needed to succeed. Farmers were simply not organized enough to
help each other."
As homesteading diminished the supply of public land, and Reclamation Service funds dried up, the Reclamation Service turned to Into home

rule and institutionalized fragmentation." 1 PISANI, supra note 10, at 325. He
noted that "Section 8 of the act ratified a medley of state and territorial water laws that
crippled coordinated planning in its infancy." Id.
43 U.S.C. § 383.
181.
182. Historians actively debate the centralization of water resources. See, e.g.,
SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1999) (1959) (applauding centralization's benefits) but cf DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER,
ARIDITY, .ND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985) (warning of the dangers of
centralization).
183. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 51-52.
184. Id. at 52.
185. MERK, supra note 63, at 509.
186. Id. at 510.
187. See generally. COMM. OF SPECIAL ADVISERS ON RECLAMATION, FEDERAL
RECLAMATION BY IRRIGATION, S. Doc. NO. 68-92, at 36-39 (1st Sess. 1924) (discussing
the weaknesses and failures of the Reclamation Act).
188. SMITH, supra note 167, at 155.
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dian lands. In 1904 Congress gave the Reclamation Service the right to
"reclaim, utilize, and dispose of any lands" within the reservation, as
long as each Indian received an irrigated farm."' As the Reclamation
Service began taking over Indian Bureau water projects that the Dawes
General Allotment Act of 1887 originally founded, Indian water rights
became captive to experiments in federal reclamation."n
Indian tribes even helped subsidize federal reclamation through
the sale of "surplus" land, or land the federal government deemed unnecessary for tribes. For example, on the Flathead Reservation in Montana, surplus land sold to white settlers at $4 to $7 an acre rapidly became worth $100 to $500 an acre when settlers irrigated. Yet, the allotment policy offered few benefits for Indians, because they owned
only small percentages of the irrigated land. According to the Report of
Advisors on Irrigationon Indian Reservations,many of the so-called Indian
irrigation projects were not Indian projects at all. ' Historian Donald
J. Pisani perhaps summed it up best: "In any contest between whites
and Indians, political expediency, if nothing else, dictated that the
The 1902 act, after all,
Reclamation Service support white farmers.
92
had been written for those homesteaders."
E. PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION ERA AND NEW DEAL POLICIES

The Reclamation Act was a manifestation of the progressive conservation movement, which became the basis of President Theodore
Roosevelt's national resource policies. One of the principal tenets of
the progressive conservation movement was that the federal government should retain ownership of western public lands and the government should use revenues from these lands to support public land
management. Further, progressives believed resource management
should benefit from scientific principles. Most notably, progressives
thought society should develop western arid lands "for the nation as a
whole, not [solely] for local interests."'93 This emerging national policy
also sought stewardship of the nation's water resources to support
navigation, irrigation, hydroelectric power, and construction of reservoirs to prevent flooding.'4
Proponents of progressive conservationism, however, soon ran
afoul of the capitalists on Wall Street over the issue of hydroelectric
189. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch.1402, § 25, 33 Stat. 224.
190. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-334, 339, 341, 342, 345, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994)). The act is commonly known as
the "Indian Allotment Act."
191. 2 PISANI, supra note 10, at 177-78.
192.
Id. at 168. See also DANA & FAMiRFAx, supra note 17, at 69.
193. SMrrH, supra note 167, at 22.
194. MARK D. O'KEEFE ET AL., BOUNDARIES CARVED IN WATER: AN ANALYSIS OF RIVER
AND WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE UPPER MissouRi BASIN 11 (1987).
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power. In 1906 the Roosevelt administration championed an amendment to the Reclamation Act, which enabled the federal government
to sell surplus hydroelectric power generated by reclamation projects.
Although President Roosevelt called for some form of federal power
commission to regulate the distribution of this power, it was not until
after he left office that Congress finally passed the Federal Power Act of
1920.96 Even then, the commission the statute created was ineffectual
during much of the 1920s. Despite the Act, three major oligarchies,
the Morgan-Bonbright-National City group, the Chase National-Forbes
group, and the Insull group, controlled almost 60 percent of the electric power in the country.'97
Ultimately, public and congressional fears about the private monopolization of hydropower and hydropower sites provided support for
the comprehensive river basin planning and development concept.
Large main stem dams, many of which the Reclamation Act authorized, were important components of this multi-purpose policy.
The government undertook comprehensive plans for the Colorado
River that led to the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the Boulder
Canyon Project Act of 1928. In 1933 comprehensive river basin development also gave birth to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), considered the model for management proposals on other river systems.9
President Franklin Roosevelt predicted, "[i]f we are successful here
[with TVA] we can march on, step by step; in a like development of
other great natural territorial units within our borders." "
During the Depression years, the TVA and other large multipurpose water development projects spurred national economic recovery. The Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams on the Columbia River
began in 1933 and 1935, respectively."'0 Congress slated similar largescale projects for central and southern California. In 1935 Congress
also approved the Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River.Y' By 1940,
with the public domain closed, and government dams provided cheap
power to fuel an economic "takeoff' in the West."'2 Federalism scholar
Daniel Elazar described the time as one of continued collaboration
between the federal and state governments, albeit with the balance of
power on the federal government's side: "[Although] [t]he great acceleration of the velocity of government made cooperative federalism
SMITH, supra note 167, at 96.
196. THORSON, supra note 92, at 60.
197.
Id.
198. Id.
199. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Suggesting the Tennessee Valley
Authority (Apr. 10, 1933) (transcript available in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library and Museum), http://www.fdlrlibrary.marist.edu/odtvacon.htm.
200. THORSON, supra note 92, at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
201.
202. 2 PisANI, supra note 10, at 197.
195.
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all-pervasive ....The co-operative system was subtly reoriented toward
Washington."" '
The West benefited from federal reclamation policy because it
meshed well with the prior appropriation doctrine by supporting the
capture and storage of water for state water users. From the western
perspective, the federal government made cultivation possible by providing the capital for construction and distribution systems, yet allowed
western states to maintain control over the actual distribution of water
through prior appropriation."°
This partnership between the federal government and western
states worked so well because it was consistent with state and federal
land settlement and disposal policy."' The United States Supreme
Court confirmed such an arrangement in California Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Company."s The Court recognized Congress relinquished property rights in western waters to the states when it
passed the Desert Land Sales Act of 1877.207 Western states would later
point to language from that case to argue the Court meant to recognize state ownership and control over all non-navigable waters.
After Calfornia Oregon Power, western state citizens and politicians
assumed the federal government would refrain from infringing on
state primacy in water allocation, unless it was acting within its powers
Eventually, westerners were disto regulate commercial navigation.'
appointed, for the large water development projects of the New Deal
exerted a great deal of influence. Still, given the economic importance
of these projects, federal interference was a price that most westerners
were willing to bear.
F. INTERSTATE COMPETITION FOR WATER

By the turn of the twentieth century, demands on interstate stream
water had increased so much that conflicts arose between neighboring
states. Over the next fifty years, these tensions frequently erupted in
cycles of federal court litigation.

203. DanielIJ. Elazar, The Shaping of IntergovernmentalRelations in the Twentieth Century,
359 ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 10, 18-19 (1965).
204. Charles T. DuMars & A. Dan Tarlock, Symposium Introduction: New Challenges to
State WaterAllocation Sovereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 331, 332-33 (1989).
205. Id. at 333.
206. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164
(1935).
207. Id. at 163-64 ("What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all
non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publicijuris subject to
the plenary control of the designated states.... ."); see also Desert Land Act of 1877, ch
107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2000)).
208. DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 204, at 334.
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In 1902, for instance, Kansas sued Colorado in the United States
Supreme Court. °9 Kansas argued Colorado's diversions from the Arkansas River damaged downstream riparian rights." '° Colorado contended it was a sovereign state and, as such, it had the right to use its
water as it saw fit, even if doing so damaged downstream states."'
To address the dispute, the Court acknowledged the principle of
equitable apportionment as the arbiter for interstate disputes over water. ' The Court compared the equities of both states, and found the
value of established upstream irrigation in Colorado outweighed the
limited injury it might inflict on Kansas. The Court denied Kansas any
relief, but left open the possibility of Kansas renewing its suit if circumstances changed.
This open-ended decision to weigh the equities
engendered a series of interstate lawsuits over rights along the Arkansas River that continue to this day.
By the 1920s, other states began litigating over western rivers. Water users in Nevada successfully sued upstream irrigators in California
along the Carson River.1 4 In similar litigation lasting almost a decade,
an irrigation company in Nebraska sued the State of Colorado over
uses on the Republican River." ' Other states also sued their neighbors
in the United States Supreme Court. Wyoming sued Colorado and
other parties to prevent a proposed diversion of Laramie River water
through a tunnel into the Cache la Poudre, which detrimentally effected water users in Wyoming. Wyoming filed the case in 1911, argued it in 1916, and reargued it in 1918 after the United States intervened to claim ownership of the unappropriated water in the Laramie
River, a non-navigable stream." 6 The parties reargued again and ultimately the Court ruled in 1922."17 Similarly, on two occasions, Arizona
unsuccessfully attempted to sue California over the Colorado River. '
Arizona's chief obstacle was the Supreme Court's holding that because
Congress had authority to build Boulder Dam .9 no court could apportion the river without the federal government joined in the litigation."'

209. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
210. Id. at 142.
211. Id. at 143.
212. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 104-05 (1907).
213. Id. at 117.
214. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bassman, 140 F. 14 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905); Rickey Land &
Cattle Co. v. Miller& Lux, 152 F. 11 (9th Cir. 1907).
215. Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498, 499 (1922).
216. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 455-56 (1922).
217. Id. at419.
218. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558
(1936).
219. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. at 455-56.
220. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. at 571.
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G.SUMMARY
The water use customs and patterns developed during the earlier
gold rush periods and agricultural settlement established prior appropriation as the legal regime for the settlement of the American West.
The prior appropriation doctrine led to the creation of new local institutions, including canal and irrigation companies. As these efforts
proved unsatisfactory, the federal government took a more active role.
National involvement appeared inevitable, as "neither private enterprise nor the states could reclaim the West alone.""' Broader Progressive Era and New Deal efforts, coupled with increased interstate competition for water, helped solidify a federal role in water. By the 1940s,
the federal government had ascended to become the dominant player
in western water resource management and appropriation.2
Despite the great strides achieved in western water development
from the 1860s to the 1940s, two critical factors remained unaddressed:
groundwater rights and Indian rights. Prior appropriation, originally
designed to allocate surface water, failed to incorporate groundwater
under its legal regime even though surface water largely depends on
the flows of tributary groundwater in many western watersheds. The
law also appeared to leave Indian rights out of the prior appropriation
equation.
As populations increased, so too did demands for water. In light of
this growth, the questions prior appropriation left unanswered soon
haunted federal-state relations and western water allocation decisions.
As the western frontier vanished, Americans could no longer ignore
the pressures that arise when great numbers of people live in close
General stream adjudications commenced with high
proximity."
hopes of providing the one fornm in which parties could resolve these
conflicts.
III. THE GENEALOGY OF WESTERN WATER ADJUDICATIONS
Conflicts over scarce water resources are not a modern malady; indeed, they are endemic to the western United States. For many of the
pre-Columbian cultures, this problem was mitigated by seasonal migration in pursuit of better forage and water. For agrarian indigenous
groups and the Hispanic and Anglo cultures that followed them, how1 PISANI, supra note 10, at 327.
221.
222. Much of the relevant literature of the time supports this assessment. Scholars
presented papers at a 1940 symposium on federalism giving significant attention to the
roles of state and local governments. Yet, in other papers concerning the use of federal grants-in-aid, the use of federal regions, and the deference accorded congressional
enactments by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the federal government was emerging as the dominant party in the federal scheme. See generally Symposium, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States, 207 ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 1 (1940).
223.

See, e.g., DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITYAND THE POLITICS OF PLACE (1990).
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ever, water shortages posed serious challenges that spawned creative
solutions. Historic methods for water management and conflict resolution continue to inform and mold our current practices. In some
cases, the tendency toward precedent, stability, and familiarity preserve
old ideas, while in other cases, the old ideas have enduring vitality because they capture common sense solutions. This section addresses
traditional methods of resolving water disputes, emergence of the
common law, statutory development, and the emergence of water right
adjudications as unique property law proceedings. This family tree of
cultures, laws and traditions has evolved into our current water right
adjudication processes, and like a genetic code, holds some important
keys to adapting our processes in the future.
A. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF RESOLVING WATER DISPUTES

Westerners rely on formal legal institutions to resolve water right
conflicts along the region's rivers and streams. The statutory general
stream adjudication is the most complex type of these formal methods
of dispute resolution. In earlier times, however, other cultural institutions exercised social control over water. Indian, Hispanic, and Mormon approaches to water management exemplify some of these more
traditional methods.
1. The Ancients

For the early inhabitants of the American West, water embodied
spiritual, cultural, and utilitarian values."' These individuals based
their religious ceremonies, community organization, and economic
practices on a hydrologic cycle that swung seasonally between scarcity
and abundance. Particularly in the Southwest, the rain god, rain lord,
or rain magician controlled clouds, springs, lightning and thunder,
and rain." The rain god, even if capricious, was the giver of life and a
force the ancients were loath to offend." 6
As early as 2000 B.C.E., the inhabitants of the Southwest gradually
progressed from a subsistence based on hunting and gathering to an
economy based on domesticated agriculture.227 The introduction of
maize and squash from Mexico, first as a seasonal dietary supplement,
eventually led to permanent settlements along the Gila and Salt rivers

224- MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY, 1550-1850, at 10-11 (1st paperbound prtg. 1996).
225. Id.atll.
226. Id.
227. Richard B. Woodbury & Ezra B.W. Zubrow, Agricultural Beginnings, 2000 B.C.A.D. 500, in 9 HANDBOOK or NORTH AMERiCAN INDIANs 43, 43 (William C. Sturtevant &
Alfonso Ortiz eds., 1979).
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in present-day Arizona, and organized irrigation appeared by about
300 B.C.E.
The Hohokam, the desert farmers of the American Southwest, organized the irrigation along the Gila and Salt rivers.2' These master
engineers eventually irrigated more than 100,000 acres of land in the
Phoenix area alone."' They built an impressive 135-mile system of canals and lined portions of the canals with clay to reduce seepage.nl
The Hohokam grew maize, beans, and cotton, often producing two
crops per year.12 The canals also provided domestic water although
the Hohokam also used wells, in order to ensure a more stable supply.2"
By approximately 550 C.E., the Hohokam culture extended into
tributary drainages of the Gila River system. ' Villages along the Santa
Cruz, San Pedro, Verde, and Agua Fria rivers supported variations on
the main Hohokam cultural theme.5 During this expansionist period,
the Hohokam deepened and lengthened canals in widespread locations. By about 1450 C.E., however, the Hohokam culture began declining. "6 Many contributing factors could possibly explain the failure
of the irrigation system, including poor maintenance, climate change,
and salinization of soils."7

228.
229.

Id. at 43-44.
George J. Gumerman & Emil W. Haury, Prehistoiy:Hohokam, in 9 HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANs 75, 75 (William C. Sturtevant & Alfonso Oritz eds., 1979).
230. 2 PisANI, supranote 10, at 165.
231.
Id. The largest canal was thirty feet wide, seven feet deep, eight miles long, and
could irrigate 8000 acres. WORSTER, supra note 182, at 34. "The gradients were carefully designed, as Hohokam agriculturalists knew that too slow a rate of flow encouraged excessive evaporation in the canals and too fast a rate induced erosion of the
banks." MEYER, supra note 224, at 12.
232. Gumerman & Haury, supra note 229, at 78.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 75, 77 tbl.1.
235. Id. at 75.
236. Id. at 88.
237. Historian Donald Worster argued that the Hohokam's inability to exercise
regional social control caused the decline:
[L]ocal self-management very soon did not suffice; downstream villages had
to establish control over those living upstream if they were to get any water at
all. The outcome [would have been] a more efficient utilization of rivers--if
efficiency means complete, total use-and a more elaborate legal framework
to resolve conflicting interests.... The Hohokam did not in fact have the full
infrastructural base, nor perhaps did they have the intention, to go that far
toward the consolidation of power.
WORSTER, supra note 182, at 34-35.
The destiny of the Hohokam is unknown. Some authorities feel the Hohokam
became the present-day Pima who were utilizing irrigation when the Spanish arrived in
the sixteenth century. Others believe the Pima were the original inhabitants of the
region who returned after the departure of the Hohokam. Gumerman & Haury, supra
note 229, at 88.
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The later stages of the Hohokam overlapped with the Anasazi culture in the Four Corners region. At sites such as Mesa Verde and
Chaco Canyon, the Anasazi developed their own forms of irrigation
At Chaco
using check dams and diversion structures with canals."
Canyon, the irrigation system helped support a population of 10,000
people."9 As in the case of the Hohokam, soil salinization and climate
change may have contributed to the Anasazi decline, forcing them to
abandon their elaborate rock-formed communities in the 1400s. They
gradually dispersed among the Hopi and Zuni people in the West and
among the Rio Grande valley pueblos to the East.4 '
The first Spanish adventurers, who arrived in 1542, found a simpler
but more widespread irrigation culture along the Gila 41 and Rio
Grande river systems:
The chroniclers of Coronado's expedition refer to the cultivation of
cotton and corn by the Pueblo Indians of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, New Mexico; Espejo, writing of his explorations of 1582-3, speaks
approvingly of the irrigation ditches supplying the pueblos in the
general region of Socorro and above, and refers to irrigation by the
inhabitants of Acoma "with many partitions of the water" in a marsh
two leagues from the pueblo; Father Kino found the Sobaipuris engaged in irrigation at their rancherias in the San Pedro and Santa

Cruz valleys and other tribes elsewhere in Arizona, and relates the use

238.
239.

MEYER, supra note 224, at 12.
Id.

240. Fred Plog, Prehistoty: Western Anasazi, in 9 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS: SOUTHWESr 108, 129-30 (William C. Sturtevant & Alfonson Oritz eds., 1979).
241. In the late twentieth century, the peoples of central and southern Arizona began to call themselves by the name O'odham. When the Spaniards first entered the
region they called Papagueria (lands of the Papago) and Pimeria Alta (upper lands of
the Pima), they gave the speakers of the O'odham language different names. STEPHEN
TRIMBLE, THE PEOPLE: INDIANS OF THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 357-58 (1993).

Sobaipuris lived along the Santa Cruz and San Pedro rivers; Pimas lived along
the Gila River (allied with the Yuman-speaking Maricopa); Papagos lived in
the desert away from the rivers; and Sand Papagos lived in the western and
most arid parts of the Sonoran Desert. Pima and Papago were Spanish[Who] themapplied names that had no meaning to the... O'odham....
selves speak of Akimel O'odhan (River People), whom outsiders call Pimas;
Tohono O'odham (Desert, Country, or Thirsty People), the Papago; and Hia
C-ed O'odham (Sand People), or Sand Papago.... Another analysis of the
O'odham neatly divides them into One Villagers, the Pima, farmers who lived
in permanent villages along rivers with permanent water; Two Villagers, the
Tohono O'odham, who divided their time between a summer village where
they irrigated fields with seasonal floodwaters and a winter home higher in
the mountains near a permanent spring; and No Villagers, the Sand Papago,
many of whom moved through the year, through the most extreme desert,
farming a little, but gathering and hunting for most of their food.
Id. at 358-59.
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of irrigation ditches in providing water for preparing mortar for the
foundations of the church at San Xavier del Bac. .. "'
The southern Arizona Papago developed modest floodplain irrigation on river edges or the mouths of ravines or arroyos, called "akchin" or arroyo-mouth farming. 4 ' Rio Grande valley pueblos utilized
more extensive systems, which continued larger and more complex
ditch systems.
Historians know little about how these traditional Indian communities resolved water rights conflicts. For the pueblos, at least, historical evidence shows they preferred communal undertakings, and built
and managed their irrigation systems as community affairs. 4 ' "The
character and exigencies of their pueblo life led inevitably to public
regulation of irrigation matters; therefore, taking care of the ditches
became one of the important traditional community tasks." '
For other tribes, such as the Hopis, family groups or clans made
decisions about water." Along the Rio Grande, however, " [t] he river
was too powerful for any small clan, or even single pueblo, acting
alone, to tame." 47 Cooperation began to develop among the pueblos,
leading to more centralized authority in the defense of the community
against intruders and for control of water."
Historians know even less about agrarian culture in other parts of
the West during this time. Archaeological evidence suggested that
Coastal and Basin Northwestern tribes did not adopt extensive irrigated agriculture.2 "' In several ways, however, their dispute-resolution
processes reflected a communal sense of property. While prime fishing, hunting and gathering areas might have belonged primarily to
one person, family or clan, the group leader settled conflicts with the
interests of the group as the foremost concern.

242. Wells A. Hutchins, The Community Acequia: Its Origin and Development, 31 Sw.
HIsT. Q. 261, 262 (1928).
243.

WORSTER, supra note 182, at 33-34.

244.

Hutchins, supra note 242, at 263.

245.
246.

Id. at 263. See also MEYER, supra note 224, at 18.
WORSTER, supra note 182, at 33.

247. Id. at 33. See also MEYER, supra note 224, at 18 ("[W] hen water was summoned
to the pursuit of political or military goals, it is likely that this action was tribal or
communal, rather than individual.").
248. WORSTER, supra note 182, at 33.
249. Douglas Cole & David Darling, Himtoiy of the Early Period, in 7 HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: NORTHWEST COAST 119, 131 (William C. Sturtevant & Wayne

Suttles eds., 1990) (noting that Northwest Coast Indians did not engage in true agriculture); Catherine S. Fowler, Subsistence, in 11 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS: GREAT BASIN 64, 94 (William C. Sturtevant & Warren L. D'Azevedo eds., 1986)

(stating that Great Basin peoples only used some brush dams and ditches to irrigate
wild plants).
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2. The Hispanics
New Spain's northern frontier included lands that today comprise
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.2" In addition, New Spain
encompassed the area six Mexican states now occupy, giving New
Spain a total of more than 960,000 square miles." ' The Spanish commenced their conquest of this region in 1542 and soon began to develop the water.5 The Spaniards valued water highly. Throughout
history, Spaniards used water "to bargain, to raise funds, to apply subtle
pressure, and to haughtily coerce. 2

11

In New Spain, water became an

even more central means for sustenance and social control. The early
explorers used major river corridors, such as the San Pedro River in
present-day Arizona, as pathways into unknown territory."' During the
Colonial period, Spaniards used water to pursue social goals including
defense, agriculture, mining, the domination and religious conversion
of the Indians, and protecting Indian populations from the excesses of
individual Spaniards.
As soon as the Spanish conquistador Juan de Ofiate arrived at the
Pueblo of San Juan near the confluence of the Rio Grande and Rio
Chama in 1598, he constructed an irrigation canal with the assistance
of 1500 Indians."' The Spanish also used a sophisticated legal regime
to divide the Southwest's waters. The Spanish water law systems remained in place following the Mexican Republic's creation in 1821
and endured through Texas's independence in 1836, its statehood in
1845, and the cession of New Mexico and California territories in 1848
(formalized in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).258
Spanish water law was not indigenous to the New World, but developed in Spain over centuries. The Spanish legal regime had layers of
Roman, Germanic, and Moorish influences. 7 This compound legal
system demonstrated remarkable tolerance for diversity. "[T]he rulers
of Spain, long before the discovery of America, were familiar with the
problems inherent in trying to reconcile the interests of different races
and different cultures, as well as in juxtaposing the demands of conquerors with the concerns of the conquered." 58
250. MEYER, supra note 224, at 6.
251. Id. at 3.
252. Id. at 25-26.
253. ld. at 21.
254. Id. at 26.
255. This area, near San Juan Pueblo, locus of the first Spanish settlement within the
present boundaries of the United States, remains under adjudication in a case filed in
1968. See New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abbott, Nos. CIV-7488 SC & CIV-8650 SC (D.
N.M. 1968).
256. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2-May 30, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
257. MEYER, supra note 224, at 106.
258. Id. at 108.
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In an effort to unify his diverse realm and standardize the disparate
legal practices, King Alfonso X ordered a major codification of Iberian
law. Completed in 1265, this codification is known as the Las siete partidas del rey don Alfonso el Sabio (commonly known as Las siete partidas).9
This codification reflected the strong influence of ecclesiastical law and
Roman Emperor Justinian's CorpusJurisCivilis.2"
After the settlement of the New World was well underway, Spain
faced the vexing problem of how to administer its colonies, which were
half a world away. Toward that end, the Spanish government drafted
the Recopilaci6n de leyes de los reynos de lts Indias ("the laws of the Indies")
in 1681, a compendium of 6,377 individual laws and directives. 6 ' They
completed a supplemental compilation, the Novisima recopilacidn de las
leyes de Espafia, by 1805, and it constituted the complete articulation of
Spanish law at the end of the Colonial period.262
Spain supplemented these major legal principles with more specific ordinances, royal decrees, and individual cases. Spain issued important decrees regulating water use in 1761.6' Spain promulgated
instructions on water law civil procedure in 1786." The Plan de Pitic
of 1796 also set forth rules for water management.5 The rules applied
in Hermosillo and other new communities throughout the northern
frontier of New Spain.2"
In the colonies, officials emphasized finding judicial solutions to
governmental problems. One scholar concluded Spain focused primarily on the "adjudication between competing interests, rather than.
deliberately planning and constructing a new society. " "
Spanish water law paralleled some community practices of Southwestern Indians, but placed a greater emphasis on land and water as
private property. Although the Spanish Crown claimed all the land
and water in these new territories, the government also employed a
system of complex land and water grants to settle and exploit these
lands, and Christianize the inhabitants. The Crown made land grants
to individual Spaniards, clerical groups intent on building missions
and supporting communities, groups of individuals who sought to establish towns or rural agricultural clusters, and the Indians themselves.

259. Id. at 21.
260. "The system of Roman jurisprudence compiled and codified under the direction of Emperor Justinian, in A.D. 528-534. This collection comprises the Institutes,
Digest (or Pandects), Code, and Novels." BLACK'S LAw DicuToNARY 344 (6th ed. 1990).
261.
MEYER, supra note 224, at 109.
262. Id. at 111.
263. Id. at 112.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 113 (quotingj.H. PARRY, THE SPANISH SEABORNE EMPIRE 194 (1967)).
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The Crown did, however, retain much of the most valuable land for
itself.
Whether these land grants also carried water rights with them was
unclear. Grantees could claim and beneficially use the springs or wells
located on their property." Whether they also had rights to other surface water sources within or bordering on their grants was less certain.
Some scholars argued that explicit grants of water rights were required,
and others believed that both express and implied grants were valid.
Still others argued that a form of prescriptive rights developed, at least
in practice. The predominant view was somewhere in the middle: explicit grants were required in most instances, and the type of land
grant influenced the result."s
Grants of land for grazing purposes included conveyed water
rights, as "Spanish law provided that animals could be watered without
special permission in common water. ' The Crown intended other
grants for farming purposes, so the implication was that the grants contained water rights sufficient to support intensive agriculture and orchards. Spaniards and Indians also used water on Crown lands for
modest domestic purposes and even agriculture. Water on, or appurtenant to, Crown lands was also available for common navigation, embarkation, and fishing purposes, uses similar to those contemplated by
today's public trust doctrine."' A leading authority indicated that there
were no riparian water rights under Spanish law27 although certain
California courts disagreed, indicating that such rights did exist in the
colonies.27
Like the American government several centuries later, the Spanish
Crown "privatized" New Spain lands in a strategic effort to encourage
settlement. Elements of the Spanish legal regime also emphasized
community and the common good. Spanish land grants frequently
268.
269.

Id. at 120.

It is clear; however, that water was granted or withheld on the basis of land
classification. The case for implied water right can be carried too far. The
absence of water provisions in certain land grants cannot be attributed simply
to oversight. Not all land grants, not even all farming grants, were intended
to convey water rights.
Id. at 131.
270. Id. at 125.
271.
See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (explaining the application of the public trust doctrine in the context of the Mono Lake dispute); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. Riv. 473 (1970).
272. MEYER, supra note 224, at 119-20.
273. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 724-30 (Cal. 1886). See also Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years
of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 252, 256-59 (1936) (describing the story in Lux v. Haggin, which resulted in limiting California's appropriative doctrine to public lands still
in federal ownership, but recognizing a riparian doctrine in lands privately held where
appropriation occurred before reservation by patent terms or statute).
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included a "set-aside" of sufficient water for future growth. Rural water
associations, known as acequias (literally, "irrigation canals"), received
easements in order to bring water by ditch to members' fields.
In northern New Mexico and southern Colorado, community
acequias successfully distributed water from the Rio Grande system for
hundreds of years before the region became American territories and
then states. Through the process of mancomunicaci6n, rural irrigators
(parciantes) formed associations to build, maintain, and administer
ditches, usually no more than one to five miles in length. These irrigators elected a ditch supervisor, known variably as the mayordomo or zanjew, who, in some areas, represented the only semblance of government to the rural residents.
Among his many duties of maintaining the ditches and supervising
diversions, the mayordomo adjudicated disputes between parciantes.
When disputes arose between different acequiaswithin the same watershed, the mayordomos from these associations sat together in an effort to
mediate the dispute. Other means of resolving local disputes included
the temporary purchase of water rights or the use of sobrante compacts
between individuals. In these informal agreements, senior users often
pledged to forbear using their surplus water. The beneficiaries of
these sobras frequently constructed reservoirs to store surplus waters.
Priorities thus arose between the sobrante users.
Spanish law also provided more formal methods of resolving water
disputes. One method, the composici6n, was a complicated method
used to cleanse, authenticate, and even modify original grants, 7' often
implemented to define the rights associated with vague land grants. A
governmental authority appointed a commission or an individual to
examine claims and documents and render a decision. A favorable
decision usually cleared the water rights titles in dispute,"6 and the decision could be used in subsequent litigation to prove ownership, if
necessary. The composici6n was thus a one-sided variant of the modern
declaratory judgment action.
The other, more formal method of dispute resolution was the repartimiento de aguas,2'" which resembled modern water rights litigation.
These proceedings were common in the northern frontier, where
274. For more information on the structure and terminology of Spanish water adjudication see generally Hutchins, supra note 242 (discussing Spanish-American irrigation
law); PHIL LOvATo, LAS AcEQUIAS DEL NORTE (1974) (explaining the laws of Acequias);
STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO (1988) (recounting a year in the life a small acequia
in northern New Mexico); Charlotte Benson Crossland, Acequia Rights in Law and Tradition, 32J. Sw. 278 (1990) (analyzing the roles of acequias and questioning whether
modern hierarchical institutions have since replaced them as the most powerful irrigation organizations in New Mexico).
275. MEYER, supra note 224, at 133-34.
276. Id. at 134.
277. Id. at 135.
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drought constantly provoked water right disputes."8 Litigants submitted these conflicts to a waterjudge or appropriate court, where officials
utilized a well-defined set of legal principles embodied in the RecopiThe judicial officer had wide latitude to apply and
laci6n of 1681."
customize these equitable principles. The same set of rules guided the
mayordomos when they conducted the mediations. The most important
elements of these equitable principles were:
1. Land and water tile. The disputing parties had to produce their
tide documents for land and water, and the officials would examine
these titles in a hypertechnical way, even to the point that parties had
to print their tides on paper embossed with the royal seal. The Spanish Crown intended this insistence on formality to protect Indian
property interests, but often the Indians suffered since they could not
produce the proper documents. In the case of the New Mexican
Pueblos of San Ildefonso, Tesuque, Pojoaque, and Nambe, the residents lost their title documents to Spanish officials who borrowed
them for copying and other official purposes and never returned the
originals.2 m
2. Prior appropriation. The judicial officer regarded prior usage as
an important factor in water allocation (although not to the extent it
is in today's western water law). As one official expressed in 1842,
"[pirior use contrary to reason or to good custom can never acquire
the force of law, because in such a case it can be considered no more
than an28old mistake, being less a use than an abuse and an infraction
of law." 1
3. Need. A person's need for water greatly influenced whether the
official would assign him a water right in a repartimiento. Officials
might even award individuals without plausible claims to water some
nominal water usage if they could prove need. By contrast, the officials could revoke explicit grants, if the individual was not using the
water or others needed it. Once, a widow prevailed even without any
title because the investigating official confirmed that her need for water was so great. Her crops had dried up to the point "that not even if
she irrigated them with Holy Water could they be saved." 82
4. Injury to third persons. These equitable principles contained protections for the rights of third parties. If there was a question that a
water right might damage others, the official could appoint an inspector to report on potential impacts (vista de ojos). The inspector's findings could prompt modification of a water right grant. Furthermore,

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 150 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 151-52 (internal citation omitted).
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although Spanish law allowed ditch diggers to construct ditches across
another's property, they had to route8 3the ditches in such a way to
cause the least injury to the landowner.
5. Intent. The outcome of a repartimientoalso depended on the disputants' intent for their water and the extent to which those intentions satisfied or contravened the Crown's overall purposes for the region. Thus, the official considered water destined for mining, cultivation of wheat, or for the use of presidios (forts) more valuable
4 and useful than water intended for other less utilitarian purposes.
6. Legal right. As previously mentioned, proof of legal title was an
important requisite of repartimiento; however, not all legal tiles bore
equal rights. The official deemed water rights for corporate communities, for instance, more important than water rights for individuals.
The judicial officer could even rescind or modify early grants if they
damaged the community. While Spanish law often favored the community over individual rights, it did not do so when community claims
were unjustifiable."
7. Equity and the common good. Fundamentally, the reparlimiento
sought the greatest good for the greatest number. Often, this meant
the corporate community would prevail over individuals. Other
times, individual interests that promised greater benefit to society
won out. Spanish judges had the discretion to balance such factors to
86
achieve ajust result."
As the result of a typical repartimiento, the official might produce a
resolution stated in general terms or award the parties specific quantities of water for rotating periods of use. On occasion, the official divided water into separate channels."
While the repartimientos had legal status, they were not permanent
decrees "as Spanish jurisprudence appreciated that few conflicts were
resolved so wisely that future abuse could not stern from a decision at

283. Id. at 152-53.
284. Id. at 154-55.
285. This is the basis for the much-debated Pueblo Rights Doctrine that has had a
confusing history in southwestern state courts. While some courts recognized the
Pueblo Rights Doctrine as giving certain communities a prior and paramount right to
water necessary for present or future purposes, other courts and authorities have argued that the doctrine is more a preference than an absolute entitlement. Compare City
of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975) (disapproved on
other grounds), City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000)
(adopting the doctrine), and Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 343 P.2d 654
(N.M. 1958) (adopting the doctrine), with State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 89
P.3d 47 (N.M. 2004) (rejecting doctrine).
286. MEYER, supra note 224, at 161-62.
287. Id.at 136.
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one time just. '8 Thus, the repartimientos,like the original grants, were
elastic and the officials could modify them based on individual or
community need. Through this elasticity, officials could also reserve
water for future growth. Many of these methods of dispute resolution
were available to the pueblos and individual Indians. 9
The Spanish water law system described above continues to impact
water adjudications in the American Southwest.29 This is in part due to
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which the United States and Mexico
entered in 1848."' The Treaty required that the United States respect
property rights acquired under Spanish and Mexican law. Some confusion about the application of this "law of state succession" resulted
from the United States Senate's failure to ratify Article X of the Treaty,
which dealt specifically with land grants. Many authorities argued
other provisions of the Treaty did protect Spanish and Mexican water
rights, such as Article VIII, which protected Mexican property "of every
kind." They also argued that the later Protocol of Quer6taro, which
explained and amplified some Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty provisions,
sheltered these rights."'
All said, in addition to a well-defined regime of water rights, the
Spanish left us with an important legal tradition still acknowledged
today:
Fortunately for the courts that would be called upon to apply Hispanic water law.. . , the Hispanic water regimen rested on a rich philosophical foundation, one designed to serve broad individual and
community goals and one which challenged judges to be guided by
what was right and proper, ex aequo et bono.2
3. The Mormons
Even before departing their religious community of Nauvoo in
western Illinois during the winter of 1846, leaders of the Church of
Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints knew their migration would settle
itself in the Great Basin. These Mormon leaders also knew they
288.
289.

Id.

We decree that the audiences name judges, unless it is the custom for the
viceroy, or president, or cabildo to do so, who shall apportion waters to the
Indians for the irrigation of their farms, orchards, and cultivated fields, and
to water their cattle, in such a way as to offend no one.
Id. at 135 (internal citation omitted).
290. See Peter L. Reich, Mission RevivalJurisprudence: State Courts and Hispanic Water
Law Since 1850, 69 WASH. L. REV. 869 (1994).
291. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 256.
292.
Protocol of Querdtaro, May 26, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 1 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ACTS,

PROTOcOLS, AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICAAND OTHER POWERS 1119 (1909).

293.

MEYER, supra note 224, at 188.
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needed to rely upon irrigation to sustain crops in their new home.
They gained this intelligence through the reports of John Fr~mont,
whose expeditions from 1843 to 1845 familiarized him with this territory. 4 Other sources of information about farming in arid lands included Apostle Orson Hyde, who knew of irrigation from his visits to
the Holy Land, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt." Other Mormons such as
members of the Mormon Battalion, who visited the Southwest, knew of
Mexican irrigation from their time spent in the Rio Grande valley. 9 '
When the advance column of the migrating Mormons reached the
Salt Lake valley in July 1847, members began the task of diverting water
from what is now known as City Creek to irrigate their freshly scratched
soils."9 7 Erastus Snow, one of the first settlers, recalled, "We found the
land so dry... that to plough it was impossible, and in attempting to do
so some of the ploughs were broken. We therefore had to distribute
the water over the land before it could be worked."" By the time
Brigham Young arrived on July 24, 1847, the settlers had planted six
acres of potatoes and vegetables.'
The Mormons laid out the plan for the City of Zion, now Salt Lake
City, in a four-square grid pattern, with nineteen wards, each consisting
of nine ten-acre blocks and each block subdivided into eight building
lots. Southeast of the city, the Mormons set aside approximately 8000
acres of land as the "big field," an area for farming in five- to twentyacre parcels.'
During the remainder of the summer of 1847, the Mormons built
diversion dams across City Creek and Big Cottonwood Creek to deliver
water by canals and ditches to individual home lots and farming parcels. For each of the nineteen wards, the citizens appointed a bishop.
The bishop's many duties included assuring the proper construction of
the ditches and the equitable division of the water for culinary, agricultural, and industrial purposes. As described by one historian,
When a group of families found themselves in need of water (or addi-

tional water) to irrigate their farms and gardens, the bishop arranged
for a survey and organized the men into a construction crew. Each
man was required to furnish labor in proportion to the amount of
land he had to water. Upon completion of the project the water
294.
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would be distributed by a ward watermaster in proportion to this labor.!"

Originally, families flood-irrigated these fields once or twice a week.'
Each project's goal emphasized the equitable division and the maximum use of available water.8°3
The church High Council appointed Edson Whipple to the post of
first watermaster in 18 4 7."0 The bishops in each of the nineteen wards
then appointed other watermasters." 5 Thereafter, the bishop's court,
composed of the bishop and two counselors, decided disputes over
water use in a ward. The losing party could always appeal the decision
to the High Council.u6
The Mormon leadership obviously anticipated some political affiliation with the United States. After debating several strategies, elders
decided to organize the State of Deseret as a political entity;"' thereafter, they petitioned Congress for its admission into the Union. From
1849 to 1851, the State of Deseret was the civil authority in the region,
although the lines between civil and church law always remained uncertain. During this period, the General Assembly passed many waterrelated measures. Most of these were financial appropriations for the
construction of dams,"s funding for municipal water resources development,"a and exclusive grants or licenses to waters of specified
streams and rivers." ' In February 1851 the General Assembly author301.
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ized county judges to grant mill and waterpower privileges on any river
or creek. The caveat was that "said privileges do not interfere with the
rights of the community, for common uses, or irrigation,
or any privi3 1
leges heretofore granted by this legislative body."
While the United States Congress rejected the State of Deseret's
overtures for admission as a state, the compromise between slave and
anti-slave forces in Washington, which Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas brokered, allowed the passage of the Utah Territorial Organic Act
in September 1850.1 At that point, Utah created a bicameral territorial legislature, and the President of the United States appointed a
governor.!"3 The Utah Territorial Legislature soon codified many of
the water practices that had existed since the first days of migration
into the Salt Lake valley. The legislature thus legitimized public ownership of water.
Historian Robert Dunbar evaluated early Mormon water management institutions as follows: "These institutions may be best understood by a realization that as members of the Church of the Latter-Day
Saints the colonialists believed that they were participating in a revival
of egalitarian primitive Christianity, with its emphasis on the sharing of
goods."" ' Accordingly, Brigham Young declared on September 30,
1848, "[t]here shall be no private ownership of the streams that come
out of the canyons, nor the timber that grows in the hills. These belong to the people: all the people."" ' Another historian noted that
colonial practices "Ld]eveloped to bring a raw environment into harmony with God's will on the one hand, and to protect the independence that its rawness permitted on the other .
3.1.."6
In these early
years, the Mormons worked cooperatively to develop the maximum use
of water and other natural resources. They cultivated the land individually, but fenced and irrigated it cooperatively. 7
Principles of stewardship, productive use, and small holdings governed land distribution in the Salt Lake valley. The Mormon leadership already decided the basin's natural resources were for public
rather than private use. The community rejected the doctrine of riparian rights, which would have benefited landholders along rivers and
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streams. Public ownership and management of water led to widespread irrigation in the valley.
The influence of the Mormon experience with water and irrigation
spread in many directions from the Salt Lake valley. Individuals established similar water management institutions in Idaho, Arizona, Nevada, and southern California-particularly within Mormon communities. In Idaho, for instance, Mormon missionary Henry H. Spalding,
who diverted water from the Clearwater River to water his garden near
Lapwai, established the first recorded irrigation right.'
His efforts
were followed by Mormon irrigation in the Lemhi, Cache, Bear Lake,
Malad, and Boise valleys."' Thus, from 1855 to 1875, the Mormons
worked cooperatively to build the earliest pioneer canal systems."'
In Arizona, the Mormons were the first non-Indian irrigators in the
northern part of the state."' During 1864 and 1865, Henry W. Miller
began irrigating fruit trees, grapevines, wheat, corn, and other vegetables.'
Members of William C. Allen's company, who settled on the
lower Little Colorado River in 1876 at present-day Joseph City, secured
2
their water rights by agreeing to form an irrigation company."
The St.
Joseph United Order, which handled the irrigation matters within its
jurisdiction, soon supplanted this agreement. 4 Thus, informal associations among Mormons persisted and ruled the day.'3'
By 1880, however, this communitarian use of water began to give
way in the Mormon heartland. Brigham Young died in 1877, and with
him, some measure of the communitarian utopia passed on as well."'
The transcontinental railroad arrived just seven years earlier. 7 A
building boom occurred in the Salt Lake City area in the late 1800s."
Rich mines, bustling commerce, and a booming urban populace put
pressure on existing water supplies. The Utah territorial legislature
passed legislation authorizing county officials to grant water rights to
individuals. " The legislation required that counties record water
rights; it also authorized adjudications to determine superior and infe-
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rior rights."0 Individual property rights in water rapidly replaced community need and the general welfare in the allocation of water rights."'
B. COMMON LAW APPROACHES

Throughout the West, territorial and state courts eventually assumed the role of resolving water right disputes. Despite Hispanic and
Mormon influences, courts applied the rules and procedures of the
Anglo-American legal tradition. In that tradition, courts initially applied common law principles of equity to water conflicts. "
The most basic disputes over water were two-party suits in equity,
seeking injunctive relief, or suits at law for damages. As western water
users soon found out, water litigation was rarely an isolated dispute
between two water users. More frequently, such disputes cascaded
throughout a watershed, ultimately implicating most of the water users
on the river. Here too, the courts attempted to use equitable principles to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits when many people claimed rights
in the same property. For instance, bills in equity were sometimes used
to enable a court to acquire jurisdiction of all the rights involved, and
of all the owners of those rights, to allow the permanent adjudication
of rights and responsibilities in a simple proceeding."'
Western courts gradually developed refined procedures, similar to
"quiet title" actions, to address multi-party litigation over water. These
proceedings originated in the court's general equity power, but were
gradually modified to better suit water rights adjudication. Some of
these modifications enhanced the judicial role, and others vested dispute resolution authority in administrative agencies.
The place of water use dictated jurisdiction in these early equitable
proceedings. In cases of a river or a stream running through different
counties, each county court had jurisdiction. "4 Generally, only a person with an actual right or legal claim to the use of water could bring a
basic adjudication suit against contestants.. The law required parties
to join all other parties with a valid claim. The rights of the defendants, however, were not subject to adjudication unless the defendant
The
affirmatively asserted rights hostile to those of the plaintiff."
330.
331.
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332.
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335.
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336. KINNEY, supra note 332, § 1545, at 2782. See also id. § 1550, at 2795("In a suit in
equity to determine water rights, as the rights of all parties to the action may be adju-
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plaintiff, and all other persons asserting a claim to a water right, bore
the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
The plaintiff was obligated to show every element necessary to establish
a legal basis and prevail."7
In states that recognized both prior appropriation and riparian
doctrines, an adjudication in equity determined the respective rights
33
Thus, even conflicting
between these appropriators and riparians.
legal regimes did not diminish an action in equity. Courts could also
determine tides to ditches, canals, and easements in these proceedings.3 9
In response to the workload generated by the constant conflict
over water rights, common law courts developed procedures tailored
for trying these unusually complicated cases. Some courts used referees or commissioners to hear and summarize evidence for the court's
benefit before trial.' Judges often left the bench to make personal
examinations of the water source so they could develop better information to support their findings.' In the majority of the cases, the judge
also could submit questions of fact to ajury to solicit advisory opinions,
although some jurisdictions disfavored this practice.'
The goal of these proceedings was a court decree that would stand
the test of time and definitively award respective rights to the parties in
the action. "
Unfortunately, this goal persistently eluded western
common law courts. Some decrees lacked specificity, with the court
postponing the actual determination of the rights to a future date.'"
Some courts were even unsuccessfully called upon to undertake the
These
especially difficult task of apportioning subterranean waters.'
heavy tasks inevitably generated unsatisfactory results.
The principal and predictable shortcoming of these procedures
was that they failed to produce final results.' For instance, the lack of
finality in an 1898 adjudication between the southern New Mexico
town of Alamogordo and a neighboring community perpetuated redundant litigation even twenty-five years later." 7 Also, despite their
dicated in the same action, defendants are entitled to set up their claims inter se in their
answers, and have the same adjudicated on such notice as the law and the Court may
prescribe.").
337. Id. § 1554, at 2802-03.
338. Id.§ 1540, at 2771.
339. Id. § 1541, at.2771.
340. Id. § 1553, at 2800.
341.
Id.
Id. § 1553, at 2801-02; see Parke v. Boulware, 63 P. 1045, 1045 (Idaho 1901).
342.
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See La Luz Community Ditch Co. v. Town of Alamogordo, 279 P. 72, 73 (N.M.
1929).
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success in obtaining an injunction against a junior upstream acequia,
the result disappointed seven senior acequias in northern New Mexico.
The decree could not be enforced, causing the parties to engage in
further litigation, almost twenty years later."'
Law professor Albert W. Stone vividly documented the lack of finality in Montana's early adjudications. They were conducted under a
bare-bone, 1885 stream adjudication statute that only slightly modified
Stone summarized the litigation on
common law procedures.
Dempsey Creek, a small stream less than twenty miles in length, as follows: "fourteen lawsuits [extending from 1891 to 1966,] with eight decisions by the Montana Supreme Court. In nearly every one of these
lawsuits, all or substantially all of the people in the community of
Dempsey Creek were litigants. " " Continuing his lament, Stone observed that repetitive adjudications also bedeviled other Montana watersheds." °
While quiet tide actions could decree absolute rights to a specific
piece of real estate, water right actions assigned merely relative, conditional rights, as they were linked to a constantly changing resource. In
order to forestall an endless stream of parties suing one another to
assert rights to the same water source, all parties affected by a given
water supply were required to join the litigation. With such a bulky list
of participants, it was simply too difficult and expensive for parties to
bring the issue before the court. The inability of private parties to secure jurisdiction over the United States government and its large portfolio of water claims only compounded the problem.
Another recurrent problem with the adjudication of appropriative
rights was notice. In the mining camps of California and elsewhere in
the West, an appropriator gave notice of priority and ownership to
others through the customary requirement of a posting at the point of
diversion. This method, of course, provided notice only in a limited
area and did little to bar competing claims. Mere notice also failed to
produce a reliable record to assist parties in later resolving conflicts."
When addressing this deficiency in 1872, the California legislature
required that, in addition to posting notice at the site of diversion, appropriators must record the notice with the county clerk or recorder,
within ten days of posting." While this statute seemed like a solution
and many other western states emulated it, the requirement did not go
far enough. Many pioneers planned projects and filed notices, but
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nonetheless failed to complete them."m Water users and state officials
could not determine the number and priorities of the appropriations
on a stream without resorting to an expensive and often inconclusive
adjudication."
As the nineteenth century closed, the West was changing rapidly.
Population grew in urban centers, fueled by prosperity from mining,
ranching, and railroads. Water disputes among neighbors escalated.
The courts were increasingly called upon to resolve them and, although the litigation rarely exceeded a dozen parties, the frequency of
conflicts continued to erode the security of all water users along a river
system.
C.DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES

As young western states gradually increased their governmental
competence, they continued to strengthen their authority over their
water resources. They did so in one of three ways. First, states sought
to regulate the initial appropriations of water. Second, states supervised the diversion, distribution, and use of water. Third, states began
adjudicating existing water rights.
One of the major water policy issues in the West during the last one
hundred thirty years has been whether the executive or the judicial
branch of government should control these water management functions. A few states chose to entrust these matters primarily to the judiciary. Other states chose to have an administrative agency handle all
three functions. Still other states fell between these extremes, but often with a strong preference for administrative authority over water
rights.'
The neighboring states of Colorado and Wyoming, which have very
different systems for managing water rights, illustrate this diversity of
choices. Colorado relies almost entirely on an adjudicatory system,
while Wyoming uses an administrative approach. What accounts for
this difference between neighboring states with a common heritage
and so many shared waterways?
To answer this question, one might consult Robert G. Dunbar's history of western water law, Forging New Rights in Western Waters.'m One
thing is certain: the reasons for the different approaches are also the
persistent root causes for many of the problems in western stream adjudications, some enduring more than a century later.
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1. Colorado System
The struggles between rival irrigation colonies in the 1870s along
Colorado's Cache la Poudre River made clear the need for a more expedient means for resolving conflicts between competing appropriators. An irrigation convention held in December 1878 sought to develop legislation to end these disputes."7 The convention proposed an
administrative system of water commissioners empowered to determine
and enforce water rights inside each irrigation district. Legislation
empowered a water commissioner "to call for persons and papers, administer oaths, take testimony and [render decisions] in regard to the
[rights of claimants to] the use of water."" 8 Parties could appeal to
district court. " Some water users were pleased because they believed
that such administrative determination would be more expedient than
the courts.
When the proposed bill reached the irrigation committee of the
Colorado House of Representatives, however, the lawyer-members of
the committee took a different approach. The committee rewrote the
bill, believing the determination of property rights, including water
rights, was the proper domain of the courts. Colorado's General Assembly passed this version into law.3"
The 1879 law authorized district judges to appoint a water referee
who would hear evidence on water claims." ' Each claimant was to present proof of the dates ditches were constructed or enlarged, the capacity of those ditches, and the amount of water they carried. After the
referee gathered evidence and presented a report, the judge issued a
decree establishing the priorities of each ditch within the district."2
Water commissioners enforced these decrees. By choosing this approach, Coloradoans made a commitment to quantify and allocate
water rights in ajudicial setting.
Not everyone was satisfied with this approach. A workable solution
agreed to by all continued to elude the state for several more years.
For instance, during 1879 and 1880, one water referee gathered evidence of water rights on the controversial Cache la Poudre. When the
resulting report reached District Judge Victor Elliott, he refused to
render a decree." The judge criticized the system because it required
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Id. § 20, at 100.
362. This system is very similar to the system adopted by Montana in 1979. Like
Colorado, the Montana legislature also decided that water rights should be determined
in ajudicial setting.
363. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 94.

WATER LA W RE VIEW

Volume 8

the judiciary itself to initiate contested proceedings while bypassing the
customary complaint and summons requirement:
I cannot bring myself to depart from the English and American systems of jurisprudence. In the administration of justice in an English
court there are always parties, and sometimes four: the actor, the
plaintiff; the reus, the thing; the judex, the court; and the juratta,the
jurors; and each have their separate and proper functions to perform.
I cannot consent... to bring myself to leave the judicial position in
which I have been placed by the constitution... and take the position
of any actor, to go around to determine, without being solicited, what
are the rights of the respective owners of ditches in these several water
districts.3

A petition to the Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to
force Judge Elliott to issue a decree was unsuccessful. 6
Colorado's 1881 legislative session passed several bills in an attempt
to remedy the deficiencies Judge Elliott identified. The resulting legislation required adjudication proceedings to be initiated by petition.'
After the filing of such a petition, the district judge appointed a referee, and issued notice to all claimants within the district. After holding
hearings, the referee prepared a draft decree and submitted it to the
judge. The judge then conducted hearings on the proposed decree
and issued the decree, after any necessary modifications. The clerk of
the court then provided each successful claimant with a certificate
awarding an appropriation date and setting a quantity of water to
which the holder was entitled. 7
After these modifications, one flaw still persisted: the law did not allow the state engineer, who represented the public granting the water
right, to participate in the adjudication or question the accuracy of
364. Id. (quotingJudge Ellis in No. 320 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1880) (emphasis added)).
The judge also indicated:
I shall... insist that someone who may desire to have a decree entered in any
particular water district, shall become an actor by serving out process, and
bringing others in to answer; and that when that shall have been done ...
and the case shall then be regularly before the court upon the testimony
taken by the referee . .. together with a simple complaint and a simple answer, the court shall then enter upon the investigation of the rights of the
parties at their solicitation and enter a decree determining their rights in the
premises.
Id. at 94-95. This decision resulted in severe criticism of the legal professionl
criticisms that have echoed since in other states: "[M en of hidebound precedents...
of blind conservatism ... looking ahead to endless fat jobs about to come to them from

the wasting and ceaseless litigation likely to arise in reference to the establishing of
priority of claims to the use of water." DAVID BoYD, A HIsToRY; GREELEY AND THE
UNION COLONY 128-31
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claims.s" As a consequence, the courts operated without vital hydrologic information and awarded water rights that exceeded the capacity
of the streams." ° A worried state engineer reported in 1886:
So great was this in some instances [the discrepancy between decreed
and actual carrying capacity of many ditches] that the results of the
gaugings and the decreed capacity seemed to have no connection
with each other. Ditches were met with having decreed capacities of
two, three and even five times the volume they were capable of carrying .... It needs no argument to show the worse than uselessness of

these decrees as a guide to the Water Commissioner in the performance of his duties.3'70
Despite these administrative flaws, Colorado's water legislation of
1879 and 1881 firmly established the judicial adjudication of water
rights. This preference continues in Colorado today.
2. Wyoming System
The hard lesson of over-appropriation under Colorado's judicial
decrees was not lost on Elwood Mead, one of the deans of western water law. Mead came to Colorado to teach mathematics at Colorado
Agricultural College in Fort Collins in 1882.' He affiliated with Bryant
La Grange, the first water commissioner on the Cache la Poudre
River. 7 ' Mead came to share La Grange's concern about the overappropriation of streams that overly optimistic court decrees caused.
La Grange argued for a "Board of State Control" which, by using a water permit system, would issue water privileges while remaining mindful of stream capacity."
Mead observed the pattern of overappropriation during summers when he gauged irrigation ditches for
the state engineer. From 1886 to1887, Mead helped the Colorado
State Grange and state engineer promote legislation to create a Board
of Control that would govern all water diversions in the state. "7 ' The
measure did not reach the house floor for debate.
A year later, Wyoming appointed Mead its first territorial engineer.17' Because Wyoming replicated many of Colorado's water laws,
368. Id. at 98.
369. Id.
370. Id.at 101.
371. Id.at 99.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 100.
374. Id. at 102-03. Mead was influenced by a reading of IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
(1886) by William Hammond Hall, the California state engineer, who investigated the
irrigation institutions of France, Italy, Spain, and ancient Rome. Id. at 103. Hall reported on the tribunal de aguas in Valencia which allocated and enforced rights on
streams-apparently another source for Mead's concept of a board of control. Id.
375. Id. at 105.
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Mead found many over-appropriated streams and a lack of adjudication 6
In 1889, Wyoming was on the verge of statehood. The deliberations of the constitutional convention afforded an opportunity to rewrite the water laws of the jurisdiction. With Mead in attendance, the
irrigation and water rights committee of the convention drafted an
article declaring that streams were the property of the state, therefore
placing streams under the supervision of a Board of Control, dividing
Wyoming into four water divisions, and creating the office of state engineer."s The convention approved these measures, and they became
part of the state's constitution."'
In 1890, other legislation provided the only means of obtaining
new water rights: by applying to the state engineer.' Also, the Board
of Control oversaw the adjudication of existing rights. Pursuant to this
legislation, the state engineer could initiate adjudication by measuring
the flow of a stream and gauging the capacities of the ditches it
A divisional superintendent conducted hearings and comserved.'
piled evidence on existing uses. The engineer and superintendent
then submitted their reports to the Board, which made the final quantification and set priority dates. The legislation added a statutory
quantification limit of one cubic foot per second for each seventy acres
of irrigated land. 8 '
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this
legislation in Farm Investment Company v. Carpenter,where the plaintiff
challenged, among other things, the Board of Control's function,
claiming it violated the separation of powers doctrine."2 The court
found the Board "act[ed] judicially; but the power exercised [was]

376. Id. at 105-06. Dunbar also quotes from a letter from Mead to Senator William
M. Stewart of Nevada: "The public waters of our streams... are conferred upon parties
who . . . build ditches regardless of its [sic] effect on the conservation of the water
supply or the expense of regulating its distribution." Id. at 106.
377. Id. at 107.
378.

Id. at 108. The convention added the proposal into the Wyoming Constitution

as follows:
There shall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of
the state and of their appropriation, distribution, and diversion, and of the
various officers connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by
the courts of the state.
Id. (quoting Wvo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).
379. Id. at 109.
380. Id. at 110.
381. 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 25 (codified at WvO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-322 (Michie
2003)).
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may
quasi judicial only, and [as] such, under proper circumstances,
3 83
appropriately be conferred upon executive officers or boards.
Nebraska.. and Alaska... replicated the Wyoming system. Alaska
statutes owe their parentage to the then-Dean of the Wyoming Law
School, Frank Trelease, who advised Alaska as it developed its Water
Code.
Historian Dunbar concisely portrayed the philosophy behind the
Wyoming approach, in contrast with that of Colorado:
[T]he essence of [the Wyoming system] lay in the subordination of
the appropriator to the welfare of the state. The interest of the state
or the community came first, that of the individual irrigator second.
Gone were the days in Wyoming when an appropriator, without anybody's leave, could post a notice, dig a ditch, install a dam, and divert
the waters of a stream. Water was too limited a resource to be diverted and wastefully used without regard for the rights of others.
Since it was the property of the state, rights to its use were to be
granted by the state, adjudicated by the state, and protected by the
state. 116
Despite the distinctions between their water rights systems, Colorado
and Wyoming had something in common: as their systems matured,
core controversies emerged. The proper scope of authority of the
newly founded administrative agencies was unclear. The states also
struggled to balance the public's need to regulate water rights with
private property interests in water. These controversies endure today.
3. Hybrid Approaches: the Bien Code
Given the differences between the Colorado and Wyoming approaches, it was natural for intermediate methods to develop. One
approach was based on the so-called "Bien Code" while another resulted from Oregon's adjudication statute.
Soon after Congress passed the 1902 Reclamation Act, many western states were eager to secure federal funding to build reservoirs and
canals. "7 The Reclamation Service, however, had conflicting concerns.
The agency feared riparian rights and undocumented appropriative
rights might siphon large amounts of project water to riparian or appropriative users outside those projects.
States also were concerned that inadequacies in their water laws
would be an impediment to obtaining federal reclamation projects.
383. Id. at 267.
384. See NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-226 to -231 (Michie 2002).
385. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.060, .065, .165- .169 (Michie 2004).
Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATERL. REv. 1, 29 (1967).
386. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 109.
387. See discussion concerning Reclamation Act supraPart II.D.
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Recognizing the need for a workable adjudication system in their
states, the governors of Oregon and Washington requested assistance
from the United States Reclamation Service in 1903." Morris Bien, a
Reclamation Service lawyer-engineer, drafted a model code for state
administration of water in 1904.'
Under the Bien Code, a state administrative agency made hydrographic surveys and developed related data.' Upon completion of the
survey, the agency delivered its information to the state attorney general, often in the form of a proposed determination."' The state attorney general then brought suit within a specified period, usually sixty
days, and made all water users in the basin parties to the action. 92 The
Code also gave the attorney general the authority to intervene in pending private water adjudications. After a mandatory period for objections had elapsed, and the court completed hearings on the objections,
the court issued a final decree. Throughout the proceedings, the
court could call upon the administrative agency to provide it with hydrological facts.
The Bien Code also vested the state engineer with the authority to
issue permits for new water uses. Once a user established beneficial
use under the permit rules, the state engineer issued a certificate of
water right. The Code served as a hybrid model for general stream
adjudications and North Dakota," ' South Dakota,39 New Mexico,"' and
Oklahoma.'
Oregon's system, formulated in 1909, also blended these judicial
and administrative procedures. 97 As in Wyoming, the Oregon adjudication process began with the state engineer, who undertook a hydrographic survey and prompted water users to complete filings to secure
their claims. With this information in hand, the state engineer developed a proposed order of determination specifying water rights and
their priority. The proposed order was then filed with the appropriate
district court, which held hearings on objections to the proposed order. If no party objected, the district court was required to affirm the
"
proposed order. Arizona, California,"' Nevada,' Texas,' Utah,4
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 119-20.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-15 to -20 (2003).
S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 46-10-1 to -13 (Michie 2004).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-13 to -19 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1997).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.6-.8 (West 1991).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 539.010-.350, 541.310-.320 (2003).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-251 to -264 (West 2003).
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-2900 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005).
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.090-.320, 534.100 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2003).
TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.301-.341 (Vernon 2000).
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Washington, "3 and Idaho 4 followed the Oregon-hybrid approach substantially.
4. Statutory Efforts to Assist Private Litigation
By the middle of the twentieth century, western states enacted further refinements, usually to assist parties in small, private water rights
cases. Private litigants were allowed to request assistance from administrative agencies. They could also request the court to refer matters to
administrative agencies for investigation and reporting. For instance,
in the 1940s, Idaho courts could request reports from the State Department of Reclamation regarding any water source involved in litigation."5 Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota also
Those states
embraced this kind of judicial/scientific method.
adopted legislation that requiredstate agencies to draft a hydrographic
survey report for every suit involving water rights.
Likewise, California and Kansas adopted reference procedures.
These allowed the court to refer factual issues and legal issues in some
cases to an administrative agency for a report. Once the agency submitted its report to the court, the litigants could file exceptions to it.
These procedures the western states adopted frequently reflected the
scientific management movement of the time by routing scientific information into these cases.
Finally, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah empowered their
courts with even more flexibility. Those states adopted legislation in
the 1950s that allowed courts to broaden private water rights litigation,
shaping the cases into more comprehensive proceedings where appropriate.
D.

SPECIAL CHALLENGES FACING STATUTORY ADJUDICATIONS

In the first-half of the twentieth century, water right adjudications
responded to the rapid economic growth of the West and filled the
need for certainty about water supply. Stream adjudications assisted
western economic development by resolving the ownership of water
rights and setting the parameters of those rights.
Routinely, adjudications faced special challenges. For instance,
some states integrated rights with origins in two disparate legal regimes, the riparian and appropriative rights doctrines, which compli-

402. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1996). See generally Robert W.
Swenson, A Primerof Utah Water Law: PartII, 6J. ENERY L. & POL'Y 1 (1985).
403. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.110-.245 (West 2004).
404. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1401 to -1428 (Michie 2003).
405. Id. § 42-1404.
406. See, e.g., CAL. WATERCODE §§ 2000-2017 (West 1971).
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0 7
In some cases, the need to reconcile
cated the adjudication effortY
the dichotomy between the entrenched and utterly different laws gov-

erning surface water and groundwater posed the biggest task. Some
states engaged in adjudications to shore up municipal water supplies,
forced to balance their own future against the practices of the past.
Other states directed great effort at inventorying water uses to capture
the prize of federally supported reclamation projects. Statutory adjudications proved a useful approach to these water management problems.
1. Integration of Riparian and Appropriative Rights
While some states, such as Colorado, abolished riparian rights at an
early date, other states acquiesced to the creation of water rights under
both doctrines and could no longer easily resort to the "abolition" solution. In many Great Plains and Pacific Coast states, the riparian water rights doctrine was seen as a threat to economic development. Although many state courts relaxed some of the riparian doctrine's more
rigid aspects, many people still regarded it as a limitation to water uses,
confining them to the narrow bands of riparian lands adjacent to state
waterways. Even in states that tolerated both the riparian and appropriative doctrines, the uncertainty of downstream riparian demands
hampered the economic activity of appropriators. Future accelerated
riparian uses on a seemingly water-abundant stream could jeopardize
irrigation and storage projects built in reliance on appropriative rights.
Such uncertainties made the need to integrate the riparian and
prior appropriation rights very clear. General stream adjudications in
several states became the means to integrate the two doctrines. Nebraska, Texas, and Kansas serve as examples.
a. NebraskaIntegrationEfforts
Nebraska, transected by the hundredth meridian, has a humid region in the eastern part of the state adjoining the Missouri River and a
more arid region to the west. Its territorial legislature adopted the
riparian doctrine to manage these resources in 1855."°* As irrigation
called for more water, the legislature and courts developed a more
flexible doctrine of water distribution. The first vestiges of appropriation principles appear in Nebraska statutes passed in 1877' that authorized the transport of water across the lands of other persons, and

407. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 67.
408. THORSON, supra note 92, at 36.
409. NAT'LWATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY-DIGESTOF STATEWATER LAWS461 (Richard L.
Dewsnut et al. eds., 1973).
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in 1889 statutes that authorized the appropriation of surface water by
posting and recording a notice of appropriation.",
The 1895 irrigation law built upon these initial steps and delineated a comprehensive statutory scheme for adjudicating existing appropriative rights and permitting appropriative rights in the future."'
The 1895 statute also eliminated any new riparian rights after its passage.
In the decade following the 1895 statute, the Nebraska Board of Irrigation proceeded to adjudicate pre-existing water rights on all of Nebraska's streams."' In 1911, the Nebraska legislature directed the State
Board of Irrigation, Highways and Drainage to completely adjudicate
any rights remaining in question."4 These proceedings substantially
completed the adjudication of existing rights. Statutory adjudications
still occur on a periodic basis to reexamine appropriative permits in
cases where parties allege possible abandonment or forfeiture. Most
holders of pre-1895 riparian rights either have given them up or replaced them with new appropriative rights. One feature of Nebraska's

system is unique: its state agency does not take into account riparian
uses when it issues new appropriative permits. Nebraska has no explicit method for registering riparian uses and converting them into
appropriative rights.
b. Texas IntegrationEfforts
Like Nebraska and other Great Plains states, Texas faced the challenge of reconciling water rights based on the riparian doctrine with
those based on the prior appropriation doctrine. From 1840 to 1895,
Texas recognized riparian water rights under the English common law,
but limited withdrawals to quantities needed for reasonable use."'
Following the lead of other states, Texas passed irrigation acts in
1889, 1895, and 1913.4" The acts interjected the prior appropriation
doctrine into surface water management. The 1895 and 1913 statutes
also included a statewide permitting program. Legislation in 1917"'L set
up an adjudication procedure; one of its goals included phasing out
riparian rights. In Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight, the court declared this adjudication process unconstitutional as an improper exer-

410.

Id. at 461-62. See aLsoJames A. Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv.

385, 386-87 (1950) ("In 1889, by an act popularly known as 'The Rayner Irrigation

Law,' the legislature expressly adopted the principle of prior appropriation.").
411. Id. at 387-88.
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cise of judicial powers by an administrative agency. "8 The state undertook a similar adjudication system in 1951, but it, too, was declared
unconstitutional in 1958. 4' 9
With no statutory mechanism to conduct an adjudication, the
Texas Water Commission and water users experimented with other
procedures in an attempt to address the conflicts between riparian and
appropriative users, as well as other water management problems facing the state. Federal court class actions involving rights along the Rio
Grande were one such mechanism, but they ultimately proved unsuccessful.
For instance, in Martinez v. Maverick County Water Conservation &
Improvement District,a class comprised of riparian plaintiffs attempted to
sue a class of appropriators." 0 They failed; the court held that the lawsuit constituted a spurious class action.'

Later, in Miller v. Jennings,"

the federal appellate court ruled that a class action involving the upper
portion of the Rio Grande did not satisfy the federal McCarran
Amendment," which provided a limited basis for waiving federal sovereign immunity, because the class action failed to not join all the
claimants possibly affected by the outcome. Class actions in Texas state
court were more successful,2 4 but they too ultimately proved unsatisfactory. These cases failed to determine the water rights of individual
class members."5
Finally, some success: the State of Texas, acting through its water
commission, filed a declaratory action involving all water rights, both
riparian and appropriative, in the Rio Grande below Falcon Reservoir." ' A court of appeals decision finally resolved conflicting water
claims in the lower valley by utilizing an "equitable water rights doctrine." However, "the case took over thirteen years to decide, involved
roughly 3,000 parties, and cost an estimated $10 million in court costs
and attorneys fees."4"7
418. Bd. of Water Eng'rs v. McKnight, 229 S.W. 301, 307 (Tex. 1921).
419. S. Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs, 318 S.W.2d 619, 621, 625 (Tex. 1958).
420. Martinez v. Maverick County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 219 F.2d 666,
667 (5th Cir. 1955).
421. Id. at 672.
422. Miller v.Jennings, 243 F.2d 157, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1957).
423. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000)). See discussion of the McCarran Amendment infra section V.
424. See Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. v. Cameron County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 253 S.W.2d 294, 296, 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Valmont
Plantations v. State, 355 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. 1962).
425. See Corwin W. Johnson, Adjudication of Water Rights, 42 TEX. L. REv. 121, 122-23
(1963) (detailing the problems with general stream adjudications).
426. State v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 443 S.W.2d 728,
730-31 (Tex. Civ. App.1969).
427. Doug Caroom & Paul Elliott, Water Rights Adjudication - Texas Style, TEX. BARJ.
1183, 1184 (Nov. 1981 ) (explaining Texas' continual struggle with regulating ground-
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c. Kansas IntegrationEfforts
Territorial Kansas, another example, applied the riparian law doctrine to surface water and used the English "absolute ownership" doctrine for groundwater. While this approach worked successfully for the
humid eastern portion of the state, it proved less desirable in the more
aridwestern areas.
Like Nebraska and Texas, Kansas faced the difficult problem of
competing riparian and appropriative law. The downfall of the riparian doctrine in Kansas occurred in the 1880s and took approximately
ten years.2 8 Agricultural expansion in the western portion of the state
prompted the decline of the doctrine. The legislature passed new irrigation laws that authorized water diversions from streams to nonriparian fields, " a practice not previously allowed under the traditional
riparian doctrine. Legislation passed in 1917" and 1919431 allowed
permits for water appropriation. By the 1940s, state political leaders
and water law experts feared that the ability of inactive riparian owners
to later claim the water stored or diverted in reclamation projects
would jeopardize anticipated Bureau of Reclamation projects in the
state.432
Nebraska, Texas, and Kansas, experienced a difficult transition
from riparian doctrine to the appropriative doctrine, The fundamental philosophical bases of the two approaches were hard to reconcile.
Riparianism put a premium on reasonable use and social responsibility, but stymied the march of irrigation science and economic development. Prior appropriation rewarded risk takers and encouraged
development, but often at the expense of the "commons." Adjudications effectively imposed metrics on inchoate uses, but time and the
inexorable pressure of growth in the West finally became the most effective agents in the abolition of riparianism.
2. Integration of Surface Water and Groundwater Laws
Some states unified the laws that governed surface water and
groundwater through general stream adjudications. Kansas again
serves as an example. In the 1930s, the City of Wichita earmarked
groundwater sources in order to augment its burgeoning municipal

water use, and the failure of the adjudicatory effort to include federal reserved rights
for Native Americans or other public lands). Also, in comparison to some of the general stream adjudications described in this article, this was a modest case.
428. John C. Peck, The Kansas Water AppropriationAct: A Fifty-Year Perspective,43 KAN.
L. REv. 735, 737 (1995).
429.
Id.
430. Act of Mar. 13, 1917, ch. 172 § 4, 1917 Kan. Sess. Laws 218, 218-19.
1919 Kan. Sess. Laws.
431.
432.
See Peck, supra note 428, at 740.
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water system. ' Wichita explored promising sites in rural areas surrounding the city and, by the early 1940s, leased land twenty miles
north of the city to sink wells and divert water."' Wichita's campaign
accentuated the weaknesses inherent in the absolute ownership doctrine, as it pertained to groundwater.
Landowners overlying the Equus Beds, fed from the stream Wichita
sought to use, resisted Wichita's efforts to obtain an appropriation
permit from the state's chief engineer."' The dispute resulted in a decision by the Kansas Supreme Court that defeated Wichita's overtures
because of the impingement on vested water rights. 3 That opinion
sounded the death knell for both the absolute ownership doctrine and
riparian law in Kansas. In the aftermath of the decision, a gubernatorially appointed water study commission recommended major changes
in Kansas' water law adopted by the 1945 legislature."7
The resulting Water Appropriation Act of 1945" eliminated any future distinction between surface and groundwater by requiring that
users obtain a permit for all future uses. The legislature addressed the
problem of pre-1945 riparian uses and groundwater rights by directing
the chief engineer to undertake the determination of those rights and
give them legal definition under prior appropriation principles. Thus,
the legislature recognized and gave priority to any pre-1945 water use,
defined as water beneficially applied some time in the three years prior
to the Act. As for quantity, such vested rights were determined based
on their "maximum quantity and rate of diversion for the beneficial
use made thereof." ' The legislature refused to expansively determine
domestic uses.
Using these guidelines, the chief engineer systematically identified
and investigated existing uses in each Kansas county. By 1956, the state
engineer substantially completed this adjudication and recommended
the establishment of approximately 5000 water rights."
3. Municipal Growth
Municipal growth pressures prompted major adjudications in several states, including Oklahoma. In 1905, the Oklahoma territorial
legislature adopted an adjudication and permitting system"' based on
the model code prepared by Reclamation Service's Morris Bien. The
433.
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system contemplated water rights adjudications covering the entire
state, but the court only completed four regional adjudications. The
water supply needs of major municipalities prompted these adjudications. The adjudications produced the Tulsa Decree of 1938;44 the
Oklahoma City-Canadian Decree of 1939;"" the Durant Decree of
1955;... and the Oklahoma City-Atoka Decree of 1958."'
The court dismissed and reinstated a fifth adjudication, involving a
Bureau of Reclamation project on the Washita River aimed at supplying municipal water, however, the court failed to complete the adjudication."' Similarly, the court ultimately dismissed a final adjudication,
involving a Bureau of Reclamation project to supply municipal water to
Norman, Midwest City, and Del City."'
4. Reclamation and Determination of Existing Rights
At the turn of the century, several themes coalesced in a more rational, science-based approach to public affairs. Businesses from assembly lines to retail stores embraced the popular scientific manageGovernment, too,
ment techniques pioneered by Frederick Taylor.'
tried scientific management techniques by using professional managers and employees selected and promoted on the merit basis, in an
attempt to sidestep the favoritism and inefficiency inherent in politics.
The natural resource management field adopted these principles
with even more enthusiasm. In response to the forceful promotion by
President Theodore Roosevelt and his chief forester Gifford Pinchot,
bureaucrats applied progressive scientific management principles to
forest and river systems. Multiple use development, with its goal of
extracting maximum benefits from natural resources, became the
watchword of federal land management agencies. The Reclamation
Act of 1902, sponsored by Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, typified the federal government's commitment to helping local communities develop their watersheds to yield maximum benefits for all.'"
As the United States Reclamation Service implemented the Reclamation Act, it became apparent that tattered and uncertain water right
records in many states created a situation with the potential to hamper
The federal government could conceivably
reclamation projects.'
442. City of Tulsa v. Grand-Hydro No. 5263 (D. Okla. Feb. 14, 1938).
443. Oklahoma City v. City of Guymon, No. 99028 (D. Okla. Dec. 20, 1939).
444. City of Durant v. Pexton, No. 19662 (D. Okla. 1955).
445. Oklahoma City v. State Bd. of Pub. Affairs, No. 10217 (D. Okla. Oct. 28,1958).
446. Oklahoma v. City of Anadarko, No. 18450 (D. Okla.).
447. City of Norman v. Schwartz, No. 18409 (D. Okla. June 30, 1959).
448. See generally FREDERICK WINSLow TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENrIFIC
MANAGEMENT (originally published in 1911) (1998).
449. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388.
450. WIEL, supra note 332, § 1428, at 1331.
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spend millions of dollars on a project, only to have most of the necessary water claimed by undocumented senior appropriators or holdout
riparian users refusing to join in the pledge to pay for the project. To
prevent this risk, the Secretary of the Interior instituted a contractual
requirement requiring the local water users association to "take
prompt action to secure the determination by the courts of the relative
rights of its shareholders to the use of the water for said lands ....
While the Secretary of the Interior easily issued mandates for the
quantification of existing rights, the Secretary had a much harder time
specifying how the quantification should occur. Common law judicial
remedies proved inefficient, and the administrative adjudication developed by Elwood Mead became the best alternative available. Many
state leaders, however, were unwilling to bestow their administrative
agencies with the powers called for by Mead's system. Some leaders
even questioned the constitutionality of doing so.
In 1903 at the behest of the governors of Washington and Oregon,
the Reclamation Service addressed these doubts. The Service developed a guide that detailed the ways in which western states could better
manage their water and thereby ensure state receipt of reclamation
funds. Morris Bien, the Reclamation Service lawyer-engineer, authored this model water code, as previously discussed.
In response to this model and Reclamation Service requirements,
several states undertook large water rights determinations. These cases
were part of the price the states paid to enjoy the promise of reclamation. Adjudications were required to obtain reclamation projects in
Oregon, New Mexico, and other states. Nevada, Arizona, and Washington also commenced such adjudications, and their experiences are
discussed in the following.
a. Nevada Adjudications
The prospect of reclamation funding to support local water development gave impetus to Nevada's stream adjudications. Nevada was
the site of one of the first reclamation projects, the Newlands Project
on the Truckee and Carson Rivers near Reno.
In 1903, the state legislature noted that the proposed reclamation
project could increase irrigated farmlands from 432,000 acres to over
1.4 million acres, vastly increasing the state's population and wealth."
The laws enacted toward that end reflected a clear understanding of
what was at stake: "[T] he Secretary of the Interior, before proceeding
to actual construction on any river in Nevada, shall be informed as to
the extent of the present actual appropriation and beneficial use of
water by existing communities .
The legislature also authorized
451.

Id. at 1322.
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the state engineer to prepare a list of appropriations from the claims
required of all users.
Nevada's efforts failed to completely satisfy federal officials. Soon
after construction of the Newlands Project, the United States initiated
adjudications to protect water users in the Project from upstream diversions on the Truckee and Carson rivers. This litigation culminated
in the Orr Ditch Decree,5' issued by a federal court in 1944. While the
water rights of the Pyramid Lake Indian Tribe were also at issue in this
litigation, the United States more actively protected its own interest in
the project than the fishing needs of the tribe. 5'
b. Arizona Adjudications
By the early 1880s, Anglo settlers in the Phoenix Basin relied on
Salt River water for irrigation but with chronic summer shortages. In
1903 the Water Storage Conference Committee formed the Salt River
Valley Water Users Association to provide funding and an organization
structure required under the provisions of the 1902 Reclamation Act. 5'
Soon thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior approved construction of
Roosevelt Dam project at the Tonto Basin site on the Salt River. As
construction began in 1904, the Association worked out differences
among its members, or shareholders. When that proved impossible,
57
the Association filed a legal action, Hurley v. Abbott,"
at the urging of
the Department of the Interior. The United States government intervened in the case.
Settled in 1910, the decision became known as the Kent Decree in
recognition of the presiding judge, Edward H. Kent 9 The Kent Decree
still governs water management in the Salt and Verde River systems of
Arizona today.
The Department of the Interior completed the Roosevelt Dam in
1909 and many people considered the Salt River Project a huge success. The government again failed to fully consider Indian interests
during the construction of the Project and the allocation of its water.
For example, only 1300 class A irrigation acres were allocated to the
displaced Fort McDowell Indians under the Project.'

454. United States v. Orr Water Dist. Co., No. A-3-LDG (D. Nev. 1944).
455. SeeNevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
456. SMITH, supra note 167, at 38-39.
457. Hurley v. Abbott, 259 F.Supp. 669 (D. Ariz. 1966).
458. Id. at 670.
459. See id.at 669 (referring to the decree entered on Mar. 1, 1910, commonly
known as the "Kent Decree").
460. James Q. Jacobs, Water Politics and the History of the Fort McDowell Indian Community (1999), at http://www.jcjacobs.net/southwest/fort mcdowell.html.
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c. Washington Adjudications
The reclamation experience in Washington took a slightly different
track. Learning from its experiences in Arizona and Nevada, the Reclamation Service in 1904 struck a deal with the Washington legislature,
which desperately wanted to capture the federal development opportunity available under the 1902 Act. The state legislature in 1905
passed what is still the law:
Whenever the secretary of the interior of the United States ... shall
notify the commissioner of public lands of this state that . . . the
United States intends to make examinations or surveys for the utilization of certain specified waters, the waters so described shall not
thereafter be subject to appropriation under any law of this state for a
period of one year... .461
By simply notifying the state of its intent to build a project, the Reclamation Service could freeze all appropriations in a watershed. The
Reclamation Service readily extended the time for the examinations.
After filing its intent, the Reclamation Service gained control over all
the basin's unappropriated water for Project development. For example, the Reclamation Service performed its own survey of the Yakima
watershed where "paper" claims to water completely precluded development. Reclamation calculated the necessary amount of water to operate the planned Yakima Basin Project. The Service then negotiated a
deal with the residents of the Yakima Basin. If the existing users in the
basin agreed to limit themselves to an aggregate amount of diversions,
which left 2000 cubic feet per second in the Yakima River in September, the Secretary of the Interior would build the Yakima Project.
In an unprecedented flood of community boosterism, coercion,
and appeals to the common good, the citizens of the Yakima basin obtained promises from the existing appropriators to limit their claims
and let the project proceed. These limiting agreements, secured in
1905 through 1911, continue in force and are now, nearly 100 years
later, being reaffirmed in the Acquavella adjudication" as binding limits on the signatories' water rights.
E. SUMMARY
Post-1900 adjudications arose from reasons closely tied to the climate and economic needs of the states. In the Great Plains region,
states struggled to determine whether eastern or western water law and
institutions would prevail. Adjudications served as a tool for recognizing existing riparian property rights, while introducing prior appropriation principles for the future. In the more arid West, the appro§ 90.40.030 (West 2004).
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priation doctrine was comparatively well-established, but adjudications
were necessary to secure the federal funding needed to realize the major benefit of the appropriation doctrine: the transport of water to distant places. To a lesser extent, adjudications helped to facilitate urban
growth, integrate surface and groundwater rights, and generate official
lists of water rights, thereby making water management more efficient.
By mid-century, western states had come a long way in developing
methods for adjudicating their water. None of these basic approaches,
however, contemplated the adjudication of federal reserved water
rights. Those rights would be strongly asserted later in the twentieth
century and cast a long shadow over state water rights and pending
general stream adjudications.
IV. THE POST-WORLD WAR II WEST
During the post-World War II era, states and localities expanded
their duties and accepted some of the functions, usually with federal
grant assistance, the federal government performed during the depression and the war. This trend toward decentralization to state and localities reversed slightly in the 1960s. According to federalism scholar
Daniel J. Elazar, the 1960s were a period of "concentrated cooperation," with "[i] ncreased federal activity in a number of fields ... coupled with an intensification of the debate over 'states rights' on one
hand and widespread acknowledgment of intergovernmental collaboration on the other." 3
The public land, Indian, and water policies of the post-World War
II era manifested increased federal activity. Federal-state relations in
these policy areas must be understood in the context of the significant
demographic changes that characterized these times.
A. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS

World War II brought population and economic growth to the
American West. Population in the seventeen western states was slightly
over 14 million in 1940. ' By 1950, the region grew by 30 percent, to
20.1 million." These increases were particularly apparent in coastal
states where major defense plants were found; California, Oregon, and
Arizona grew over 50 percent, while Nevada and Washington grew by
approximately 40 percent.46

463. Elazar, supra note 203, at 21. Elazar refers to the New Deal and World War II
as a period of "crisis-oriented centralism" and in contrast, the post-World War II era is
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Perhaps the 1940s was the most significant decade because it sealed
the urban destiny of the West. At the beginning of the decade, western
population was evenly distributed between urban and rural areas. Only
four states had greater than 50 percent of their population living in
cities and towns." By the end of the 1940s, eight other states' charac'
ter shifted from predominately rural to predominantly urban. One
sociologist observed, "It was only at the conclusion of World War II that
the West began to acquire an urban and industrial base. The West's
economy and population, which had expanded but changed relatively
little in essential character for more than 100 years, now began to alter
at an increasing rate."'
In human terms, these demographic changes were at first accompanied by waves of Americans securing jobs at defense plants, military
bases, and support industries. Later in the decade, veterans returned
to western cities close to their stations. Many solders and sailors raised
on farms opted for urban areas upon their return home, in pursuit of
the greater employment, educational, and romantic opportunities.
The end of World War II did not stop the flow of federal dollars
that supported the military bases and defense contracts. The Cold
War, Korean War, and later, the Vietnam conflict continued the flow of
cash to the West."'" Other benefits of western living became more apparent to American companies and their workers. With improvements
in telephone communication and travel technology, and the advent of
computer technology, the benefits of the information age made western cities much more accessible. The comparatively less concentrated
population of the West made it more desirable to companies and retirees, as did lower rents and mortgages. Advances in air conditioning
technology made the West even more livable. By 1965, air conditioning opened the metropolitan areas of the Southwest to unstoppable
growth. Finally, the spectacular western outdoors with its wide open
spaces drew people who yearned for more leisure time. The region
also drew thousands of tourists, once wartime gasoline rationing
ended. Thus, the trail westward attracted all comers. These trends
drew Americans to live in the West: industry, finance, electronic media,
petroleum, and the weather.
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Two Wests emerged from World War II, economically speaking.'
One West focused on service industries, tourism, and high-technology
growth, while the other still depended on the use and extraction of
natural resources. Both stimulated the continued growth of metropolitan areas. Timber, agriculture, and mining (hard rock and oil) continued to boom after World War II right up until the 1970s, when a
collapse occurred that lasted through the next decade. 4n
By 1970, with a population of 34.8 million, the West accounted for
17 percent of the United States population, 83 percent of western residents lived in urban areas. 47 ' Los Angeles, the largest western city, had
nearly two million residents in 1950, but by 1970 the city sprawled and
became home to an additional 800,000 persons, reaching a total population of 2.8 million.4 7' The expanding boundaries of western cities
illustrated this phenomenal urban growth. From 1950 to 1990, "San
Antonio added 264 square miles to its municipal boundaries, Houston
380, Phoenix 402, and Oklahoma City 557. " "47 Developments in public
land, Indian, and water policy occurred in the context of these demographic shifts.
B. PUBLIC LAND POLICY
Before the World War, federal public lands outside the national
parks and monuments were typically utilized by the traditional parties:
loggers in forest lands, miners locating and developing a claim, and
ranchers with grazing allotments in both the national forests and on
the unreserved public domain. Because the natural bounty was so vast
and the western population so small, these lands easily accommodated
modest numbers of hunters and fishermen. Since the 1930s both the
Forest Service and the Grazing Service, then a bureau within the Department of the Interior, assumed a more active role in preventing the
misuse of these resources, but these measures were undertaken to save
the logging and grazing industries from themselves, and promote the
general public interest in healthy lands. For this reason, minimal conflict between user groups existed. While multiple-use had been in the
lexicon of federal land managers for decades, single use of the then-

471. In a recent book, economist Thomas Michael Power examined the current
economic trends of the American West and concludes that the West is less reliant today
on extractable industries than in past years.
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472. See O'Connor, supra note 67, at 460-65.
LANDSCAPES AND FAILED ECONOMiEs: THE SEARCH FOR A VALUE OF PLACE

473.

HisToRicAL STATISTICS, supra note 60, at 22.

474.
475.

See O'Connor, supra note 67, at 554.
Id.

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 8

abundant public lands was the predominant practice. 6 Only after
World War II did federal land managers began to face resource conflicts in which all of the competing parties could not be accommodated.
These resource conflicts developed as a result of the growing national interest in outdoor recreation and the efforts of a small group of
resource preservationists who fought development, as it might cause
the destruction of pristine resources. As some commentators noted,
"By the end of the Second World War, expanding population combined with rising disposable income, longer paid vacations, retirement
programs, and increased mobility ushered in an era of mass recreation."' 7 This recreating public wanted automobile access to developed
campsites, trailheads, and lakeside docks. The Forest Service and the
National Park Service scrambled to meet this growing demand and, in
turn, to engender support from this emerging political force. In 1958
Congress authorized the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission. ' Chaired by Lawrence Rockefeller, this commission undertook a study of the demand for, versus the availability of recreational
resources through the year 2000."
The Forest Service, in particular, was hard-pressed to juggle the
competing interests of the new recreating public, the National Park
Service's bold initiatives to control prime forest lands, and the growing
suspicions of the Forest Service's traditional resource constituency,
which wondered about the agency's predilections. The timber industry
fundamentally changed after World War II, maturing from a series of
logging companies to a more complex wood products industry with
greater interest in long-term profitability, revegetation technologies,
and the permanent availability of public timber lands to fill the growing demands of the industry. The Forest Service faced another challenge in trying to meet the demands of this evolving constituency.
Two instances prompted the public to question the federal agencies' commitment to their propounded public land management philosophy. These suspicions fueled the resentment of traditional commodity users against unwelcome interference by agencies and the public. During the "great land grab" of 1946 to 1947, western stockmen
pushed legislation that allowed them to acquire fee interest in the grazing allotments they held under the Taylor Grazing Act."' Under a similar proposal, grazing land administered by the Forest Service would
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also be transferred to the federal Grazing Service for similar disposition to the permittees"'
Other stockmen's proposals included automatic grazing permit renewal if a permittee pledged livestock as security for a loan (a frequent
occurrence), and a measure that granted permittees tide to any improvements they made on the land. These proposals, roundly criticized by author Bernard DeVoto in his regular Harper's Magazine column, "From the Easy Chair," ultimately failed."
Then, a decade later, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed to build
a major dam on Utah's Green River."' The dam would have flooded a
scenic canyon area within Dinosaur National Monument in Utah.4
The proposal led to the Echo Park controversy. While Congress defeated the measure in 1956, it provoked serious doubts within the
emerging conservation community. That community wondered if valued public lands could be entrusted for the long term to the federal
land management agencies. '
While the Forest Service had an administrative program in place
since 1929 to protect primitive areas, areas considered safe from harm
8
The danger
in the 1920s and 1930s suddenly became endangered."
stemmed from their rising commercial value. Rising land prices, road
system expansion, and technological advances in mineral extraction
and harvest made them extremely attractive. Thus, " [t] he Forest Service was under tremendous pressure from industry not to 'lock the resources up."' 7 Fearing that the agencies planned to serve up pristine
lands to traditional commodity groups, some conservation groups
sought permanent congressional protection for these areas. In this
climate, conservation groups introduced the first wilderness bill in
Congress in 1956."
Internal disarray and interagency conflict also hampered federal
public land management during the post-War period. The Grazing
Service within the Interior Department sought to increase grazing fees
before the war, but Democratic Senator Patrick McCarran.. from Nevada obtained the Department's commitment not to increase fees until
congressional hearings could be held. Surrounded by the "scattered
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remnants of the states' rights factions of the West,"' 9 McCarran successfully stalled the proposal until 1947. Public land historian E.
Louise Peffer notes that McCarran was the "most belligerent fighter in
the seven-year war of attrition which he waged ...
By the end of World War II, the Grazing Service's proposal to hike
its fees was caught between McCarran's wrath and that of congressional
committees, which bemoaned how little grazing revenue the Grazing
Service collected. By 1946, Congress gutted the Grazing Service's
budget.' In that same year, the Secretary of the Interior abolished the
Grazing Service and the General Land Office (GLO), combining their
functions into the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). As two public
land historians indicated, "[t]he effect of the reorganization was to
grant authority over most of the federal lands and all of the federal
mineral estate to an uneasy collection of Grazing Service range managers and political hacks and the GLO's Washington-based clerks, bookkeepers, and paper shufflers. 9 3 With the Interior Department's bureaus weakened in this fashion, western stockmen maintained the
status quo on their allotments.
While the Grazing Service withered away in the late 1940s, its much
stronger sister agency, the National Park Service, represented a constant thorn in the side of the Forest Service. The National Park Service
attempted to portray itself as the premier federal agency for providing
recreational opportunities to the public. To perpetuate that perception, the National Park Service stepped up its long-term practice of
raiding the public land resources of the Forest Service. Between 1902
and 1960, the National Park Service obtained almost five million acres
of forestland in seventy separate transactions with the Forest Service. '
In the 1960s, the critics of the federal land agencies became
louder. Their tone echoed the civil rights and anti-war rhetoric of the
decade. Those concerned about more recreational opportunities on
federal lands and preserving pristine areas increasingly looked to Congress, rather than the agencies, for help. In 1964, Congress established
the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 9 ' which allowed the purchase
of additional lands by federal agencies and assistance to state and local
parks systems. This legislation resulted in a modest reversal of the
long-term public land disposition trend that started almost two centuries before.
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In 1964 Congress also passed the Public Land Sale Act, "'which facilitated the disposal of modest amounts of land for community residential and agricultural purposes. The Classification and Multiple Use
Act49 provided BLM and its predecessors with the first authority ever to
inventory the land and resources under its jurisdiction. The National
Park Service also utilized legal authority obtained in 1954498 to acquire
private lands with appropriated funds. As a result of purchases and
transfers from other agencies, the National Park Service added ten
natural areas, forty-seven historical areas, one recreation area, eleven
lakeshores and seashores, eight recreation reservoirs, three scenic rivers, and one cultural area during the decade. Perhaps most important,
Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964 and set aside some pristine lands as "instant wilderness," and authorized the study of an even
larger amount of federal land for potential wilderness area status.
This same year, Congressman Wayne Aspinall, a Democrat from
Colorado and chair of the House Interior Committee, secured funding
for a multi-year study of the public lands. The Public Land Law Review
Commission, ' with Aspinall as chair, studied public land tenure and
management for the next six years. When it filed its final report in
1970,"' the Commission recommended continuing disposition of federal lands. The Commission also pointed out the need for greater
congressional authority over public land management, measures to
help traditional commodity users, and a commitment to dominant use,
rather than multiple uses, of public lands.
While Aspinall's Commission undertook the most thorough and
systematic review ever of public land issues, the attention generated by
the emerging environmental movement overshadowed its report and
recommendations. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act5 2 in 1969. The Act established the Council on Environmental
Quality"' and set forth criteria for evaluating the environmental impacts of all major federal actions. Earth Day, celebrated throughout
the country in April 1970, marked the commencement of the first
broad environmental movement in the United States.
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C.INDIAN POLICY: THE TERMINATION PERIOD

The severe backlash against communism was an important current
in American politics during the late 1940s and 1950s. This charged
atmosphere had important ramifications for federal Indian policy. To
some, the communal lifestyles of American Indians evoked fears of
communism. The immediate solution seemed to be the elimination of
tribalism. Accordingly, conservative congressmen began to advocate
smaller budgets and bureaucracies, and some looked to the BIA as an
appropriate target."'
As a result, leading tribal advocates departed; John Collier resigned
as Commissioner of the BIA in 1945 and attorney and Indian legal
scholar Felix Cohen resigned from the Interior Department in 1948."°
In 1949 the Hoover Commission recommended "complete integration" of Indians into the American population."' In 1950, President
Truman appointed Dillon S. Myer, a Collier opponent, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. As historian Angie Debo writes,
He [Myer] had been in charge of the internment camps in which persons of Japanese ancestry were placed in the panic following Pearl
Harbor, and had carried out a vigorous, even coercive, policy of resetling them throughout the general population. Now he showed the
same intention of breaking up the Indian reservations and scattering
the people, and he used the same coercive methods.f7
The Bureau abandoned reform policies in favor of "withdrawal programming" and Myer dictated his policies without Indian input."'
Debo writes of one example, which provides a clue to the sentiment of
the times:
Reform administrators in the Indian Bureau resigned or were discharged. There were complaints of administrative actions here and
there favoring white appropriation of Indian property. Certainly this
happened to the Paiutes of the Pyramid Lake Reservation in Nevada,
where white trespassers were using their grazing lands. The Indians
took their case to court and won. Their superintendent supported
their rights, and Myer moved him to another reservation at the demand of the trespassers' counsel, Senator Pat McCarran. Then the
trespassers remained, and the Indians could not dislodge them.! a
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When Dwight Eisenhower became President in 1952, the prevailing
philosophy, which advocated terminating federal assistance to tribes
and a returning to assimilationist policies, gained even more support.
Eisenhower appointed Glenn Emmons, who was a banker, not an In5
Emmons embraced termination
dian affairs expert, to head the
5 BIA.
'
policy."
his
of
"keynote
as the
By 1953, Congress officially adopted termination in House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 108:
"

[Ilt is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the
same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as
are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their
status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights
and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship." 2
Within days of this resolution, Congress passed a law based on HCR
108; Public Law 280 authorized five states to enforce their criminal and
civil laws on Indian reservations."' Other states were free to accept the
same authority. Even though Eisenhower recommended that states
obtain tribal consent before acting, he signed Public Law 280 without
this condition."4
This "new" federal policy of termination, which denied political
power and federal protection to Indian tribes, marked a reversion to
old attitudes of assimilation and resentment toward federal subsidies to
help impoverished tribes. Under this policy, progress only occurred
through removing the supervision responsibilities of the federal government, with all of its attendant costs. Even amid the backdrop of
abject failure of allotment policy and its failed attempts to assimilate
the Indian tribes, Congress proceeded nonetheless to adopt the termination policy." '
HCR 108 only expressed congressional policy; it was not law. Congress passed several individual acts to implement the termination policy. One study by lawyers Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Biggs of the
legislation passed between 1955 and 1970 posited the results of termination: escalating losses of Indian land to non-Indian ownership (at
least 1,362,155 acres) and displacement of Native Americans (at least
11,466 individuals)."' These authors identified exacerbating elements
supranote 63, at 601.
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of the termination plans. Termination policy resulted in fundamental
changes in land ownership patterns, an end to the trust relationship,
imposed state legislative jurisdiction and state judicial authority, an
end to all exemptions from state taxing authority, and a discontinuation of all special federal programs to tribes and individual tribal
members. According to Wilkinson and Biggs, these factors destroyed
tribal sovereignty."
Ultimately, through termination tribes also lost their natural resources. Termination acts generally took reservation lands and tribal
funds out of the federal trusteeship. The government sold the land or
paid modest compensation, and distributed the funds directly to tribes
or tribal members."'
Two tribes, the Menominee in Wisconsin and the Klamath in Oregon, lived on proceeds from valuable stands of timber."' After termination, the sawmill on the Menominee lands subsidized most reservation services that the federal government paid for previously. This
burden turned a profit center into a failing business. The Klamath
Tribe lost ownership of their timber stands." The effects of the federal
government's termination policy became painfully obvious to tribes
like these.
D.WATER POLICY AND SHIFrlNG FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

In the years after World War II, many of the tensions between the
federal government and the states over water law and policy came to
the forefront. The friction had started with the Progressive Conservation Era and continued well into the twentieth century. Varied reasons
for the federal-state conflict existed, but fall into three categories: (1)
continued expansion of federal water management activities, (2) federal actions taken in disregard of state regulation and control, and (3)
federal interference with state-recognized property rights.'
In addition to these state-federal tensions, growing interstate conflicts along
major river systems contributed to the uncertainty that burdened water
rights during this period.
1. Continued Expansion of the Federal Government's Role
Congress originally possessed unbridled control over the vast lands
the nation acquired from France, Mexico, and Great Britain before the
Civil War. Congress gradually ceded land and authority to states, terri517.
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tories, and individuals through a series of enactments during the last
half of the nineteenth century. In the area of water, Congress relinquished paramount control over water resources to westerners by enacting the General Mining Act of 186622 and the Desert Land Sales Act
of 1877."'
As previously discussed, this laissez-faire approach shifted dramatically during the Theodore Roosevelt administration, prompting the
withdrawal of many federal lands for forests and other specified purposes and the struggle to maintain federal control over promising hydropower sites on major rivers. Congress passed the Federal Power
Acte" in 1920, which allowed the federal government to control the
licensing of private power projects on navigable rivers. The concept of
multiple use natural resource management encouraged the development of the "308 Reports" 25 that provided Congress with information
on how to develop river basins comprehensively.
Many of the projects originally conceived in the 308 Reports were
realized during the Depression. These undertakings provided work for
thousands of people during the lean years of the 1930s. These projects
also changed forever the economies and ecologies of large regions of
the country. They included Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River,
completed in 1940; Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, finished in
1935; Wilson Dam (part of the Tennessee Valley Authority), completed
in 1924; Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, completed in
1941; and the Bonneville Dam, completed in 1938.
Although World War II interrupted this bold engineering mandate, it renewed itself with vigor after the war. For instance, the PickSloan Plan, authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1944, " set into motion the construction of five other major dams and related channel
improvements on the Missouri River. The St. Lawrence Seaway underwent extensive navigation improvements. In retrospect, of the
$16.3 billion spent by Congress on water and power projects between
1824 and 1955, Congress spent 88 percent of that money between 1930
and 1955. "
By the 1950s, westerners were somewhat taken aback at the scope
of activities undertaken by the national government. As one commentator recalled, the federal government became
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actively engaged in extensive reclamation work, power development,
transmission and sale of power, flood control, navigation improve-

ment, river basin planning, pollution control, and even municipal
and industrial water supply. With each federal increase in control

there was inevitably a decrease in state control and a consequent
strain on federal-state relations. 8
Many of the agencies seemed to lose sight of the original purposes of
their work: "They occasionally [became] so absorbed in the thrill of
building bigger and better dams that they want[ed] to build and manage for the sake of the project rather than for the interest of those to
be served thereby.""' The federal role in water policy received increasing scrutiny. The second Hoover Commission documented the number of overlapping agencies with no unified mission, inventoried twelve
federal agencies with responsibilities for flood control, nine involved in
irrigation, seven with responsibilities for navigation improvement, nine
agencies involved in pollution control, ten interested in watershed development, fifteen involved in hydropower, and thirteen involved in
water supply issues." °
2. Federal Disregard of State Regulation and Control
In several areas, Congress utilized its constitutional powers to authorize federal agency actions that disregarded or preempted state
regulation and authority. The federal navigation power and servitude
provided the basis for this activity.
As early as 1899, the United States Supreme Court prevented the
private development of a dam at Elephant Butte on the Rio Grande in
New Mexico because the obstruction on a non-navigable portion of the
river would effect downstream navigation."' Decades later, Congress
justified the building of Hoover Dan on the Colorado River as an exercise of the federal navigation power, and the Supreme Court rebuffed Arizona's attempt to require the dam and accompanying water
rights be permitted under state law.53
The United States Supreme Court also rejected the attempt of
Oklahoma to enjoin federal construction of a dam and reservoir on
the Red River. The United States intended for the dam to facilitate
navigation on the Arkansas and Mississippi Rivers, and provide flood
control and power production. Oklahoma had a land use plan for that
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portion of the state and complained that federal activities would inundate 100,000 acres of land, displace 8,000 people, destroy productive
farmland, prevent oil and gas development, reduce tax values, and distribute the hydropower only in Texas. Still, the Supreme Court based
its decision on the dam's propensity to improve navigation on the Arkansas and Mississippi rivers."'
In a similar vein, President Roosevelt vetoed the original Republican River compact among Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas. He cited
possible interference with the federal navigation power and the federal
power to develop irrigation." ' Congress used the navigation power to
justify other large basin projects, such as some of the TVA dams and
tributary projects on the Missouri River under the 1944 Flood Control
Act, even though these improvements only tangentially related to actual navigation. As one commentator surmised, "These multi-purpose
dam projects, by encompassing reclamation, flood control, power generation, and recreational interests, necessarily cut across many areas of
state control and state law, with the resultant federal-state conflict. "5 '
The Federal Power Act of 1920 and the regulatory activities of the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) became a special point of contention between the federal government and the states. The United States
Supreme Court recognized the federal navigation power as sufficient
justification for the sweeping authority granted to the FPC under the
Power Act." While always controversial, the FPC outraged western officials further still with a series of decisions between 1946 and 1955.
In FirstIowa Hydro-electric Cooperative v. FederalPower Commission,"' an
electric cooperative sought to build a dam on Iowa's Cedar River, a
navigable waterway. Iowa denied the applicant a permit because the
project diverted water into another basin, a transfer that violated Iowa
policy. The Supreme Court upheld the FPC's authority to license the
project over state opposition, because the project furthered the federal
objective of comprehensive development of natural resources."
The FPC again ignored state authority in 1954, when it licensed
two tall dams in conflict with state law that established a Columbia
River sanctuary and prohibited dams over twenty-five feet in height on
tributaries in order to protect anadromous fish. The City of Tacoma
on the Cowlitz River, a navigable waterway entirely within the state,
proposed dams much higher than any previously built structures, 500
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and 240 feet respectively. " The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the FPC's decision." The United States Supreme Court declined to review the case. 541
The Supreme Court directly considered similar state fishery concerns a year later in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, the well-known
"Pelton Dam" case.54 A private power company sought to build a dam
across Oregon's Deschutes River, a non-navigable river that served as
an important breeding area for salmon and steelhead. The state objected based on the dam's interference with the migration of the anadromous fish.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
the FPC's license, over the state's objection, holding that "[i]f the dams
will destroy the fish industry of the river, we are powerless to prevent
it." 43 The court did not justify the FPC's authority over the project
based on the federal navigation clause, but still found that the commission had jurisdiction, based on the fact that one end of the dam rested
on an Indian reservation held in trust by the United States, and the
other end rested on a site previously reserved by the United States as a
hydropower site. The decision immediately alarmed westerners because it suggested that federal lands of all types had paramount water
rights overriding state-recognized water rights.
3. Federal Disregard of State-Recognized Property Rights
Increased activity along western waterways, coupled with the more
frequent exercise of the federal navigation power to construct dams
and other projects, raised concerns of many western water users about
the security of their water rights. One commentator noted that "the
recent malignant expansion of federal power [has come] at the expense of state prerogatives and private appropriation and riparian
Many of the western states successfully nurtured the prior
rights."'
appropriation doctrine and resisted efforts by the federal government
to claim ownership of unappropriated water on non-navigable streams.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court allayed their fears when
it largely ignored the United States' efforts to claim such rights in Wyoming v. Colorad 5 in 1922. Later, in California-OregonPower Company v.
Beaver Portland Cement Company, Justice George Sutherland indicated
"[w]hat we hold is that following the act of 1877 [Desert Land Sales
539. See Washington Dep't of Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 (9th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
540. Id. at 398.
541. Washington Dep't Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
542. Fed. Power Comm'n v, Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
543. Washington Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 398.
544. Martz, supra note 529, at 631.
545. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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Act], if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public
domain became publicijuris,subject to the plenary control of the desOnce again, in the Supreme Court's 1945 deciignated states .... .
sion in Nebraska v. Wyoming, Justice William 0. Douglas rejected federal
claims to title of unappropriated western water by calling the argument
"largely academic."" 7
While private rights and state regulation seemed more secure on
non-navigable waterways, the reverse was true for navigable rivers. In
1945 the Supreme Court held that property owners were not entitled
to compensation when the navigational servitude encumbered land
below the high water mark, due to the construction of dams.' " While
holding that the specific state statute required compensation for private property loss due to reclamation projects, the Court suggested that
the Constitution might not require such compensation." 9
The Federal Power Act also had consequences for property ownership in the West. Regarding the FPC, one western water law attorney
argued,
[i]n the accomplishment of its important mission... the Commission
has ridden rough shod over state laws and policies on water resource
development and has not only taken private rights for public projects
without compensation, but may even have authorized private licensees to take the velocity and flow of streams and the economic value
of dam sites for private power use without compensation. It has extended its jurisdiction to streams that are not navigable in fact and to
projects that have no measurable effect upon navigation.w
Western congressional representatives, some of whom had firsthand experiences with federal agency activities in the West, undertook
a series of legislative initiatives to curtail federal power. The most controversial of these was the Barrett Bill, introduced in 1956. ' The Bill
required federal agencies to conform to state law and obtain necessary
state permits; however, Congress introduced and modified this Bill
several times but never passed it.

546. Id. at 163-64. This sentence "is used to argue that the case recognized state
ownership, or at least control, of all nonnavigable waters. And indeed, taken out of
context and isolated from the issues, that is not a totally unreasonable assertion. But
the controversy in Beaver Portland Cement involved only private parties, none of whom
claimed a federal right other than their patents." Eva Hanna Morreale, Federal-State
Conflicts Over Western Water-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L.
REv. 423, 436-37 (1966).
547. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945).
548. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1945).
549. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 754-55 (1950).
550. Martz, supra note 529, at 637.

551.
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In the ensuing decade, Congress introduced and debated fifty such
"settlement bills," but passed none. In 1961, law professor Frank Trelease calmly reviewed these upheavals and concluded: "[t] he American
federation of states is a fairly good compromise for achieving the
greatest freedom for states to deal with local problems while at the
same time reserving to the federal government power to accomplish
national objectives.""'
4. Increased Interstate Competition Over Major Rivers
Beginning in the 1920s, many of the southwestern states pioneered
the use of the interstate compact as a means to resolve disagreements
over interstate streams. While these agreements did much to resolve
tensions, they typically took many years to negotiate and litigation frequently preceded, accompanied, or followed. While the participating
parties signed the Colorado River Compact in 1922, Arizona did not
ratify it until 1944. In the interim, on two occasions Arizona unsuccessfully sought to relitigate the issues before the United States Supreme
Court."' In 1952, Arizona sued California for a third time, seeking to
divide the waters of the lower basin. The lawsuit led to a decision generally in Arizona's favor in 1963."'
Similarly, in the Rio Grande basin, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Texas began negotiating a compact in 1923. A temporary, status quo
agreement was in place from 1929 to 1934 when Texas sued New Mexico in the United States Supreme Court and claimed that the construction of El Vado Dam in New Mexico on the Chama River interfered
with Texas' water entitlement below Elephant Butte Dam. At the urging of the federal government, the states returned to the negotiating
table and concluded the Rio Grande Compact in 1938. Texas sued
New Mexico when that state began falling behind in its deliveries to
Texas in 1940. The Court dismissed that case in 1957 when the Court
recognized the United States' sovereign immunity and the federal government refused to join the litigation.'' Texas and New Mexico sued
Colorado in 1966, accusing that state of failing to make the deliveries
called for by the compact."' The states agreed to postpone that case
pending negotiation. 7
Disagreements over the Pecos River, another shared waterway between Texas and New Mexico, led to threats of litigation as early as
552.

Frank J. Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 Burr. L. REv. 399,

425 (1961).

553. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S.
558 (1936).
554. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963).
555. Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991, 991 (1957) (per curiam).
556. Texas v. Colorado, 389 U.S. 1000 (1967).
557. Texas v. Colorado, 391 U.S. 901, 901 (1968).
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1924. Negotiations, however, produced an interim agreement in 1935
and a formal compact in 1948."' Texas sued New Mexico when that
state proposed the construction of the Brantley Reservoir in 1974."
Some of these interstate disputes, such as the Arizona v. Californialitigation over the Colorado River, might be seen as colossal forms of general stream adjudications.
Along other western rivers, interstate tensions motivated the states
to attempt to write compacts, but did not cause actual litigation. While
South Dakota and Wyoming agreed in 1948 on a compact for the
Cheyenne River, Congress rejected it because of its possible impact on
Indian tribes. Between 1925 and 1966, the northwestern states of
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, sometimes joined by Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada, attempted to write a compact concerning the
Columbia River." All or some of those states rejected compacts proposed in 1955, 1961, and 1963." The states abandoned the effort in
1966. Similarly, states proposed a compact for the Missouri River basin
in 1952, and then again in 1953. However, the basin states did not
adopt that compact.
While none of these interstate disputes was directly responsible for
a state initiating a general stream adjudication, the ongoing troubles
over interstate waters no doubt contributed to a climate that supported
such proceedings. As early as Kansas v. Colorado in 1907,6 the United
States Supreme Court signaled that it would weigh the relative existing
uses of water in each of the litigating states. State engineers and attorneys general understood that their position would improve if they
showed the extent of actual use of water along a contested interstate
stream, evidenced by a judicial decree in a general stream adjudication.
Elwood Mead and Morris Bien, joined by Oregon State Engineer
John H. Lewis, were so disturbed by the potential of interstate conflicts
they suggested to the National Irrigation Congress the application of
Wyoming's administrative water right determinations to interstate conflicts. They proposed the creation of a federal administrative agency
with the authority to determine the water rights of interstate streams,
when the states along those streams had not previously adjudicated
their rights."' 3 Such a federal solution to this problem was not well re-

558. G. EMLEN HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE
PECOS RIVER 45 (2002).
See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 126 (1987).
HARVEy R. DOERKSEN, STATE OF WASHINGTON WATER RESEARCH CTR.,
RIVER INTERSTATE COMPACT, POLmTCS OF NEGOTIATION 23-24, 168 (1972).
561. Id. at91, 122-27, 137-50.
562. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 86-87 (1907).
559.
560.

563.
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JAMES R. KLUGER, TURNING ON WATER WITH A SHOVEL: THE CAREER OF ELWOOD

36 (1992).
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ceived in the West. Rather it provided further impetus for states to
determine or adjudicate their own water rights.
E. SUMMARY
If one can regard natural resource management authority as a triptych in which states, the federal government, and tribal powers each
comprise a scene, one image clearly dominated the post-World War II
era. The federal government seized the strongest role in western resource management during this period.
By contrast, the Indian tribes' authority progressively faded. Federal movements, such as assimilation and termination, thwarted tribal
power by the diminishment of Indian land ownership and tribal sovereignty, thereby erasing tribal participation in natural resource matters.
State power also dwindled, not so much because of state passivity,
but because federal strength grew unabated. Congress undertook bold
new initiatives that served to enhance federal agency power. Federal
reclamation projects consistently prevailed over state conservation and
management efforts.
States used the interstate compact negotiations most vividly to reassert primacy over their natural resources. These succeeded for the
most part, despite lengthy time lines and occasional outbreaks of litigation. Prompted in part by these successes, states began to commence
with general stream adjudications. As the era closed, a new kind of
state mobilization began. That mobilization culminated with the enactment of the McCarran Amendment.
V.PASSAGE OF THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT
After World War II, western states, while still asserting state primacy
in water allocation, began to fear that federal reserved rights would
interfere with the water rights of junior appropriators based on state
law. Federal sovereign immunity prevented the reserved rights of federal agencies and Indian tribes from involvement in state general
The United States compounded the problem
stream adjudications.'
by often claiming its water rights as paramount and superior to other
water users. 65 In claiming these superior rights, rather than eminent
564. For example, when Arizona sought an adjudication before the United States
Supreme Court among basin states of Colorado River water rights in 1936, the Court
dismissed the case because the federal government claimed sovereign immunity. Without determining the extent of federal navigation rights to the river, the Court could
not establish rights to water impounded above Hoover Dam. Arizona v. California, 298
U.S. 558, 571-72 (1936).
565. Federal courts appeared open to such arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 786 (S.D. Cal.
1950) (discussing the "paramount" rights claimed by the federal government related to
the power to regulate navigation). The so-called "tidelands litigation" also revealed the
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domain power, the federal government avoided the requirement to
pay damages to junior appropriators. Federal reserved water rights
created an unknown "wild card" for western states, which prevented
them from planning for the future management of their waters.
Western states, under the leadership of Patrick McCarran, adamantly opposed the Department of Justice's staunch federal supremacy
position regarding western water rights. In 1952, this United States
Senator from Nevada successfully achieved passage of the McCarran
Amendment," which waived federal sovereign immunity and provided
the United States' consent to be joined in general stream adjudications. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment indicated a
congressional willingness to tolerate diverse state proceedings. This
waiver, however, was valid only for judicial adjudications and not for
adjudication procedures undertaken exclusively by administrative
agencies. This waiver made modem general stream adjudications possible.
The passage of the McCarran Amendment did not clarify all the
uncertainties about quantifying federal water rights. Procedural issues
remained, such as what processes constituted a general stream adjudication and whether the amendment really waived immunity as to the
federal government's legal reliance on the threatening concept of "paramount" rights.
In these cases, the United States Supreme Court denied several coastal states, including California, of revenue from the valuable offshore oil leases in the marginal sea, the
three-mile zone seaward of the low-watermark. See United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 35-36 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950); and United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950).
566. The amendment was enacted as section 208(a)-(c) of the Department ofJustice
Appropriation Act. Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 945, 66 Stat. 560 (current version
at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000)). It reads as follows:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a
party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead
that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
order, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney General or his designated representative.
(c) Nothing in this section shall he construed as authorizing the joinder of
the United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any interstate stream.
Id. § 666(a)-(c). See generally David W. Edwards, Comment, McCarranAmendment: General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Problems, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 53 (1981).
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reserved rights of federal agencies. In Arizona v. California, the United
States Supreme Court issued a powerful enunciation of Indian reserved
rights. "' With this opinion a new set of legal questions arose that
threatened to undo the McCarran Amendment. Must tribes litigate
Indian reserved water right claims in federal court? Did the McCarran
Amendment waive sovereign immunity as to these rights so that a state
court might also adjudicate these rights? Many state decision makers
believed these questions could be answered by modern general stream
adjudications.
A. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE

The federal reserved water rights doctrine began with the controversy over the building of Elephant Butte Dam on the Rio Grande in
New Mexico. In the 1890s, private developers had sought to build a
dam on the river, but the United States opposed the project. In a case
reaching the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Company, the Court found that the federal government properly vetoed the project based on its land ownership along
the river. " The Court held that "a [s] tate cannot by its legislation
destroy the right of the United States, as owner of lands bordering on a
stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be
necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property.""9
The origins of the reserved right doctrine, in an Indian law context, began in a fishing controversy along Washington's Columbia
River soon after the turn of the twentieth century. Non-Indian fishermen utilized fish wheels to catch large amounts of salmon, and landowners denied the Yakima Indians access to customary fishing locations along the river. The United States sued on behalf of the Yakimas,
and the Supreme Court held in United States v. Winans that, pursuant to
their 1859 treaty with the United States, the Indians reserved their fish' With Justice McKenna speaking for the majoring and access rights. 70
ity, the Court held that "the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not
granted." 7
1. The Winters Doctrine

Many consider the case of Winters v. United States to be the Court's
first full expression of the federal reserved rights doctrine as it pertains

567.
568.
569.
570.
571.

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 710 (1899).
Id. at 703.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 377-78, 381 (1905).
Id. at381.
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to water."2 In the 1880s, settlers pressured the federal government to
open the vast Great Blackfeet Reservation, established in 1855 in the
Montana Territory for non-Indian homesteading and other economic
activities. Indeed, Congress eventually reduced the reservation by
17,500,000 acres and divided it into three individual reservations, Fort
Peck, Blackfeet, and Fort Belknap. The negotiations with the Gros
Ventre and Assiniboine tribes, which eventually occupied the Fort
Belknap Reservation, occurred at the Fort Belknap Agency in January
1887. After three days of negotiations in extremely cold weather, the
Indians agreed to reserve for themselves 600,000 acres, a small fraction
of their original holdings, in exchange for the federal government's
promise of homes, livestock, farm equipment, and other aid. Congress
ratified the agreement between the tribes and the United States on
May 1, 1888; while the agreement did not specifically mention water
rights, the text indicated that the reservation's purpose was to encourage the Indians to abandon their nomadic way of life and adopt agriculture as a "pastoral and [civilized] people."57 The newly drawn reservation boundaries of the Fort Belknap Reservation included the
middle of the Milk River as the northern boundary74
Settlers immediately flowed into the area, aided by the Great
Northern Railroad, newly completed in 1893."' Many settlers established farms and new communities, such as Havre, Harlem, and Chinook, upstream of the Fort Belknap Reservation and began using Milk
River water. However, the government delayed irrigation on the new
reservation. Finally in 1898, the reservation superintendent filed a
state notice of appropriation for a flow rate of 10,000 miners' inches
(250 cubic feet per second)Y"
In spring 1905, drought conditions, compounded by upstream diversions, created a difficult situation for Indians on the Fort Belknap
Reservation:
We have had no water in our ditch whatsoever. Our meadows are
now rapidly parched up. The Indians have planted large crops and a
great deal of grain. All this will be lost unless some radical action is
taken at once to make the settlers above the Reservation respect our

572.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). SeegenerallyJOlHNSHURTS,

INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: TIlE WNTERS DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL

CoNTEXT, 1880-1930s (2000) (providing a legal history of the Winters case and doctrine).
573. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
574. Shurts, supra note 572, at 19.
575. See ALBRO MARTIN, JAMES J. HILL AND THE OPENING OF THE NORTHWEST 396
(1976).
576. Norris Hundley, Jr., The "Winters" Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery
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rights. To the Indians it either means good crops this fall, or starvation this winter.57'
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs authorized legal action, and

the federal attorney for Montana sued in federal court for an injunction against twenty-one defendants, including two irrigation companies
and a cattle firm.
While the United States Attorney based his case both on prior appropriation and riparian principles, United States District Court Judge
William H. Hunt based his decision to issue an injunction on the rights
the Indians reserved when they signed the 1889 treaty. In Judge Hall's
judgment, when the Indians signed the treaty granting rights to the
United States, they reserved "the right to the use of the waters of Milk
River, at least to the extent reasonably necessary to irrigate their
lands." 78 After the settlers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel of that court upheld
the injunction in February 1906 and elaborated further on Judge
Hunt's reservation doctrine. The court stated "[w]e must presume
that the government and the Indians, in agreeing to the terms of the
treaty... knew that 'the soil could not be cultivated' without the use of
water to 'irrigate the same. ' '""a The court affirmed that the doctrine of
reserved rights existed against the United States and its grantees, as
well as against the state and its grantees. The Ninth Circuit apparently
determined that the United States reserved the water right, based upon
its previous sovereign ownership of the lands in question, and that the
tribes also reserved water rights, based upon their right of occupancy
of the land."'
In January 1908, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the issue in a decision written by Justice McKenna.' The Court
utilized the same basic reasoning set forth by Judge Hunt and the
Ninth Circuit, although the Court's opinion less clearly stated whether
the United States, tribes, or both "reserved" the necessary water for the
reservation. The Court held "[t]he power of the [g]overnment to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation [cannot be de-

577. Letter from William R. Logan, Superintendent, Fort Belknap Indian Agency, to
Francis E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Uune 3, 1905) (on file with authors).
578. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 749 (9th Cir. 1906) (describing the district
court holding). As historian Norris Hundley indicates, while Judge Hunt and later the
court of appeals refers to the 1888 agreement as a treaty, it did not have that stature
since Congress had abandoned the treaty-making system in 1871. See Hundley, supra
note 576, at 26.
579. Winters, 143 F. at 745.
580. Hundley, supra note 576, at 30.
581. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574, 578 (1908).
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nied] . .. [t]hat the government did reserve them we have decided,
and for a use which would be necessarily continued through years. "5 2
The Ninth Circuit again applied the reserved water rights doctrine
in a case also decided in 1908, Conrad Investment Company v. United
States." In this dispute, once again arising in Montana, the court held
that the Blackfeet Indians had a paramount right to water for irrigating
and for other useful purposes. 84 While the court specified the amount
of water for the tribe, it expressly indicated that the tribe could modify
the decree by application to a court as uses increased."' Thus, the
court emphasized the open-ended nature of the reserved rights doctrine, which signaled the great uncertainty of the doctrine for western
states and territories and their non-Indian citizens.
2. Post-WintersDecisions
In the years following the Supreme Court's Winters decision, the reserved rights doctrine developed haphazardly. While acknowledging
the "Montana cases," an Indian Bureau agent entered into a limitation
agreement with white settlers giving them 75 percent of the waters of
Ahtanum Creek to the detriment of the Yakima Tribe. " This strange
act, flatly contradictory to the spirit of Winters, caused future litigation
over the respective water rights in this area of central Washington.
In Arizona, the district court entered the Kent Decree in 1910 to apportion Salt River."? While the decree granted rights to Indian tribes
in the Phoenix area, the decree failed to mention the reserved water
right doctrine. In another Arizona case, the court held that the United
States did not possess reserved spring water that, if developed, provided no significant benefit to the Indian reservation.8 Similarly, the
Oregon Supreme Court held in 1917 that the 1855 treaty with the
Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla Indians contained no implied grant
of water rights to the Umatilla River for the benefit of the Indians. The
court awarded water only for actual beneficial uses."
In the 1920s, the reserved water right doctrine received indirect
support from the United States Attorney General, Harlan F. Stone,
582. Id. at 577 (internal citations omitted).
583. Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831-32, 835 (9th Cir. 1908).
584. Id. at 831.
585. Id. at 832.
586. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 329, 336 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957) (concluding that the United States as trustee for
Indian tribes was authorized to grant non-Indian landowners a right to use Indian
water but that right could not exceed landowners' actual needs at time of grant); In re
Water Rights in Ahtanum Creek, 245 P. 758, 760 (Wash. 1926).
587. Hurley v. Abbott, 259 F.Supp. 669, 669 (D. Ariz. 1966) (referring to the 1910
case commonly known as the Kent Decree).
588. United States v. Wrightman, 230 F. 277, 282-83 (D. Ariz. 1916).
589. Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 169 P. 121, 128 (Or. 1917).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

later a member of the United States Supreme Court, who ruled that
the Indians' right to water was an incident of occupancy, that is, a
"right to the hidden or latent resources of the land, such as minerals or
potential water power." 590 Also, during the 1930s, courts continued to
address the rights of Indians to some important western rivers. Arizona's federal court entered a consent decree in 1935, quantifying water rights along the Gila River system. Known as Globe Equity No. 59, the
decree quantified specific rights for the Gila River Indian Reservation,
with an immemorial date of priority, and the San Carlos Apache Tribe,
with a priority date of 1846."' The decree, however, made no mention
of the reserved water rights doctrine or the Winters decision."'
The question arose in Nevada as to whether reserved water rights
could exist for a reservation created by statute or executive order,
rather than by treaty or agreement between the United States and a
tribe. On two occasions, the federal district court refused to recognize
reserved water rights for the Paiute Tribe, distinguishing the Winters
decision by finding that the Indians were at war with the United States
when their reservation was created,"9 ' and later indicated, "this court is
not moved to give a decree destroying the rights of the white pioneers."" 4 On review, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a statute or executive order, as well as a treaty or agreement could
evidence an intention to reserve water. The court noted, "The intention had to be arrived at by taking account of circumstances, the situation and needs of the Indians and the purpose for which the lands had
been reserved." 9
3. Allotment Issues
What water rights, if any, followed an allotment of Indian land occupied the courts most frequently between 1908 and the 1950s. In
Skeem v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that non-Indian lessees of Indian allotments could utilize the Indians'
water rights as "neither the actual leasing of their lands under the authority to lease nor the surrender of possession to the lessees operated
to relinquish any water rights in the lands which they [the Indians] so
choose to retain." ' 6 Also, in United States v. Hibner, the court extended
590. Executive Order Indian Reservations-Leasing Act, 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 171, 178
(1924).
591. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. E-59-Globe, at 86 (D. Ariz.
1935) (commonly known as the Globe Equity Decree).
592. See id.
593. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158, 163 (D. Nev.
1935)
594. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 14 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D. Nev. 1936).
595. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1939).
596. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921).
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this same principle to the sale of Indian allotments within the Fort Hall
Reservation in Idaho.5"7 The court held that a purchaser of an Indian
allotment acquired the same water rights and priority date of the Indian allottee although the buyer must put the water to beneficial use
with reasonable diligence or risk abandonment.
These Indian allotment issues continued in the 1930s. In United
States v. Powers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the nonIndian assignees' water rights constituted a continuation of the Indian
allottees' rights. "' The Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to
deprive any allottee or patentee of his 'just and equal right" to the use
of the water. The United States Supreme Court sustained the decision
in 1939 and interpreted the Treaty of 1868 as implying water rights for
individual allottees for farming purposes."'
In a case involving Montana's Flathead Reservation, the Ninth Circuit also determined that an individual Indian had no water rights until the selection of an allotment, but after the allotment, the allottee
was entitled to a 'just and equal distribution" of the water.' The Montana Supreme Court also recognized the basis of the reserved water
rights doctrine. In a 1938 case arising on the Crow Indian Reservation,
the court held the United States reserved water for the use of the Indians; that a portion of the reserved water right was appurtenant to allottees' lands; and when allotments are sold or leased, a portion of the
reserved water right goes with the land unless a contrary intention appears."
B.ADJUDICATION OF FEDERAL AND TRIBAL RIGHTS BEFORE MCCARRAN
AMENDMENT

Prior to passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952, most western states did not contemplate the adjudication of federal or tribal reserved water rights. In states with large amounts of federal agency or
tribal land, the adjudications ultimately were inconclusive undertakings.0 ' The United States almost always succeeded in avoiding involvement in litigation by asserting sovereign immunity." Since the
United States served as trustee for most tribal land and water, these
tribal water rights also benefited from immunity.
597. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho 1928).
598. United States v. Powers, 94 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1938).
599. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939).
600. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1939).
601. Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co., 79 P.2d 667, 669 (Mont. 1938).
602. See, e.g., In re Water Rights in Ahtanum Creek, 245 P. 758 (Wash. 1926) (involving a state court adjudication of which United States was aware but did not participate).
603. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 610, 626, affd in part sub nom. City of
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 629 (1963) (dismissing suit against the United States
for lack ofjurisdiction).
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State or federal court proceedings progressed in locations not implicating federal or tribal lands and the court issued relatively stable
resulting decrees. Where disputes involved federal interests, the
United States sued other water users in state or federal court or consented to be joined in individual state or federal lawsuits. If the federal
government chose not to become involved in an adjudication, however, the litigation would likely not be final or meaningful. A persistent problem, particularly under both the Colorado and Wyoming adjudication models, was that no adjudication could truly be general if it
involved the federal government and the United States asserted sovereign immunity."
The federal government initiated suit or consented to be joined in
adjudications on several important western rivers resulting in decrees
such as Arizona's Globe Equity decree,"5 Nevada's OrrDitch decree," and
Washington's consent decree in the Yakima River basin," as well as the
foundational Winters v. United State?" case on the Milk River in Montana. Still, the large amount of federal and tribal land in the West,
comprising 50 percent of the land mass in seven states, set the stage for
continued conflict between federal agencies and the owners of statebased water rights.'
The ubiquitous presence of federal and tribal lands in the West,
many with potential federal reserved water rights, thus cast a shadow
on many private and state resource management decisions. Private
landholders and permittees of state lands might not appreciate that a
nearby federal parcel carried with it a potentially senior water right.
Even if private landholders and permittees appreciated this possibility,
they had no certain way of calculating the extent or priority of this
right. These individuals could not look to the courts for an answer
604. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 356, § 106, at 106.
605. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. E-59-Globe, at 86 (D. Ariz.
1935).
606. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113 (1983) (describing the history of
the Orr Ditch decree).
607. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 626 F.2d 95, 97
(9th Cir. 1980).
608. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
609. In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission described the impact of
federal landholdings upon western water:
Federal lands are the source of most of the water in the 11 coterminous western states, providing approximately 61 percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region. Most of this runoff comes from land withdrawn or reserved for specific purposes. Forest Service and National Park Service reservations contribute about 88 and 8 percent, respectively, of the runoff from
public lands and more than 59 percent of the total yield from all lands of
those states. Other public lands, such as the vast acreages administered by
the Bureau of Land Management, do not contribute much to the overall yield
of western streams, but are so situated that they influence water quality.
ONE THIRD OF THE NATiON'S LAND, supra note 9, at 141.
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either, since the United States could not be involuntarily brought into
state or federal court to participate in an adjudication of its water
rights.
Thus, many individuals formed the perception that unascertained
federal and tribal water rights clouded the value and utility of all other
water rights in the major watersheds of the West. Whether this perception was mostly truth or myth remains difficult to ascertain. In the
early 1950s, however, California altered its proposed California Water
Plan to avoid the need for an adjudication of the Sacramento River
basin." '° The Colorado Supreme Court stated "[o]ur situation with respect to water rights [where] priorities are decreed under state laws,
but any water rights of the United States in Colorado remain mysterious, largely unknown, uncatalogued and unrelated to decreed rights.
This creates an undesirable, impractical and chaotic situation.""' One
federal attorney described the concerns:
There is perhaps no topic in the field of state-federal relations which
raises the hackles of westerners more than the issue of the federal
government's acquisition of water rights. As a result of the size of the
United States' landholdings, in addition to its broad constitutional
authority, the states fear that the federal government will disrupt their
already over-appropriated systems for water allocation and usurp their
scarce supply."'
]
Senator Patrick McCarran argued "[h undreds of cases.. .have been
left 'hanging in the balance, because the federal government has adamantly blocked the path of justice' by not consenting to be sued in
Nothing in the official McCarran
water right adjudications.""

610. Vincent Ostrom, State Administration of Natural Resources in the West, 47 AM. POL.
Sc. Rav. 478, 479 n.2 (1953).
611. United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 458 P.2d 760, 765
(Colo. 1969). This language, coining more than fifteen years after the passage of the
McCarran Amendment, may not be an entirely accurate assessment of pre-McCarran
circumstances.
I am coming to believe that "the Feds" were right all along. In 1964, at the
height of the debates over the "Western Water Rights Settlements Acts," it was
pointed out that "not a single case of harm has been reported," that "for all of
the outcry... not one state, not one county, not one municipality, not one irrigation district, not one corporation, not one individual has come forward to
plead and prove that the United States . .. has destroyed any private right."
Twenty-two years after PeltonDam this is still true.
Frank J. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENY. L. J. 473, 491-92
(1977).
612. Sandra Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A Federal
Practitioner'sPoint of View, 19 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1323 (1988).
613. Catherine Anne Berry, The McCarran Water Rights Amendment of 1952: Policy Development, Interpretation, and Impact on Cross-Cultural Water Conflicts 134
(1993) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado) (on file with the University
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Amendment's legislative history, however, enumerated all these cases.
When the legislative history is examined, it is apparent that the difficulties in just one small adjudication provided the catalyst for the McCarran Amendment, and major southern California water controversies
that had litde to do with the stated purposes of the McCarran Amendment soon overshadowed this adjudication.
C.STATED AND BACKGROUND REASONS FOR THE MCCARRAN
AMENDMENT

The original, specific impetus for the McCarran Amendment was
the lack of progress in a small Nevada adjudication" 4 that continued to
distress one of the participating lawyers. Attorney J. D. Skeen represented the Ellison Ranch Company, which owned a large ranch in the
Quin River basin in northern Nevada. After the BIA purchased additional land and water rights on the Quin River in 1939, neighboring
water users sought to reopen a 1919 decree in order to resolve disputes
over water use. The United States objected to state court jurisdiction
and removed the case to federal court. The federal court held sovereign immunity precluded suit against the United States. To remedy
the situation, Skeen prepared the first draft of what became the
McCarran Amendment in 1949, written in broad universal terms, but
designed primarily to secure state court jurisdiction over the United
States in the Quin River adjudication. 1 '
Skeen then found a very receptive United States Senator in Nevada's Patrick McCarran."' Early in his career, McCarran represented
some litigants in the Orr Ditch litigation on the Truckee River and
strongly allied himself with the Italian-American irrigators, who homesteaded along the tributaries to Pyramid Lake, against the Indians of
the Pyramid Lake Reservation. McCarran's r~sum6 included service on
the Nevada Supreme Court where he authored several important water
law decisions.
McCarran's central belief in state authority over water resources
probably prompted his introduction of Skeen's bill. While on the
bench in 1924, McCarran stated, "[t]he theory that the [federal] government has control over all unappropriated waters, as laid down in
of Colorado) (quoting Press Release, Patrick McCarran July 6, 1952). Berry is the
source for much of the following history on the origins of the McCarran Amendment.
614.
Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 192 P. 262 (Nev. 1920), appeal dismissed, 286 P. 120, 125 (Nev. 1930).
615. In part, the United States sought to avoid state courtjurisdiction over an appeal
from a state engineer's decision favorable to the federal government. United States v.
District Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1951).
616.
See generally MICHAEL J. YBARRA, WASHINGTON GONE CRAZY: SENATOR PAT
McCARRAN AND THE GREAT AMERICAN COMMUNIST HUNT (2004) (providing a recent
biography on McCarran who was nationally known as a Red-scare, anti-Communist
crusader).
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the [Orr] decree, is, in my opinion, and it is shared by others, revolutionary."' 7 Fellow Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, also active in securing passage of the McCarran Amendment, shared McCarran's sentiments. Watkins had been a farmer, an attorney for a water users' association, ajudge, and a newspaper editor. He had been involved in the
Provo River adjudication where the United States would not agree to
state court jurisdiction."' Watkins "believed that reclamation was the
'foundation stone' of the modern economic structure in the western
,
69
United States and, indeed, the entire country ....
Senator McCarran introduced the original version of the McCarran
Amendment as Senate Bill 2305 on July 20, 1949.Y While much of the
original language eventually became law, Senate Bill 2305 varied in
one important respect from the final legislation: while waiving the
sovereign immunity of the United States, the 1949 version provided
that the United States had the right to remove to federal court an adjudication commenced in state court."'
Both the United States Departments of Justice and Interior opposed the proposed legislation. The Justice Department, in particular,
noted that Congress had the ability to waive sovereign immunity on a
case-by-case basis and that the proposal subjected the United States to
"a piecemeal adjudication of water rights, in turn resulting in a multiplicity of actions.""' The Interior Department suggested that the
waiver only extend to water rights established under state law by the
United States and specifically exclude any water rights held by the
United States on behalf of Indians. Senate Bill 2305 died in the Judiciary Committee at the end of the 81st Congress in 1950.
McCarran re-introduced his Bill in January 1951 as Senate Bill 18.
Congress assigned the Bill to the Judiciary Committee and thence to a
617. Berry, supra note 613, at 82.
618. See United States v. District Court, 238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951) (providing a
chronology of this litigation).
619. Berry, supra note 613, at 91.
620. Id. at 107.
621. The 1949 version read as follows:
That consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source or for the administration of such rights where it appears that the
United States is the owner or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, exchange, or otherwise and that the
United States is a necessary party to such suit: Provided, That the United
States shall have the right of removal to the Federal court of any such suit to
which it is a party: Provided further, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit. Summons or other process in
any such suit shall be serviced upon the Attorney General or his designated
representative.
Id. at 107 n.48 (quoting S.2305, 81" Cong. (1949)).
622. Id. at 108 (quoting Letter from P. Ford, Ass't U.S. Attorney General, to P.
McCarran (Feb. 27, 1950)).
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subcommittee consisting of "McCarran, as chairman, Watkins, and
Warren Magnuson of Washington." "' The Judiciary Subcommittee held
hearings in April and August 1951 presided over by Watkins, the only
Senator present. Many representatives of western water resource organizations testified in support of the bill. In particular, Glen Saunders, a Colorado water attorney, argued that the bill did not go far
enough and Congress should eliminate the possibility of removal to
federal court."' No tribal representatives attended the hearings. William Veeder, then a Department of Justice attorney, was the sole witness against the bill. He argued that state law inadequately protected
the United States' interests and that the legislation resulted in prolific
litigation and "the forward progress of the West, for which we are all
fighting, would be impeded tremendously.'"...
During this period, the fate of McCarran's proposed legislation became fatefully intertwined with two major California water controversies. Neither of these controversies directly related to the purpose of
McCarran's Bill; but, once the controversies and the Bill became
slightly linked, McCarran received considerable support for his legislation from the large and powerful California delegation.
The earlier of the two controversies involved California's Central
Valley Project, a reclamation project originally commenced by the state
but taken over by the federal government during the hard times of the
1930s. The project diverted water from the Sacramento River delta
and transported it to the west side of the San Joaquin Valley. In turn,
water from the San Joaquin River was impounded at Friant Dam and
diverted into canals, thereby drying up the San Joaquin River for 60
miles downstream of the dam (an area near Fresno). While the United
States bought out many water users in the dewatered reach, some
landowners filed suit in state superior court in 1947 seeking to enjoin
the federal officials from storing water at Friant Dam. The United
States removed this litigation to federal court. Years later, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that this litigation constituted an essentially private action and not a comprehensive proceeding under the
McCarran Amendment. 62
The second, more controversial proceeding that assisted in the passage of the McCarran Amendment was the Santa Margarita water conflict near San Diego. In 1940 the Vail Company, an upstream riparian
user of the Santa Margarita River in San Diego County, and Rancho
623. Id. at 110.
624. Id. at 112.
625. Id. at lll.
626. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).Judge Lawrence K. Karlton recently
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the Bureau of Reclamation
liable under the Reclamation Act for damage done to the San Joaquin River fishery
due to the dewatering caused by Friant Dam. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson,
333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 925-26 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
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Margarita y Las Floras, a downstream riparian reached a stipulated
agreement. The judgment stipulated that Vail received almost onethird of the river's flow, the Rancho received almost two-thirds, and
four small landowners received very small amounts. 7
In 1941, the United States Navy purchased Rancho Margarita to establish Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base. At about the same time,
Fallbrook Public Utility District, a supplier of municipal and irrigation
water for valuable citrus and avocado crops, started using water in the
middle of the Santa Margarita watershed. Fallbrook based its claim on
appropriative rights, and Fallbrook argued that a reservoir upon the
river, if built with federal reclamation funds, would provide enough
water for all. Discussions between the United States and Fallbrook resulted in a preliminary agreement to build the reservoir for both Fallbrook and the Navy. William Veeder, the same Justice Department
attorney, objected to this agreement on the basis that the United States
already had water rights under the 1940 judgment. Thus, in January
1951, the Department ofJustice filed suit in federal court to adjudicate
its water rights on the Santa Margarita, naming as defendants hundreds of individuals in the vicinity. "'
While the United States had a strong legal position, as it advocated
the 1940 stipulated judgment, its suit to enforce the judgment was an
unmitigated public relations disaster. The public perceived the lawsuit
as a hindrance to economic growth. California officials, including
then-Governor Earl Warren and then-Senator Richard Nixon, denounced the suit. In "December 1951, Readers Digest ran a story condemning the lack of moral sensitivity in our Government which has put
into jeopardy thousands of our small landowners; their property,
homes, savings and their future."'"
Using a common form of pleading in riparian rights litigation, the
Justice Department alleged "paramount rights" to the Santa Margarita
based on the 1940 court judgment. Opponents immediately linked
this term with the concept of "paramount rights" in the tidelands litigation brought by the United States against California, Texas, and Louisiana. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court denied the
627. Berry, supra note 613, at 125.
628. United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D. Cal.
1951). The litigation has gone on for years. After one interim victory, one of the parties is reported to have said, "One more such victory for either of us and we will both
be in the poorhouse. Let's shake the lawyers and get in a room and make a decision,
one way or the other, on this matter." Carl G. Mueller, Jr., Comment, FederalOwnership
of Inland Waters: The Fallbrook Case, 31 TEX. L. REv. 404, 409 n.34 (1953). On October 4,
2004, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution which authorized
$60 million for groundwater-surface water conjunctive use facilities in the watershed.
H.R. 4389, 108th Cong. (2004). The Bush Administration opposes the legislation because of the uncertain affect the project would have on the water rights of the
Pechanga, Cahuilla, and Romona tribes, which are still pending in the adjudication.
629. Berry, supra note 613, at 127 (internal quotations omitted).
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states revenue from valuable offshore oil leases in the marginal sea, the
three-mile zone seaward of the low-water mark."' Thus, the public
viewed the Santa Margarita litigation as another front of an unrelenting federal campaign to diminish state responsibility over local natural
resources.
The Santa Margarita conflict helped the McCarran Amendment
secure a powerful alliance between Senator McCarran and Senator
William F. Knowland of California and other members of the California delegation because California also wanted state control of its water
resources. While Senate Bill 18 passed the Senate on June 21, 1952,
McCarran, who also served on the Joint Senate-House Committee on
Appropriations, saw the opportunity to include the language of his bill
as an amendment to the 1953 appropriations bill. Senator Knowland
further amended the appropriations bill to prohibit the Department of
Justice from spending funds for the water rights adjudication of the
Santa Margarita River. Senator Knowland's amendment apparently
created a powerful engine, linked in the legislators' mind with McCarran's proposal, which resulted in both houses rapidly approving both
provisions. While several executive agencies counseled President
Harry Truman to veto the appropriations bill due to these add-ons,
Truman reluctantly signed the legislation onJuly 9, 1952."'
Ironically, in September 1951, attorney J. D. Skeen reported to
Senator McCarran that the resolution of the problem of securing the
Justice Department's participation in the Quin River adjudication had
occurred. Although the issue that prompted the legislation had been
resolved, the proposed McCarran Amendment now had a life of its
own. California's Central Valley Project and Santa Margarita water
conflicts sufficiently enraged western politicians and led to the necessary mobilization to secure passage of the McCarran Amendment.
D.WHAT TYPE OF ADJUDICATION DID CONGRESS HAVE IN MIND?

Passage of the McCarran Amendment did not immediately resolve
all federal-state tensions over western water, but instead left state officials wondering how to proceed. Courts and lawyers were unsure how
to interpret the congressional waiver of immunity that applies "in any
suit... for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source ...."32 Would adjudication proceedings continue as
they had in the early 1900s, as illustrated in the following discussion of

630.

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23, 41 (1947); United States v. Louisi-

ana, 339 U.S. 699, 701, 706 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 709, 720
(1950).
631.

Berry, supra note 613, at 134.

632.

43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2000).
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cases in Oregon and Nevada, or would a substantial modification be
required in how states adjudicated water rights?
The United States Supreme Court's important Pacific Live Stock v.
Lewis decision, written by Justice Willis Van Devanter from Wyoming,
described the pre-McCarran Oregon adjudication system. "' A California corporation, which owned land along Oregon's Silvies River,
brought suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of Oregon's 1909 (amended in 1913) adjudication statute. In the process of
sustaining the adjudication statute against challenges of due process
and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Court described the features of this adjudication.
Under the Oregon statute, the three-member Oregon Water Board
(OWB) can begin an adjudication based upon a petition of a water
user. Notice is provided to all water users at every material step.
Claimants file their claims with the division superintendent, and then
the state engineer makes measurements and observations and prepares
a report. Claimants may contest the claim of any other claimant. Objectors receive a hearing before the OWB division superintendent
where they may introduce evidence and subpoena witnesses. Thereafter, the evidence, sworn statements of witnesses, and the engineer's
observations and measurements are submitted to the board. The
board makes findings of fact and a provisional order of determination.
The board transmits the evidence and provisional order of determination to the court. The court hears exceptions to the board's findings
or proposed order. The court may hear further evidence or the matter
may be resubmitted to the board for additional hearings. The court
enters a final order that may be appealed to the state supreme court.
At the conclusion of the adjudication, assuming adequate proof,
claimants received a certificate of water right. The United States Supreme Court upheld this statutory arrangement in its 1916 decision."
Two years later, in 1918, litigants challenged Nevada's adjudication
statute, substantially similar to Oregon's.1 5

Patrick McCarran, then

ChiefJustice of the Nevada Supreme Court, dissented in that case, and
the length and complexity of both majority and dissenting opinions
indicated the court's working knowledge of all aspects of the adjudication. The court sustained Nevada's statute over challenges that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court also held that the
state engineer exercised only quasi-judicial powers. Justice McCarran,
in his dissent, indicated his belief that the statute invaded the judiciary's province. "The district court assumes to take jurisdiction of this
matter after determination by a ministerial officer, and can only review
to ultimately affirm or modify that determination. In this it permits
633.
634.
635.

Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916).
Id. at 454-55.
See Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918).
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itself to be divested of original jurisdiction and assumes an appellate
jurisdiction forbidden by the Constitution.""u
During the 1951 hearings on the proposed McCarran Amendment,
several witnesses also described the adjudications in their states. Denver water attorney Glen Saunders provided a detailed description of
the Colorado system, which is much more a judicial process than Oregon's. The Colorado process was an ongoing adjudication that decreed all significant state law water rights. Courts also adjudicate new
water uses and add them to existing decrees.
The senators supporting the McCarran Amendment did go to
some lengths to ensure that one type of state litigation would not qualify for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. In particular, Senator
Warren Magnuson of Washington was concerned that some water users, frustrated with the federal reclamation program, might use the
waiver provided to frustrate progress on federal reclamation projects in
western states. In correspondence between the senators, McCarran
assured Magnuson that the bill was not meant to authorize such suits.
Federal courts faithfully refused to recognize a waiver of sovereign immunity in such instances.
We cannot know exactly what type of adjudication McCarran or
Congress intended when enacting the McCarran Amendment. McCarran and Watkins, who were primarily involved in the amendment, no
doubt knew of the many approaches used by western states in adjudicating water. Pacific Live Stock, Vineyard Land, and the testimony of Senate witnesses portrayed the adjudication processes underway when the
McCarran Amendment passed. Certainly, Oregon and Colorado represented polar opposites on the spectrum of approaches. Although
McCarran appeared to personally oppose an administrative adjudication like Oregon's, 7 he probably tolerated the diversity of state adjudications if his amendment restored control of water resources to the
western states.
Most other western senators were probably more interested in the
amendment as a way to prevent perceived federal over-reaching in
cases like Santa Margarita. Members of the House of Representatives
likely gave the matter little thought as the provision sped through that
chamber, without hearings, as part of an appropriations measure.
E. IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF McCARRAN AMENDMENT

The passage of the McCarran Amendment did not clarify all the
uncertainties about quantifying federal water rights. Procedural issues
remained, such as what processes constituted a general stream adjudi-

636.
637.

Id. at 186.
See id. at 175-85.
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cation and whether the amendment really waived immunity as to the
reserved rights of federal agencies.
The federal government continued to frustrate state efforts to adjudicate rights even after passage of the federal McCarran Amendment
in 1952. In several important conflicts, the United States routinely
asserted sovereign immunity. Examples included: United States v. United
States District Court,'" which challenged the administration of the Central Valley Project in California; a claim that the United States
breached its contract by delivering water from the Rio Grande Project
to a non-Project irrigation district;-," an appropriator's suit to prevent
the diversion of water to New Mexico's Bosque del Apache Wildlife
Refuge;' and Texas' effort to enforce provisions of the Rio Grande
Compact.64 1
The United States Attorney General ordered some of the federal
attorneys to withdraw from pending stream adjudications on the basis
that these were not comprehensive proceedings and did not afford
jurisdiction for the courts to adjudicate federal paramount rights:
Accordingly, the United States withdrew from Denver v. Northern Colorado Conservancy District [pending before the Colorado state court],
adjudicating the transwatershed diversion rights of Denver and the
Bureau of Reclamation, and from Rank v. Krug [pending before the
California federal district court], adjudicating the rights of the United
States and San Joaquin water users to the Central Valley Project water.
In the latter case nine years of testimony, at tremendous expense to
the litigants, has very probably been wasted by the refusal of the government to submit its claims to litigation in the Central Valley case.64'
Similarly, in Nevada, the commanding officer of the Hawthorne Naval
Reserve withdrew applications for drilling permits from the state of
4
Nevada, indicating that state approval was not necessary."
Despite the federal government's challenge to many state adjudicative proceedings, the McCarran Amendment laid the foundation for
modern general stream adjudications beginning in the 1970s.
F. ARIZONA V. CAUFORNIA AND THE REEMERGENCE OF FEDERAL RESERVED

RIGHTS
With the passage of the McCarran Amendment, western states
freely pursued different approaches to stream adjudications with the
638. United States v. United States District Court, 206 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1953).
639. Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425,
428 (5th Cir. 1954).
640. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Gatlin, 294 P.2d 628, 628-29 (N.M. 1956).
641. Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
642. Martz, supra note 529, at 644.
643. Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Nev. 1958).
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promise that the federal government could no longer assert sovereign
immunity. In reality, states had little incentive in the early 1950s to
undertake large-scale, basin-wide or statewide adjudications. State officials focused on the potential impact of large federal agency projects,
such as Camp Pendleton. States were less concerned with Indian water
rights since they were based on that largely forgotten, half-century old
Winters case-and, in any event, the tribes lacked the financial ability to
develop their water."
Western state officials were familiar with the judicially created federal reserved rights doctrine, but in reality this doctrine proved not to
be an obstacle in adjudications. For fifty years, officials recognized
federal Indian reserved water rights in the abstract but ignored them
on the land. Western illusions would soon be shattered.
The realities of western water fundamentally changed in 1963 with
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Calfornia.
In recognizing a congressional apportionment of the Colorado River
among basin states, the Court also examined the water rights of the
lower Colorado River Indian reservations. In its decision, the Court
reaffirmed the reserved rights doctrine of the Winters case but also extended the doctrine to include other federal reservations, such as wildlife refuges. The Court affirmed the special master's recognition of
reserved water rights for five Indian tribes along the river and also to
various national forests and monuments. Most importantly, the Supreme Court approved the standard of "practicable irrigable acreage,"
clarifying how Indian reserved rights might be quantified based on
how much reservation land could be successfully irrigated. The Court
also held that the Secretary of the Interior, as the river master, could
apportion and distribute Colorado River water among the users within
each state without regard to state permitting procedures.
The potential of large Indian reserved water right claims on all of
the West's major rivers sent shock waves through the region. The Supreme Court also extended the reserved rights doctrine to public lands
reserved for a particular governmental purpose, including national
parks and forests. Today if Congress creates a park, national forest,
wildlife refuge, military base, or other use of public land without explicitly addressing water, the reservation of land implies Congress' intention to reserve water sufficient to accomplish congressional purposes. As is the case with Indian water rights, the priority date for the
federal water right is the date Congress withdrew the public land from
the public domain or reserved the land for a particular purpose. The
water need not actually be put to use; but, when it is, the use has prior644. See generally DANIEL MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES,
FEDERAL WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER (1987) (discussing the federal government's failure to develop Indian water).
645. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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ity over intervening rights created under a state system of prior appropriation. As water law professor Frank Trelease commented, "the worst
fears of the westerners had come true; federal administrative control of
water... [had been] substituted for the appropriation system of...
[water] ... rights." '
VI. CONCLUSION
After Arizona v. California, Winters was no longer a dusty turn-of-the
century novelty but a powerful legal doctrine. With Arizona v. California came a new set of legal questions that threatened to undo the
McCarran Amendment. Must Indian reserved water right claims be
litigated in federal court? Did the McCarran Amendment waive sovereign immunity as to these rights so they might also be adjudicated in
state court? As explored in a forthcoming article, twenty more years of
costly and divisive litigation would be required before the United States
Supreme Court answered these questions. Western states soon faced a
mature and expanded reserved rights doctrine, prompting state officials to view modern adjudication proceedings as a means for finality.

646. Mark Basham, Note, In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 30 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 187,
193 (1990) (internal citations omitted).

